Prices Contract Model and Information Sharing Platform of Closed-loop Supply Chain Based on Recyclers’ Competition

2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (23) ◽  
pp. 7719-7723
Author(s):  
He Chao ◽  
Zhuang Yu-Liang ◽  
Feng Chun-Hua
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain

scholarly journals The value of information sharing in a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yanting Huang ◽  
Benrong Zheng ◽  
Zongjun Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Value Of Information ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Model C

This paper considers a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer and a collector in which the retailer possesses private demand information and determines whether to share his private information with other chain members. Specifically, we develop four information sharing models, namely no information sharing (Model C-R), the retailer sharing information with the manufacturer (Model C-R-M), the retailer revealing information to the collector (Model C-R-C), and the retailer disclosing information to both the manufacturer and the collector (Model C-R-T). We adopt the Stackelberg game to acquire the equilibrium strategies and examine the value of information sharing on chain members’ decisions. We find that, chain members will set the largest wholesale price, retail prices of direct and indirect channels when the retailer only shares information with the manufacturer and the highest return rate can be obtained in the case of the retailer only revealing information to the collector. We can also find that, information sharing is profitable to the manufacturer and the collector, while is detrimental to the retailer. The manufacturer, the collector and the retailer can reach the largest profits in Model C-R-T, Model C-R-C and Model C-R-M, respectively.

scholarly journals Information Sharing in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Asymmetric Demand Forecasts

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pan Zhang ◽  
Zhongkai Xiong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Collection Efficiency ◽  
Demand Forecast ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Make To Order ◽  
Make To Stock ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Demand Forecasts

This paper studies the problem of sharing demand forecast information in a closed-loop supply chain with the manufacturer collecting and remanufacturing. We investigate two scenarios: the “make-to-order” scenario, in which the manufacturer schedules production based on the realized demand, and the “make-to-stock” scenario, in which the manufacturer schedules production before the demand is known. For each scenario, we find that it is possible for the retailer to share his forecast without incentives when the collection efficiency of the manufacturer is high. When the efficiency is moderate, information sharing can be realized by a bargaining mechanism, and when the efficiency is low, non-information sharing is a unique equilibrium. Moreover, the possibility of information sharing in the make-to-stock scenario is higher than that in the make-to-order scenario. In addition, we analyze the impact of demand forecasts’ characteristics on the value of information sharing in both scenarios.

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