National Security Surveillance: Unchecked or Limited Presidential Power?

Author(s):  
Espinosa Manuel José Cepeda ◽  
Landau David

As in much of Latin America, the Colombian president has historically been extremely powerful. The 1991 constitutional designers sought to achieve greater balance in the separation of powers, in part by weakening presidential power. This chapter considers the Court’s attempts to limit executive discretion and protect against excessive amalgamations of executive power. Even in areas where presidents have historically enjoyed almost plenary power, such as national security, the Court has attempted to place limits on presidential power. Most significant in this regard is the Court’s aggressive and successful jurisprudence limiting presidential use of states of exception. The Court has imposed jurisprudential criteria limiting states of exception to true and unexpected social and political crises, thus greatly reducing its historical role in day-to-day Colombian life and forcing political institutions to confront most problems under a situation of normality.


Author(s):  
Julian E. Zelizer

This chapter examines how conservatives have come to embrace presidential power after an initial wariness. Before the 1970s, there were some conservative activists skeptical of—if not downright hostile toward—presidential power. A key turning point was the 1970s, when many conservatives believed that the congressional reforms that were passed in the aftermath of Watergate weakened the power of the executive branch and were a symbol of what went wrong as a result of the 1960s. The chapter first considers how the conservatives began to accept presidential power during the presidency of Richard Nixon between 1969 and 1974 before discussing congressional reforms in the area of national security. It also discusses the use of executive power under Ronald Reagan, who strengthened the marriage between American conservatism and presidential power; Bill Clinton; and George W. Bush, who expanded presidential power in his war on terrorism.


Author(s):  
Christakis Théodore ◽  
Bouslimani Katia

This chapter reflects on the relationship between national security, surveillance, and human rights. The possibility to adopt restrictive measures in case of threats to national security is an essential component of the international legal system and one of those ‘adjustment variables’ that allow international human rights law to accommodate and ascertain its social functions. The abuse of these mechanisms, however, is also a major threat to the legal order, judicial security, and the rule of law. Domestic rulers and security agencies have often used ‘national security’ as a pretext to violate human rights and fundamental freedoms; to monitor political opponents; to conceal embarrassing or illegal behaviour; to bypass investigation by independent and democratic bodies; or to suppress political and social unrest. In a democracy, surveillance must be balanced with public liberties, and especially with privacy. The chapter looks at the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on national surveillance. It presents the three main criteria used by the Court to assess the compatibility of surveillance laws with the European Convention of Human Rights.


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