scholarly journals Impact of Executive Compensation Incentives on Corporate Tax Avoidance

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (12) ◽  
pp. 1817-1834
Author(s):  
Yishu Wang ◽  
Jia Yao
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Corporate Tax ◽  
Compensation Incentives

scholarly journals The Non-Linear Relationship Between CEO Compensation Incentives And Corporate Tax Avoidance

2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 439-450 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seungmin Chee ◽  
Wooseok Choi ◽  
Jae Eun Shin
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Linear Relationship ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Corporate Tax ◽  
Non Linear ◽  
Prior Literature ◽  
Low Levels ◽  
Risk Reducing ◽  
Compensation Incentives

This study examines the effect of CEO compensation incentives on corporate tax avoidance. Unlike prior literature that assumes a monotonic relation between executive compensation incentives and tax avoidance, we find a non-linear relation between the two. Specifically, we find that CEO compensation incentives exhibit a positive relation with corporate tax avoidance at low levels of compensation incentives, whereas they show a negative relation at high levels of compensation incentives. We further find that the non-linear relationship between CEO compensation incentives and corporate tax avoidance does not exist for the subsample of S&P500 firms. Collectively, we provide evidence of the two counter effective forces, namely, - the incentive alignment effect and the risk-reducing effect, - that help explain the effect of CEO compensation incentives on tax avoidance.

scholarly journals Does executive compensation reflect equity risk incentives and corporate tax avoidance? A Japanese perspective

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 60-71
Author(s):  
Hiroshi Ohnuma
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Net Present Value ◽  
Multivariate Analyses ◽  
Risk Measures ◽  
Estimation Method ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Present Value ◽  
Corporate Tax ◽  
Equity Risk ◽  
Japanese Perspective

This study examines corporate tax avoidance as a determinant of executive compensation on the basis of equity risk incentives. Previous research shows that equity risk incentives motivate managers to make more risky, but positive net present value—investment decisions. Through correlation analyses, this study demonstrates that the tax risk measures adopted in this study are negatively associated with both the adoption of stock options and tax aggressive measures. Through multivariate analyses, this study demonstrates that executive compensations are significantly associated with our measures of tax risk positions despite the inclusion of several control variables. Moreover, this study finds consistent evidence that executive equity risk incentives are significantly associated with aggressive tax positions, regardless of the estimation method and the strength of the corporate governance function, and across several tax risk measures.

scholarly journals The Influence of Executive Compensation and Executive Shares Ownership towards Corporate Tax Avoidance

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 49
Author(s):  
Melisa Rahardja Tandiono ◽  
Setyarini Santosa
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Annual Report ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Building Construction ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Company Performance ◽  
Negative Coefficient ◽  
Corporate Tax ◽  
Construction Company

<p>This study aims to examine the influence of executive compensation and executive shares ownership towards tax avoidance. By knowing the influence of executive compensation and executive shares ownership towards tax avoidance, it could be an input for better regulations relates to tax avoidance. This study used the annual report of property, real estate, and building construction company listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2014-2018. This study uses purposive sampling to determine the samples. There are 14 companies used in this research, in total there are 70 annual reports as samples used in this research. The control variables used in this research are company performance proxied using return on asset and company size proxied using total asset. The method used in this research is multiple linear regression. This study found that executive compensation has significant influence with negative coefficient on tax avoidance and executive shares ownership does not influence tax avoidance.</p>

Does Inside Debt Moderate Corporate Tax Avoidance?

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas R. Kubick ◽  
G. Brandon Lockhart ◽  
John R. Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Corporate Tax ◽  
Inside Debt
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