scholarly journals Information Sharing in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Asymmetric Demand Forecasts

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pan Zhang ◽  
Zhongkai Xiong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Collection Efficiency ◽  
Demand Forecast ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Make To Order ◽  
Make To Stock ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Demand Forecasts

This paper studies the problem of sharing demand forecast information in a closed-loop supply chain with the manufacturer collecting and remanufacturing. We investigate two scenarios: the “make-to-order” scenario, in which the manufacturer schedules production based on the realized demand, and the “make-to-stock” scenario, in which the manufacturer schedules production before the demand is known. For each scenario, we find that it is possible for the retailer to share his forecast without incentives when the collection efficiency of the manufacturer is high. When the efficiency is moderate, information sharing can be realized by a bargaining mechanism, and when the efficiency is low, non-information sharing is a unique equilibrium. Moreover, the possibility of information sharing in the make-to-stock scenario is higher than that in the make-to-order scenario. In addition, we analyze the impact of demand forecasts’ characteristics on the value of information sharing in both scenarios.

scholarly journals Government incentive mechanism of closed-loop supply chain based on information asymmetry

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qunli Wu ◽  
Xinxin Xu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Collection Efficiency ◽  
Scientific Policy ◽  
Recovery Efficiency ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Waste Products ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

Aimed at the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) composed of the manufacturer, the retailer and consumers in the waste products market, this paper studies how the government handles the adverse selection problem on the hidden recovery costs of the retailer and deals with the moral hazard problem on the level of retailer's hidden efforts. A government incentive regulation aiming at maximizing social welfare has been established based on the incentive theory in this paper. A list of contracts with transfer payments is presented to reveal the retailer's collection efficiency and motivate the retailer to make the optimal investment. Further, the impact of related factors on the recovery cost and social welfare level according to the numerical simulation are verified. The results show that under the government regulation, only by reporting the true recovery technology type information to the government can the retailer maximizes the profit. In addition, the retailer with high recovery efficiency can obtain both retained profit and additional information rent. Finally, as the retailer makes efforts to improve the recovery level, it also increases investment cost, which affects the enthusiasm of enhancing the retailer's recovery efficiency. Therefore, the government should not blindly pursue the improvement of recycling efficiency regardless of the cost, but should pay more attention to the control of recycling equipment and technology cost.The results facilitate scientific policy development, and provide a reference for promoting closed-loop supply chain operations.

scholarly journals Coordination of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Dual-Source Supply and Low-Carbon Concern

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Li ◽  
Shuying Gong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Collection Efficiency ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Source ◽  
The Impact

Considering the impact of dual-source supply and low-carbon manufacturing on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system, this article constructs a CLSC model with two competitive dominant upstream suppliers and one following a downstream (re-)manufacturer, then coordinates supply chain through cost-sharing contract. Based on the industrial case in the area of power battery, we analyze the optimal strategies under competition, cooperation, and coordination structures separately and then investigate the influences of emission reduction effort and collection efficiency on supply chain performance. The results reveal that collection of used products can positively affect the (re-)manufacturer’s profit but has opposite impact on the new component supplier. Besides, recycling is beneficial to both low-carbon consumers’ utility and social welfare, but hurts the total profit of CLSC because of the high investment cost of collection. Therefore, the paper designs a cost-sharing contract, which is of applicability and efficiency for both economic and environmental development. Furthermore, it can also increase the profit of CLSC up to cooperation case and improve each member’s profit, eliminating double marginal effect and achieving supply chain coordination.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Competing Retailers under Government Reward-Penalty Mechanism and Asymmetric Information

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiao-qing Zhang ◽  
Xi-gang Yuan ◽  
Da-lin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Recovery Rate ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Weee Recycling ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Decentralized Model

In manufacturer-led closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with two competing retailers, the retailer-1 recycles WEEE whose fixed recycling cost is asymmetric information. Using dynamics game theory and principal-agent theory, three dynamic game models are built including (1) benchmark model without reward-penalty mechanism (RPM); (2) decentralized model with carbon emission RPM; (3) decentralized model with carbon emission RPM and recovery rate RPM. This paper discusses the influence of RPM and retailers competition on the CLSC and members benefits. The results show that (1) the carbon emission RPM increases retail price, but decreases the WEEE recycling motivation usually. On the contrary, the recovery rate RPM guides WEEE recycling and lowers the retail price effectively. (2) In any case, the retailer-1’s profit is higher than that of the retailer-2; apparently it suggests that the retailer recycling WEEE gains competitive advantages. Furthermore, both the recovery rate RPM and retailers competition are beneficial to improve the competitive advantage. The relationship between two retailers’ retail price is affected by many complicated factors. (3) The WEEE buyback price and WEEE recovery rate with high fixed recycling cost (H-type) are always higher than that of low fixed recycling cost (L-type), respectively, which means that the H-type fixed recycling cost has scale advantages; the greater the reward-penalty intensity and the fiercer the competition, the more obvious the scale advantages under certain condition. (4) The retailers’ competition can not only guide WEEE recycling but also improve retailers’ profits. Meanwhile, the impact of competition on the manufacturer is related to RPM, but the fierce competition decreases the manufacturer’s profit.

scholarly journals Analysis of the Value of Information and Coordination in a Dyadic Closed Loop Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (20) ◽  
pp. 8398
Author(s):  
Juan Pedro Sepúlveda-Rojas ◽  
Rodrigo Ternero
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Value Of Information ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Local Optimization ◽  
Supply Chain Performance ◽  
Optimization Approach ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Impact

Purpose: This article analyzes the value of information and coordination in a closed loop supply chain (CLSC) and discusses the benefits of a global or local optimization approach and the impact of uncertainty. Methodology: A theoretical dyadic closed loop supply chain is analyzed where the manufacturer re-manufactures products returned by customers, producing “as good as new products” for the retailer. Twelve coordination scenarios were analyzed. For the definition of these scenarios, a framework based on two criteria was proposed: value of information and perimeter of decision making. Findings: Information on returns leads to lower costs than information on demand. In the presence of complete or partial coordination between the actors in the supply chain, it is preferable to have low product return rates. However, if we are in the complete absence of coordination, high rates of return are more convenient as they function as a buffer against uncertainties. The perimeter of decision making (global or local optimization) does not significantly improve the supply chain performance in relation to its costs. Only the exchange of information improves its performance. Therefore, companies should make efforts to exchange information, first, on their lot sizes, then on their returns and finally, on the customer demand. Originality: The novelty of our work relies on an analysis of the closed loop supply chain performance with the simultaneous presence of information, coordination, and uncertainty.

scholarly journals A Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Trade-In Strategy under Retail Competition

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yanting Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Retail Competition ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Intense Competition ◽  
Direct Benefits ◽  
Strategy Model ◽  
Product Sales ◽  
The Impact

This paper investigates a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer and two competing retailers who collect used products through trade-in strategy. Three remanufacturing models with trade-in strategy have been developed: (1) the manufacturer implements trade-in strategy (Model M), (2) single retailer collects used products through trade-in strategy (Model SR), and (3) two retailers undertake trade-in activities (Model TR). We analyze the impact of trade-in strategy on equilibrium decisions and chain members’ profits when retailing is competitive. We show that, as for the manufacturer, he prefers the case where trade-in is implemented by himself due to the direct benefits from remanufacturing, and the case of single retailer implementing trade-in strategy is the most unfavorable for the environment. We also show that, if the net value of a used product is sufficiently large, the retailer only selling products benefits from the case of the manufacturer implementing trade-in strategy because the manufacturer can coordinate both the forward and reverse flows, and Model M dominates Model TR for the retailer who undertakes both product sales and trade-in strategy. Moreover, a larger trade-in rebate can be achieved when two retailers simultaneously conduct trade-in strategy due to the intense competition between two retailers.

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions of a Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Uncertain Demand of Indirect Channel

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Gao ◽  
Xiong Wang ◽  
Qiuling Yang ◽  
Qin Zhong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Uncertain Demand ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
The Impact

The dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer under uncertain demand of an indirect channel is constructed. In this paper, we establish three pricing models under decentralized decision making, namely, the Nash game between the manufacturer and the retailer, the manufacturer-Stackelberg game, and the retailer-Stackelberg game, to investigate pricing decisions of the CLSC in which the manufacturer uses the direct channel and indirect channel to sell products and entrusts the retailer to collect the used products. We numerically analyze the impact of customer acceptance of the direct channel (θ) on pricing decisions and excepted profits of the CLSC. The results show that when the variableθchanges in a certain range, the wholesale price, retail price, and expected profits of the retailer all decrease whenθincreases, while the direct online sales price and manufacturer’s expected profits in the retailer-Stackelberg game all increase whenθincreases. However, the optimal recycling transfer price and optimal acquisition price of used product are unaffected byθ.

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