The Price of Anarchy of Non-Uniform Altruism Traffic Assignment

2011 ◽  
Vol 467-469 ◽  
pp. 475-480 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiao Jun Yu

In this paper, assumed the users are partially altruistic,the altruism level of different user class has difference. The user’s perceived cost assumed to be a linear combination of selfish component and altruistic component. A variational inequality (VI) model is investigated to formulate the user’s route choice behavior in non-uniform altruism transportation network with fixed demand. The price of anarchy caused by this kind of behavior is analytically derived and this result takes some known results in the literature as its special cases.

2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiao-Jun Yu ◽  
Chun-Hua Fang

The efficiency loss of mixed equilibrium associated with two categories of users is investigated in this paper. The first category of users are altruistic users (AU) who have the same altruism coefficient and try to minimize their own perceived cost that assumed to be a linear combination of selfish com­ponent and altruistic component. The second category of us­ers are Logit-based stochastic users (LSU) who choose the route according to the Logit-based stochastic user equilib­rium (SUE) principle. The variational inequality (VI) model is used to formulate the mixed route choice behaviours associ­ated with AU and LSU. The efficiency loss caused by the two categories of users is analytically derived and the relations to some network parameters are discussed. The numerical tests validate our analytical results. Our result takes the re­sults in the existing literature as its special cases.


2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yingguo Li ◽  
Zhijia Tan ◽  
Qiong Chen

This paper studies the dynamics of the traveler's day-to-day route adjustment process in the general transportation network with fixed or elastic demand and homogeneous or heterogeneous users. Each traveler is assumed to adjust his/her route choice according to the excess travel cost between the instantaneous experienced travel cost and a certain referred level, which induces an aggregate path flow dynamics. We call the path flow dynamics the excess travel cost dynamics, which corresponds to the excess payoff dynamics in evolutionary games and serves a general framework of modeling the homogeneous or heterogeneous route choice behavior of travelers.


Author(s):  
Hideki OKA ◽  
Makoto CHIKARAISHI ◽  
Jun TANABE ◽  
Daisuke FUKUDA ◽  
Takashi OGUCHI

1995 ◽  
Vol 22 (4-7) ◽  
pp. 119-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
P.D.V.G. Reddy ◽  
H. Yang ◽  
K.M. Vaughn ◽  
M.A. Abdel-Aty ◽  
R. Kitamura ◽  
...  

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