Is Information Ethics Culture-Relative?

2009 ◽  
pp. 154-167
Author(s):  
Philip Brey

In this article, I examine whether information ethics is culture relative. If it is, different approaches to information ethics are required in different cultures and societies. This would have major implications for the current, predominantly Western approach to information ethics. If it is not, there must be concepts and principles of information ethics that have universal validity. What would they be? The descriptive evidence is for the cultural relativity of information ethics will be studied by examining cultural differences between ethical attitudes towards privacy, freedom of information, and intellectual property rights in Western and non-Western cultures. I then analyze what the implications of these findings are for the metaethical question of whether moral claims must be justified differently in different cultures. Finally, I evaluate what the implications are for the practice of information ethics in a cross-cultural context.

Author(s):  
Philip Brey

In this article, I examine whether information ethics is culture relative. If it is, different approaches to information ethics are required in different cultures and societies. This would have major implications for the current, predominantly Western approach to information ethics. If it is not, there must be concepts and principles of information ethics that have universal validity. What would they be? The descriptive evidence is for the cultural relativity of information ethics will be studied by examining cultural differences between ethical attitudes towards privacy, freedom of information, and intellectual property rights in Western and non-Western cultures. I then analyze what the implications of these findings are for the metaethical question of whether moral claims must be justified differently in different cultures. Finally, I evaluate what the implications are for the practice of information ethics in a cross-cultural context.


Author(s):  
Philip Brey

In this chapter, I examine whether information ethics is culture relative. If it is, different approaches to information ethics are required in different cultures and societies. This would have major implications for the current, predominantly Western approach to information ethics. If it is not, there must be concepts and principles of information ethics that have universal validity. What would they be? The descriptive evidence is for the cultural relativity of information ethics will be studied by examining cultural differences between ethical attitudes towards privacy, freedom of information, and intellectual property rights in Western and non-Western cultures. I then analyze what the implications of these findings are for the metaethical question of whether moral claims must be justified differently in different cultures. Finally, I evaluate what the implications are for the practice of information ethics in a cross-cultural context.


Author(s):  
Philip Brey

In this chapter, I examine whether information ethics is culturally relative. If it is, different approaches to information ethics are required in different cultures and societies. This would have major implications for the current, predominantly Western approach to information ethics. If it is not, there must be concepts and principles of information ethics that have universal validity. What would they be? I will begin the chapter by an examination of cultural differences in ethical attitudes towards privacy, freedom of information, and intellectual property rights in Western and nonwestern cultures. I then analyze the normative implications of these findings for doing information ethics in a cross-cultural context. I will argue for a position between moral absolutism and relativism that is based on intercultural understanding and mutual criticism. Such a position could be helpful in overcoming differences and misunderstandings between cultures in their approach to information and information technologies.


Chapter 17 concerns the interplay between freedom of information and intellectual property rights, in particular copyright, database right, and patents. It assesses the threat of infringement posed by the freedom of information regime. It then goes on to consider what exemptions might be invoked to protect them under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, including the exemptions protecting confidential information, ongoing research, commercial interests, and information intended for future publication. A contrast is drawn with the much simpler approach taken in the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (EIR), which contain an exemption specifically applicable to information the disclosure of which would adversely affect intellectual property rights. Reference is made to some relevant decided cases. In conclusion, the chapter looks at the issue from the perspective of EU law.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angus Whyte

This is a report from the Legal Environment of Digital Curation workshop held at Glasgow University on November 23, 2007. The event provided an overview of legal considerations for non-legal professionals who work with data, focusing especially on intellectual property rights and licensing, data protection, freedom of information and privacy, and data as evidence. The workshop was organised in conjunction with the SCRIPT-ed journal of law and technology, and supported by JISC, the AHRC and Edinburgh University.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guido Noto La Diega

This work presents ten arguments against algorithmic decision-making. These re-volve around the concepts of ubiquitous discretionary interpretation, holistic intu-ition, algorithmic bias, the three black boxes, psychology of conformity, power of sanctions, civilising force of hypocrisy, pluralism, empathy, and technocracy. Nowadays algorithms can decide if one can get a loan, is allowed to cross a bor-der, or must go to prison. Artificial intelligence techniques (natural language pro-cessing and machine learning in the first place) enable private and public deci-sion-makers to analyse big data in order to build profiles, which are used to make decisions in an automated way. The lack of transparency of the algorithmic deci-sion-making process does not stem merely from the characteristics of the relevant techniques used, which can make it impossible to access the rationale of the deci-sion. It depends also on the abuse of and overlap between intellectual property rights (the “legal black box”). In the US, nearly half a million patented inventions concern algorithms; more than 67% of the algorithm-related patents were issued over the last ten years and the trend is increasing. To counter the increased mo-nopolisation of algorithms by means of intellectual property rights (with trade se-crets leading the way), this paper presents three legal routes that enable citizens to ‘open’ the algorithms. First, copyright and patent exceptions, as well as trade se-crets are discussed. Second, the EU General Data Protection Regulation is critical-ly assessed. In principle, data controllers are not allowed to use algorithms to take decisions that have legal effects on the data subject’s life or similarly significantly affect them. However, when they are allowed to do so, the data subject still has the right to obtain human intervention, to express their point of view, as well as to contest the decision. Additionally, the data controller shall provide meaningful in-formation about the logic involved in the algorithmic decision. Third, this paper critically analyses the first known case of a court using the access right under the freedom of information regime to grant an injunction to release the source code of the computer program that implements an algorithm. Only an integrated ap-proach – which takes into account intellectual property, data protection, and free-dom of information – may provide the citizen affected by an algorithmic decision of an effective remedy as required by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the European Convention on Human Rights.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Inggrit Fernandes

Batik artwork is one of the treasures of the nation's cultural heritage. Batik artwork is currently experiencing rapid growth. The amount of interest and market demand for this art resulted batik artwork became one of the commodities in the country and abroad. Thus, if the batik artwork is not protected then the future can be assured of a new conflict arises in the realm of intellectual property law. Act No. 28 of 2014 on Copyright has accommodated artwork batik as one of the creations that are protected by law. So that this work of art than as a cultural heritage also have economic value for its creator. Then how the legal protection of the batik artwork yaang not registered? Does this also can be protected? While in the registration of intellectual property rights is a necessity so that it has the force of law to the work produced


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