FIGURE 7. Number of moderately or severely food insecure people in the Arab States by subregion

Keyword(s):  
2004 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 188-197 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nur Masalha

In 1948 an official ‘Transfer Committee’ was appointed by the Israeli Cabinet to plan the Palestinian refugees' resettlement in the Arab states. Apart from doing everything possible to reduce the Arab population in Israel, the Transfer Committee sought to amplify and consolidate the demographic transformation of Palestine by: preventing the Palestinian refugees from returning to their homes; the destruction of Arab villages; settlement of Jews in Arab villages and towns; and launching a propaganda campaign to discourage Arab return. One of the Transfer Committee's initiatives was to invite Dr Joseph Schechtman, a right-wing Zionist Revisionist leader and expert on ‘population transfer’, to join its efforts. In 1952 Schechtman published a propagandists work entitled The Arab Refugee Problem. Since then Schechtman would become the single most influential propagator of the Zionist myth of ‘voluntary’ exodus in 1948. This article examines the leading role played by Schechtman in promoting Israeli propaganda and politics of denial. Relying on newly-discovered Israeli archival documents, the article deals with little known and new aspects of the secret history of the post-1948 period.


2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-151

The quadrilateral meeting at Aqaba, intended to ““kick off implementation”” of the road map, was attended by King Abdallah, Prime Minister Abbas, Prime Minister Sharon, and President Bush. All four leaders made statements at the end of the meeting, but only those by Abbas and Sharon are reproduced below. President Bush's statement was noteworthy for its mention of Israel as a ““vibrant Jewish state”” (““America is strongly committed and I am strongly committed to Israel's security as a vibrant Jewish state””) and of Palestinian ““hopes”” for a ““viable”” state, and for reiterating that the Arab states ““have promised to cut off assistance and the flow of money and weapons to terrorists groups and to help Prime Minister Abbas rid Palestinian areas of terrorism.”” The statements by Abbas and Sharon were drafted with U.S. officials prior to the meeting. Though Abbas did not comply with the Israeli demand of Palestinian acknowledgment of Israel as a ““Jewish state,”” his speech provoked indignation in the occupied territories for its reference to ““the suffering of the Jews”” without mention of Palestinian suffering, its reiterated call for ending the ““armed intifada,”” and its ““renunciation”” of terrorism. Sharon resisted U.S. suggestions to refer to ““settlements,”” but did mention ““unauthorized outposts.”” In reference to Sharon's mention of ““territorial contiguity”” for a ““viable”” Palestinian state, a spokesman indicated that the contiguity would be ensured by ““bridges and tunnels.”” The text of the statements, transcribed by eMediaMill- Works and carried by the Associated Press, was posted on the Washington Post's Website.


2007 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 220-238
Author(s):  
Ersun N. Kurtulus

The article presents a critical assessment of the widespread conceptualization of the June 1967 War between Israel and its neighboring Arab states as a pre-emptive war both in academic and non-academic writing. Tracing the origins of the notion of pre-emptive war to international law, the article identifies three necessary conditions for such a war to be classified as pre-emptive: acute crisis combined with high alert levels; vulnerable offensive weapons; and strategic parity as regards to offensive capabilities. On the basis of a re-interpretation of the evidence produced by previous research, this article argues that the circumstances surrounding the Six Day War did not fulfill some of these necessary conditions. This conclusion also is supported by evidence related to the Israeli decision to launch a first strike.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document