Artificial Minds and Conscious Machines

2011 ◽  
pp. 254-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pentti O Haikonen

The following fundamental issues of artificial minds and conscious machines are considered here: representation and symbolic processing of information with meaning and significance in the human sense; the perception process; a neural cognitive architecture; system reactions and emotions; consciousness in the machine; and artificial minds as a content-level phenomenon. Solutions are proposed for related problems, and a cognitive machine is outlined. An artificial mind within this machine that eventually controls the machine is seen to arise via learning and experience as higher level content is constructed.

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Pettit

Abstract Michael Tomasello explains the human sense of obligation by the role it plays in negotiating practices of acting jointly and the commitments they underwrite. He draws in his work on two models of joint action, one from Michael Bratman, the other from Margaret Gilbert. But Bratman's makes the explanation too difficult to succeed, and Gilbert's makes it too easy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Fields ◽  
James F. Glazebrook

Abstract Gilead et al. propose an ontology of abstract representations based on folk-psychological conceptions of cognitive architecture. There is, however, no evidence that the experience of cognition reveals the architecture of cognition. Scale-free architectural models propose that cognition has the same computational architecture from sub-cellular to whole-organism scales. This scale-free architecture supports representations with diverse functions and levels of abstraction.


2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 288-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph W. Houpt ◽  
Andrew Heathcote ◽  
Ami Eidels

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaimie Krems ◽  
Keelah Williams ◽  
Laureon Allison Watson ◽  
Douglas Kenrick ◽  
Athena Aktipis

Friendships provide material benefits, bolster health, and may help solve adaptive challenges. However, a recurrent obstacle to sustaining those friendships—and thus enjoying many friendship-mediated fitness benefits—is interference from other people. Friendship jealousy may be well-designed for helping both men and women meet the recurrent, adaptive challenge of retaining friends in the face of such third-party interference. Although we thus expect several sex similarities in the general cognitive architecture of friendship jealousy (e.g., it is attuned to friend value), there are also sex differences in friendship structures and historical functions, which might influence the inputs of friendship jealousy (e.g., the value of any one friendship). If so, we should also expect some sex differences in friendship jealousy. Findings from a reanalysis of previously-published data and a new experiment, including both U.S. student and adult community participants (N = 993), provide initial support for three predicted sex differences: women (versus men) report greater friendship jealousy at the prospective loss of best friends to others, men (versus women) report greater friendship jealousy at the prospective loss of acquaintances to others, and men’s (but not women’s) friendship jealousy is enhanced in the context of intergroup contests.


1985 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alvin Despain ◽  
Randy Katz ◽  
Yale Patt ◽  
David L. Patterson
Keyword(s):  

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