scholarly journals Inconstitucionalidad de la exclusión del derecho de voto del art. 13 inc. 2 y 3 de la Ley federal electoral de Alemania / Unconstitutionality of the exclusion of the right to vote in Article 13, sub-sections 2 and 3 of the Federal Electoral Law of Ger

2019 ◽  
pp. 123-163
Author(s):  
Gonzalo Dell'Orsi
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Bundesrepublik Deutschland ◽  
Universal Suffrage ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
National Constitution ◽  
The Right ◽  
Electoral Law ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

El Tribunal Constitucional Federal Alemán declaró la inconstitucionalidad del art. 13 inc. 2 y 3 de la ‘Ley Federal Electoral’, por considerar que dicha normativa vulneraba el derecho constitucional del voto universal, reglamentado en el artículo 38, inc. 1, primera oración de la ‘Ley fundamental para la República Federal Alemana’, y el principio de no discriminación por discapacidad, reglamentado en el artículo 3, inc. 3 segunda oración de este último cuerpo normativo.   The German Federal Constitutional Court declared the unconstitutionality of sections 13, sub-sections 2 and 3 of the Federal Electoral Law, on the grounds that such legislation violated the constitutional right to universal suffrage, regulated in section 38, sub-section 1, first sentence of the Germans National Constitution, and the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of disability, regulated in section 3, sub-section 3, second sentence of the Germans National Constitution   [1] En alemán Bundeswahlgesetz (BWahlG). [2] En alemán Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (GG).

Das PSPP-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts: Umfang der Übertragung von Souveränität und Überprüfung von Ermessensgebrauch

IG ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 220-226
Author(s):  
Achim-Rüdiger Börner
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The Public ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
National Constitution ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Eu

In its judgment of 5 May 2020, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has held that the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) of the European Central Bank (ECB), which started in 2015, and the relevant decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) of 11 December 2018, holding that the programme is compatible with European Union (EU) law, are ultra vires acts. Indeed, this decision is based on a French understanding of discretion which has previously been adopted in the European Treaties and according to which discretion is controlled only for undue, illegal influence. Today, the Treaties have adopted a review of discretion under the aspects of suitability, necessity, and appropriateness. Moreover, criticism at the decision of the FCC neglects that the accession to and the membership in the EU have to observe the thresholds of the respective national constitution, as its violation is not and may not be expected by the Union or any other Member State. Ultra vires acts of the Union, which remain uncorrected by the Union itself, are subject to disapproval and rejection by the constitutional court of any Member State.

scholarly journals Some Kind of Right

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (S1) ◽  
pp. 40-44
Author(s):  
Jud Mathews
Keyword(s):  
German Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Right ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
Specific Reason

AbstractThe Right to Be Forgotten II crystallizes one lesson from Europe’s rights revolution: persons should be able to call on some kind of right to protect their important interests whenever those interests are threatened under the law. Which rights instrument should be deployed, and by what court, become secondary concerns. The decision doubtless involves some self-aggrandizement by the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC), which asserts for itself a new role in protecting European fundamental rights, but it is no criticism of the Right to Be Forgotten II to say that it advances the GFCC’s role in European governance, so long as the decision also makes sense in the context of the European and German law. I argue that it does, for a specific reason. The Right to Be Forgotten II represents a sensible approach to managing the complex pluralism of the legal environment in which Germany and other EU member states find themselves.

scholarly journals The Federal Constitutional Court Rules for a Bright Future of Constitutional Pluralism

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (S1) ◽  
pp. 27-30
Author(s):  
Matej Avbelj
Keyword(s):  
Legal Order ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Bright Future ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Right ◽  
Constitutional Pluralism ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

AbstractThe ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the Right to be forgotten II case is an example of constitutional pluralism in action. It demonstrates how a pluralist-minded court can elevate itself from and above the constitutional confines of its own legal order. By integrating the material standards of another legal order in its own review of constitutionality a national constitutional court contributes directly to the strengthening of the fundamental rights of individuals against the national authorities within the overall system of European legal order.

scholarly journals Resolución del Tribunal Constitucional Federal alemán sobre el art. 217 del Código penal alemán

2020 ◽  
pp. 213-225
Author(s):  
Gonzalo Dell'Orsi
Keyword(s):  
Assisted Suicide ◽  
Personality Development ◽  
Criminal Code ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Right ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

Con fecha 26 de febrero de 2020, la cámara segunda del Tribunal Constitucional Federal Alemán declaró la inconstitucionalidad y nulidad del art. 217 del Código Penal Alemán. Este artículo, en su redacción luego de ser modificado en el año 2015, amenaza en su primer inciso con pena privativa de la libertad a quien promoviera de manera comercial la asistencia al suicidio. En dicha oportunidad, los Magistrados entendieron y decidieron de manera conjunta sobre seis recursos de inconstitucionalidad, y concluyeron en que la norma atacada vulnera los siguientes derechos constitucionales: el derecho al libre desarrollo de la personalidad (art. 2. inc. 1 en conexión con el art. 1 inc. 1); el derecho a la libertad (art. 2 inc. 2 segunda oración en conexión con el art. 104 inc. 1); y el derecho a la libertad de trabajo (art. 12 inc. 1).   On 26 February 2020, the second chamber of the German Federal Constitutional Court declared section 217 of the German Criminal Code unconstitutional and void. This section, as amended in 2015, threatens in its first paragraph with prisión sentence for anyone who commercially promotes assisted suicide. On that occasion, the judges considered and decided jointly on six constitutional appeals, and concluded that the rule attacked violated the following constitutional rights: the right to free personality development (article 2, paragraph 1, in connection with article 1, paragraph 1); the right to liberty (article 2, paragraph 2, second sentence in reference to article 104, paragraph 1); and the right to freedom of work (article 12, paragraph 1).

Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) Case

2021 ◽  
Vol 192 ◽  
pp. 451-511
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

451Economics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Fiscal sovereignty — Public debt — Monetary policy — Economic policy — European Union — Asset purchase programme — Quantitative easing — Central banks — European Central Bank — European System of Central Banks — BundesbankTreaties — Treaty-making powers — Constitutional limitations on treaty-making powers — Transfers of powers by States to intergovernmental and other transnational authorities — Whether compatible with constitutional prerogatives of national parliament — Overall budgetary responsibility — Basic Law of GermanyInternational organizations — European Union — Powers — Member States as masters of the treaties — Principle of conferral — Whether Union having competence to determine or extend its own powers — Principle of subsidiarity — Court of Justice of the European UnionRelationship of international law and municipal law — European Union law — Interpretation — Application — Judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Weiss — Principle of proportionality — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether German Federal Constitutional Court having absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Compatibility with Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany — Openness of German Basic Law to European integration — Whether purchase programme ultra vires — Whether ultra vires acts applicable in Germany — Whether having binding effect in relation to German constitutional organsJurisdiction — European Union institutions — Whether jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court extending to Court of Justice of the European Union and European Central Bank — Whether acts of EU institutions subject to national constitutional review — Ultra vires review — Review of core identity of national constitution — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — The law of Germany

Core of State Sovereignty and Boundaries of European Union's Identity in the Lissabon – Urteil

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-418
Author(s):  
Elisabetta Lanza
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
State Sovereignty ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Treaty Of Lisbon ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Eu

In the 2009 judgment dealing with the Treaty of Lisbon, the German Federal Constitutional Court urges to modify a domestic statute in order to guarantee the rights of the internal rule-making power and also provides a reasoning on the role of the European Union (EU) as an international organization, the principle of sovereignty and the relations between European Institutions and Bodies and the EU Member States. According to the German Court the Treaty of Lisbon does not transform the European Union into a Federal State (Staatsverband), but into a Confederation of States (Staatenverbund). In spite of the 1993 landmark judgment, the so-called “Maastricht Urteil”, the Court steps forward and focuses also the subject-matters that necessarily have to pertain to the Member States jurisdiction, the so-called “domain reserve”. The German Federal Constitutional Court decision on the Lisbon Treaty arouses the reflection on the core of State sovereignty and on the boundaries of the EU legal system and focuses on the force of the right to vote of every citizen, the basis of democracy.Furthermore, the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court highlights the well-known issue of the EU's identity and the balancing between EU democracy and Member State sovereignty. In the light of the German Constitutional Court statements, the present work aims to understand which could be actually the EU's identity and how could be approached “democratic deficit” of the EU.

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