Research on the Value of Traceable Information Sharing

2014 ◽  
Vol 644-650 ◽  
pp. 5489-5493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Na Zhang ◽  
Shou Wen Ji ◽  
Zhe Yuan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
Value Of Information ◽  
Evaluation System ◽  
Practical Significance ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Principal Agent Model

This paper first analyzes the problems of traceable information sharing between dairy suppliers and manufacturers, and proposes the theoretical and practical significance of building related evaluation system of information sharing. And then the traceable information in dairy supply chain based on batch management is analyzed and a principal-agent model is developed to assess the value of information sharing between dairy suppliers and manufacturers. Results show that when the information sharing between dairy suppliers and manufacturers reaches a certain degree, the Pareto optimality of the overall supply chain can be achieved.

The Study on the Quality Management of Supply Chain Production in Operations

2011 ◽  
Vol 267 ◽  
pp. 265-270
Author(s):  
Li Na Wang
Keyword(s):  
Quality Control ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Quality Management ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Product Quality ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Numerical Example ◽  
Principal Agent Model

Based on the different effort levels of product quality management of the suppliers, this paper has established the principal-agent model under the asymmetric information. At the same time, it has also studied the coordination quality control in supply chains and the optimal revenue problem of the supply chain. Finally, the model has been carried out the numerical example analysis.

scholarly journals Incentive Contract between Banks and B2B Platform in Online Agricultural Product Supply Chain Finance

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 20
Author(s):  
Xiaoxu Chen ◽  
Peng Xu ◽  
Guoqiang Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Incentive Contract ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Agricultural Enterprises ◽  
Supply Chain Finance ◽  
Principal Agent Model ◽  
The Given ◽  
Level Of Effort

Online agricultural supply chain finance, as an effective way to solve the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized agricultural enterprises in the chain, has made rapid progress in recent years, and the cooperation between banks and e-commerce has become the mainstream mode. Taking the electronic order pledge of agricultural products as an example, this paper discusses the incentive contract design between banks and B2B platform from the perspective of moral hazard prevention and the use of principal-agent theory. In this paper, the principal-agent model is constructed by considering the bank's effort and no effort, and then give the optimal incentive coefficient and fixed return. The results show that banks’ effort will increase the level of efforts of B2B platform, but also increase their own variable payment; under the given conditions, the bank’s effort will increase its income, and at a certain level of effort, the largest increase in revenue, In addition, improving the application level of B2B data processing technology and the degree of data pledge development will contribute to the increase of incentive coefficient and revenue.

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