scholarly journals Price and delivery-time competition of perishable products: Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium

2008 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 843-859 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaolin Xu ◽  
◽  
Xiaoqiang Cai ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (07) ◽  
pp. 2050043
Author(s):  
MAXIM BICHUCH ◽  
KE CHEN

In a crisis, when faced with insolvency, banks can sell stock in a dilutive offering in the stock market and borrow money in order to raise funds. We propose a simple model to find the maximum amount of new funds the banks can raise in these ways. To do this, we incorporate market confidence of the bank together with market confidence of all the other banks in the system into the overnight borrowing rate. Additionally, for a given cash shortfall, we find the optimal mix of borrowing and stock selling strategy. We show the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium point for all these problems. Finally, using this model we investigate if banks have become safer since the crisis. We calibrate this model with market data and conduct an empirical study to assess safety of the financial system before, during after the last financial crisis.


Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Vassili N. Kolokoltsov

Quantum games and mean-field games (MFG) represent two important new branches of game theory. In a recent paper the author developed quantum MFGs merging these two branches. These quantum MFGs were based on the theory of continuous quantum observations and filtering of diffusive type. In the present paper we develop the analogous quantum MFG theory based on continuous quantum observations and filtering of counting type. However, proving existence and uniqueness of the solutions for resulting limiting forward-backward system based on jump-type processes on manifolds seems to be more complicated than for diffusions. In this paper we only prove that if a solution exists, then it gives an ϵ-Nash equilibrium for the corresponding N-player quantum game. The existence of solutions is suggested as an interesting open problem.


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (01) ◽  
pp. 1350005 ◽  
Author(s):  
SHUMEI HIRAI ◽  
FERENC SZIDAROVSZKY

This paper considers contests in which the efforts of the players determine the value of the prize. Players may have different valuations of the prize and different abilities to convert expenditures to productive efforts. In addition, players may face different financial constraints. This paper presents a proof for the existence and uniqueness of a pure Nash equilibrium in asymmetric contests with endogenous prizes.


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