Strong Programme in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge

2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 26
Author(s):  
Edward Mariyani-Squire

The 'strong programme' in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) is based upon finitism and extensionalism. This article examines a critique of these bases. It is argued that David Tyfield's (2008; 2009) realist critique and his alternative intensionalist account of meaning face problems at least as serious as those he identifies in the strong programme’s finitism. This is not to say that the strong programme is problem-free: it fails to give sufficient acknowledgement to non-conventional constraints on meaning formation and change. It is also suggested that, as they are currently conceived, realism's intensionalism and the strong programme's extensionalism are irreconcilably incompatible at such a basic level that the 'debate' between them reduces to an exchange of 'assurances'.


Author(s):  
Simone Tosoni ◽  
Trevor Pinch

The chapter presents the early years and the subsequent developments of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK), starting from the School of Edinburgh and the Edinburgh Strong Programme advanced by David Bloor, introducing its four tenets: symmetry, impartiality, causality, and reflexivity. After presenting the main works done in Laboratory Studies, it extensively presents the Bath School and its focus on scientific controversies and tacit knowledge. In particular, it discusses in depth Harry Collins’ concept of “experimenter’s regress” and Trevor Pinch’s “externality of observation”, presenting the empirical work these concepts are based on. The chapter then clarifies the specific form of relativism (methodological relativism) adopted by the Bath School, pointing out its differences from epistemological relativism, and finally discusses the issue of reflexivity as addressed with SSK.


2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-310
Author(s):  
Jeroen Bouterse

When, as historians, we want to explain developments in the history of natural science, how are we to do justice to the role of the natural world – the thing scientists investigate – in our explanations? The idea that the structure of the natural world renders the development of science inevitable seems to be inadequate, but so does the idea that we should explain the history of science without any reference to nature, as if what scientists study made no difference at all to what they believe. Is ‘nature’ even a feasible category, however? To what extent is it a problem that in referring to the result of scientific development in our explanation of scientific development, we are assuming the authority of science? Does this undermine the possibility of critical and independent historiography? This article deals with several possible solutions to these problems, and outlines an alternative to rationalism as well as to the Strong Programme in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge and Latour’s Actor-Network Theory.


2016 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 245-263
Author(s):  
Duncan Law ◽  
Nicole Pepperell

The ‘strong programme’ in the sociology of scientific knowledge has both exerted enormous influence on science studies, and been widely criticised for its apparent commitment to epistemological relativism. In this article we argue that the recent work of the pragmatist philosopher Robert Brandom provides a potential resolution to these debates. Brandom’s work, we argue, meets the key commitments of the strong programme, including particularly commitments to symmetry and reflexivity, while also demonstrating how these commitments are compatible with a robust – but non-dogmatic, pragmatist – concept of objective knowledge. In so doing, it provides a theoretically developed account of why the traditions of empirical science studies that emerged from the strong programme need not be seen as undermining scientific objectivity, while it also supports a reflexive, critical sociological analysis of scientific practice.


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