Defense Department

2014 ◽  
pp. 509-524
Keyword(s):  
2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacques S. Gansler ◽  
William Lucyshyn ◽  
Michael Arendt

Author(s):  
J. P. Clark

This article examines the U.S. military’s plans for carrying out combined joint operations across multiple theaters and domains in the twenty-first century. It summarizes the most likely strategic and operational approaches available to future adversaries, such as anti-access/area denial (A2/AD), gray zone warfare, and other asymmetric methods. The article also considers the respective challenges posed by the two likely catalysts for military operations: contested norms and persistent disorder. The U.S. military response to this strategic context is still forming, but there are common themes among the services: the recognition that future operations will entail greater risk; the need to disperse forces to survive on a more lethal battlefield; a desire to create networked forces attacking with a combination of physical and nonphysical (cyber and electronic warfare); and a rebalancing of force structure in terms of both weapon sophistication and mission type.


Significance Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba on November 29 called for action "now, not later" to "deter" Russia. The same day, US Defense Department spokesman John Kirby said the Pentagon was watching Russian troop movements near Ukraine "with great concern". Fears of imminent conflict stem not just from the number of troops and tanks moved closer to Ukraine, but from Moscow's more than usually hostile rhetoric and its deliberate ambiguity, through hints that Ukraine may provoke it into some form of action. Impacts The threat of Russian action will accelerate and expand the defence assistance Ukraine gets from the United States and other NATO members. Moscow would hope its importance as a gas supplier mitigates EU sanctions imposed for military action against Ukraine. The Ukrainian government will be tempted to use the Russian threat to curb domestic opposition.


1972 ◽  
Author(s):  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON DC
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Paul J. Heer

This chapter chronicles Kennan’s and Davies’s central and successful role in formulating US policy toward China on behalf of Secretary of State Marshall during 1947-49. Their focus was on justifying gradual disengagement from US involvement in the Chinese civil war and retreat to a policy of minimum aid to the Koumintang (KMT or Nationalist) government of Chiang Kai-shek, on the grounds that Chiang’s regime was a lost cause and China was strategically expendable. The chapter discusses Kennan’s and Davies’s relative assessments of the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the prolonged debate over China policy between the State Department and the US military establishment (the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff).


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