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Significance Pakistan last week accused India’s foreign intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), of orchestrating the attack. Delhi denies the allegation. Meanwhile, there are widespread suspicions that responsibility may lie with Islamic State (IS) or the Pakistani Taliban Movement (TTP). Impacts The TTP will try to strengthen its presence in Pakistan, eyeing control over Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province’s tribal areas. IS attacks in Pakistan will continue to focus on the Shia minority. Delhi and Islamabad will each try harder to mobilise international opinion against the other.


Author(s):  
Timothy Andrews Sayle

Igor Gouzenko’s defection might have been the first—and most famous—of the Cold War in Canada, but it was hardly the last. Recently opened after Access to Information Act requests made by the Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project, a number of records cast brighter light on this aspect of Canada’s intelligence history. This article offers an overview of how the Government of Canada established its policy to manage defection and those who defected. It offers a number of possible leads for future research projects, some, but not all, of which, will require the release of further material, whether under the Access to Information Act or a broader declassification framework from the Government of Canada.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 34-54
Author(s):  
Andrew Dalip

The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare is pleased to publish the following thought piece from one of our esteemed Speakers from the 2020 West Coast Security Conference. The author, Mr. Dalip, is a lawyer working in the financial crime and corruption sphere. From 2015 to 2018, Mr. Dalip was a chairman at the Steering Group Planning Committee for the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF); and from 2014 to 2018, he was a special legal advisor to the Ministry of Attorney General Trinidad and Tobago. The intersection between corruption and intelligence is gaining increased focus. Foreign intelligence services have an anti-corruption role at the strategic level through Intelligence Risk Assessments and at the operational level during post-conflict operations. Intelligence assessments of the effectiveness of non-kinetic tools on target countries also guide implementation and policy changes. The roles of security intelligence and foreign intelligence services are, however, no longer always discrete, particularly in the context of non-state actors. Foreign intelligence services would benefit from the skill sets of security intelligence agencies in detecting corruption related predicate offences, both in performing their core roles and supporting law enforcement operations. This includes the use of financial intelligence as well as other key open source intelligence resulting from anti-money laundering frameworks, the development of which has been driven globally by the Financial Action Task Force. In performing these roles, intelligence agencies must also be mindful of their own vulnerability to corruption.


2021 ◽  
pp. 36-65
Author(s):  
Robert Schuett

Who shaped the early Kelsen’s style of thinking under the Kaiser? What were the intellectual circles in which he moved in fin-de-siècle Vienna and the interwar period before he left Austria for Cologne, Geneva, Prague, and the United States? The chapter explores ‘the other Kelsen’ by revisiting his formative years, as well as his work in the lecture halls of university and his high-profile roles in the War Ministry, Karl Renner’s state chancellery, and American foreign intelligence after escaping the fascist Continent. A reluctant jurist, Kelsen had a passion for philosophy and literature, and from Freud and the economists he learned that individual and social life was all about drives and desires, instincts and interests. Where Kelsen was, there was no land of utopia.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (25) ◽  
pp. 183-218
Author(s):  
Paweł Gacek

Initiation of criminal proceedings in the case of intent offence subject to a public accusation as a prerequisite of suspending an officer of the Internal Security Agency and the Foreign Intelligence Agency This paper is entirely devoted to the prerequisite of obligatory suspension of an officer of the Internal Security Agency or the Foreign Intelligence Agency. This regulation is included in the Article 58 sec. 1 of the Act on the Internal Security Agency and the Foreign Intelligence Agency. Suspension from official duties is obligatory in the event of an initiation of criminal proceedings in the case of an intent offence subjected to a public accusation. Therefore, attention was focused on the wording: “initiation of criminal proceedings in the case of intent offence prosecuted with public accusation against an officer of the International Security Agency and the Foreign Intelligence Agency” as a condition enabling the use of the legal construct included in Article 58 sec. 1 of the Act on the International Security Agency and the Foreign Intelligence Agency. This happens in a situation of changing the phase of preparatory proceedings in the criminal case prosecuted against an officer of the International Security Agency or the Foreign Intelligence Agency from in rem to ad personam, submitting subsidiary indictment to the court and reopening of the criminal proceedings. Artykuł został poświęcony problematyce związanej z przesłanką obligatoryjnego zawieszenia funkcjonariusza ABW albo AW w czynnościach służbowych. Ta regulacja jest zawarta w art. 58 ust. 1 Ustawy z dnia 24 maja 2002 r. o Agencji Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego oraz Agencji Wywiadu. Zawieszenie w czynnościach służbowych jest obowiązkowe w przypadku wszczęcia postępowania karnego w sprawie o przestępstwo umyślne ścigane z oskarżenia publicznego. Uwagę skoncentrowano na sformułowaniu „wszczęcie postępowania karnego o przestępstwo umyślne ścigane z oskarżenia publicznego przeciwko funkcjonariuszowi ABW albo AW” jako na przesłance warunkującej zastosowanie konstrukcji prawnej zawartej w art. 58 ust. 1 ustawy o ABW i AW. Następuje to w sytuacji zmiany stadium postępowania przygotowawczego prowadzonego wobec funkcjonariusza ABW albo AW z in rem w ad personam, wniesienia subsydiarnego aktu oskarżenia do sądu, a także wznowienia postępowania karnego.


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