CRITICAL-DISCURSIVE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM: WHAT IS THE STANDPOINT OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM RESEARCH?

An overview of critical-discursive Social Constructionism is presented, showing its historical development and its critique of any methodological approaches that do not take into consideration the social-historical reality. In particular, it criticises the dualistic ‘external object - cognitive subject’ position of the Positivist current that has its roots in the Enlightenment and later in Modernity, which leads to a conception of reason and scientific truth as supposedly incontrovertible realities outside of any historical and social construction. Finally, social constructionism is presented not as a formal theory grounded of strict methodological principles, but rather as an approach that attempts to show the limitations of certain scientific or methodological views, emphasising the importance of social construction through language and the relative relevance of different positions, from which a certain vindication of epistemological relativism emerges.

CRITICAL POTENTIAL OF FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY

The article explores the arguments in favor of feminist epistemology used in the works of L. Code, S. Harding, D. Haraway, J. Lloyd and other gender (radical) feminists. The sources of feminist epistemology are the naturalized epistemology and the thesis of underdetermination by W. Quine, the views of W. Sellars, Marxism, the strong program of sociology of knowledge, logical positivism. The features of feminist epistemology include many signature schemes, the tendency to use different schemes from suitable disciplines, rethinking of the concepts «knowledge» and «knower» for previously excluded or non-included groups of women, people with disabilities, representatives of different races, sexual minorities. Another feature is that «Feminine» experience and voice, viewed from an essentialist or non-essentialist approach, are considered the grounds for the position of «knower». The article examines the critical remarks made by feminists against the assumptions of traditional epistemology: universal human nature, «a view from nowhere», pureimpersonal reason, the assumption of «Robinsonade». Attention to subjectivity, values and selfish interests in the production of knowledge should be considered a merit of feminist epistemology. However, L. Laudan has already shown that no one, including representatives of feminist epistemology, have demonstrated the plausibility, let alone the veracity of judgements that justify any number of possible interpretations of the knowledge gained. The paper shows that feminist epistemology cannot avoid the well-known vicissitudes of epistemological relativism. However, feminist epistemology deserves the attention of philosophers because it is part of a broader relativist turn in social sciences and the humanities that seeks to extend its criticism to scientific knowledge.

Becoming Dead: Burial Assemblages as Vitalist Devices

This text comprises a critical discussion of assemblage theory and its application to burial studies. In recent research, burials have been viewed as fluid and indeterminate assemblages that ‘become’ in varied ways depending on different perceptions (concepts and ideas) and apparatuses (e.g. excavation tools and measuring instruments). The past and the present are thus mixed in potentially ever-new configurations which run the risk of replacing epistemological relativism with ontological fluidity. It is argued here that the hypothetical mutability of burial assemblages can be reduced significantly by addressing the varying speed and degree of the involved processes of integration and disintegration. By doing this, the main focus is shifted to the animacy of such processes and how they may have been understood and utilized in burials. Using both general and specific examples, it is argued that cremation burials can be studied as carefully compiled amalgamations that utilize the properties and animacies of different materialities to deal with death, corpses and the afterlife.

Truth as Literature: Ethics of Journalism and Reality in the Digital Society

Modern journalism emerged in the XIX century based on truth and reality. The rise of Romanticism in that century proposed an approach against the Enlightenment and its pillars: objectivity, positivism and realism. Unlike it, Romanticism claimed subjectivity and the self as the more authentic reality. Thus, it took beauty out of the base of aesthetics and put in its place communication and expression. With the arrival of Postmodernism, the notions of reality and truth have been in crisis too and so it proposes a moral and epistemological relativism. This view has been a permanent attack on journalism. This paper vindicates reality and truth, and so journalism as one of the main institutions based on those concepts, besides science. Therefore, journalism can be seen as the most necessary and genuine aesthetic in the current digital era because it takes and melts objectivity and realism from Illustration, communication and subjectivity from Romanticism, and impact from Postmodernism. In current network societies, journalism has rehabilitated a new narrative and is increasingly more based on stories than on news. That is creating a genuine literature of reality, which gathers both the ethic and the aesthetic project of the Enlightenment, Romanticism and Postmodernism.

Critical realism: A better way to think about middle powers

The fundamental problem in middle power scholarship lies in the research design that inadvertently permits bias, tautology, and circularity in the process of realizing the final outcome. Most researchers begin with a presumption that middle powers are countries in the middle range of the world order, capable and willing to play some constructive roles beyond their borders. Thus, they tend to select methods and data compatible with the given presumption, and reach predictable outcomes that determine middle power status by middle power behaviours, or middle power behaviours by middle power status. This is an epistemic fallacy where the ontic category of middle powers is defined by the epistemic knowledge of middle powers. Eventually, any countries with comparable characteristics/behaviours to the given presumption can be classified as “middle powers” conducting middle power behaviours. This article offers critical realism as a much-needed remedy to the stagnant middle power scholarship. It examines a group of countries already categorized as middle powers—Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia (MIKTA)—under a critical realist framework, and finds that those countries and their activities cannot be generalized by the conventional middle power conception. In fact, the middle power rhetoric itself holds both a positive and negative ideological implication that requires further scrutiny. Yet, what makes the critical realist research design and its findings invaluable is the commitment to ontological realism, epistemological relativism, and judgmental rationalism that addresses the recurring epistemic fallacy. Therefore, the research findings are not merely new insights about “middle power” countries; they are a valid clue that can help uncover the “real” world that causes the so-called “middle power” categorization.

Underdetermination

The term underdetermination refers to a broad family of arguments about the relations between theory and evidence. All share the conclusion that evidence is more or less impotent to guide choice between rival theories or hypotheses. In one or other of its guises, underdetermination has probably been the most potent and most pervasive idea driving twentieth-century forms of scepticism and epistemological relativism. It figures prominently in the writing of diverse influential philosophers. It is a complex family of doctrines, each with a different argumentative structure. Most, however, suppose that only the logical consequences of a hypothesis are relevant to its empirical support. This supposition can be challenged.

‘Epistemological diversity’ in education: Philosophical and didactic considerations

A recent but widespread view holds that ethnic or cultural groups have their own distinctive epistemologies, that epistemologies are also gendered, and that these have been largely ignored by the dominant social group. A corollary of this view states that educational research is pursued within a framework that represents particular assumptions about knowledge and knowledge production that reflect the interests and historical traditions of this dominant group. The call for epistemological diversity becomes problematic when it conflates epistemological pluralism and epistemological relativism. More often than not, in such arguments for different, diverse, alternative, decolonized or demasculinized epistemologies some relevant philosophical issues remain unresolved, if not unaddressed altogether. What exactly do these claims about epistemological diversity mean? Do these ways of establishing knowledge stand up to critical interrogation? Moreover, how do they relate to traditional epistemological distinctions, e.g. between knowledge and belief and between descriptive and normative inquiry, and to epistemologically essential components like warrant/justification and truth? This paper examines some of the mistakes and misconceptions involved in appeals to diverse epistemologies. The concern is not just whether or not a word (‘epistemology’) is being misused, but also (and importantly) whether or not the issues dealt with in epistemology (a complex field that has evolved over a long period of time) are being given short shrift, if not ignored altogether.