Capacity, incentives, and mandate responsiveness

The absence of significant agenda-setting effects of party platforms in the UK, as found in all other countries, seems counterintuitive: the comparative literature would predict the greatest impact in majoritarian systems, while counter-majoritarian institutions are meant to dilute governing parties’ policymaking powers. Comparing different political and institutional configurations in each country over time, we can confirm such a moderating impact of counter-majoritarian institutions and coalition constraints. We then show that party incentives may help to disentangle the British paradox. High incentives in electoral periods are associated with strong programme-to-policy linkages, in particular in the UK. We conclude that majoritarian systems provide governing parties with extended institutional powers to implement their mandate, although this may limit their incentives: opposition parties have less opportunity to pressurize them and scrutinize any drift away from mandate priorities. Consensual systems limit governing parties’ institutional power, but the ‘tunnel’ of attention may generate strong incentives to stick to campaign priorities.

Developing and evaluating the Teen-Strong life skills programme in Southern Thailand

Summary Risk sexual behaviours are known as a threat to health and wellbeing of adolescents. Although there are standard sexual education curriculums in Thai schools, most schools use traditional teaching methods rather than participatory teaching activities. This study aimed to (i) develop ‘Teen-Strong’ programme by combining the concept of the World Health Organization’s life skills programme with Thai sexual education curriculum and (ii) investigate the association of Teen-Strong programme with knowledge and decision-making regarding risky sexual behaviours and teenage pregnancy in Thai adolescents. The Teen-Strong programme was developed by means of experts review and cognitive interviewing process and evaluated in 66 adolescents in Grades 7–9 from six schools in southern Thailand. Twenty-six students were assigned to the experimental group (attended Teen-Strong programme and standard sexual education) and 40 to the control group (attended only the standard sexual education). A pre–post-test quasi-experimental design was used and the Teen-Strong questionnaire (TSQ) was administered to measure knowledge and decision-making at three time points: before (T1), immediately after (T2) and 1 month after (T3) attending the programme. A 2 × 3 mixed-design ANOVA was used to analyse the data. TSQ scores in the experimental and control groups were higher at T2 and T3 as compared with T1. Mean increase in TSQ scores at T2 and T3 compared with T1 were significantly higher in the experiment than the control group [T2 vs. T1: t (64) = 4.07, p-values < 0.0001; T3 vs. T1: t (64) = 3.32, p-values = 0.017]. This study showed that Teen-Strong programme could increase adolescent’s knowledge and decision-making skills regarding risk sexual behaviours.

Why do Environmental and Ecological Economics Diverge?

Environmental economics and ecological economics became established scientific fields as a result of the growth and the success of the environmental movement in the 1960s and 1970s. Using the strong programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge and the general theory of scientific/intellectual movements, this article compares four pairs of scholars (two pairs of scholars appropriated for these fields and fields' founders during the emergence and establishment of the fields). The article depicts how their institutional, ideological and scientific backgrounds contributed to the divergence of these fields. Practitioners of environmental economics and ecological economics were influenced by different strands of the environmental movement. Environmental economics has epistemological and institutional links with environmentalism and ecological economics with ecologism. Different types of interdisciplinarity were used in these fields—a bridge building type of interdisciplinarity in the case of environmental economics and a restructuring and integrative in the case of ecological economics.

Social constructionism and climate science denial

It has been much debated whether epistemic relativism in academia, for instance in the form of social constructivism, the strong programme, deconstructionism, and postmodernism, has paved the way for the recent upsurge in science denial, in particular climate science denial. In order to provide an empirical basis for this discussion, an extensive search of the social science literature was performed. It showed that in the 1990s, climate science was a popular target among academic epistemic relativists. In particular, many STS scholars used it as an allegedly clear example of claims by natural scientists that should be treated as mere social constructions, rather than as reports on the actual state of the natural world. A few connections between social constructivists and corporate science denialism were also uncovered, but the extent of such connections could not be determined. With few exceptions, the stream of criticism of climate science from academic relativists has dwindled since the 1990s. One reason for this seems to be that the contrarian position lost its attraction when it became associated with corporate and right-wing propagandists.

Sociology or Psychology?

The article is an attempt at the reverse engineering of conceptual architecture and logic of David Bloor's Strong Programme (SP) in the sociology of scientific knowledge via explicating key resources and interpretative techniques for constructing it. To do this I show how problematic is a conventional interpretation of the SP as a radicalization of Kuhn's theory of science and as a sociologization of epistemology. This problematization allows me to put anew three questions concerning the SP. In what sense it is post-positivist? In what sense it is sociological? Does it belong to social epistemology? To answer these questions I set myself four tasks. First, Bloor’s theoretical position concerning the Kuhn-Popper debate is located. Second, I point to and present Mary Hesse’s network model of science (NM) as a crucial theoretical source for the early SP. Third, I analyze in detail how Bloor interpreted and appropriated NM. Finally, I show what theoretical and methodological effects this interpretation had for the SP as presented in 1976. The general layout of the conceptual architecture of SP is modeled on the Hesse’s NM. It combines the principle of correspondence and that of coherence and sees the language of science as a network of predicates and laws segmented by contingent and empirical boundaries and not a priori logical divisions between theory and observation. But Bloor creatively interprets and appropriates NM by the double move of generalization and specification. Whereas Hesse’s NM refers to the functioning of scientific language, in Bloor’s hands, it comes to describe human learning in general inscribed in psychological processes (perception and thinking). As a result, SP is based on a form of psychological empiricism that sees science as a two-storied building. The first floor (perception) ensures correspondence and the second one (thinking) provide conditions of coherence. SP of 1976 is a specific model for the sociological segmentation of the second floor.