Judicial law-making and European integration: the European Court of Justice

2006 ◽  
pp. 187-202
Keyword(s):  
European Integration ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Law Making

scholarly journals Euratom, the European Court of Justice, and the Limits of Nuclear Integration in Europe

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (8) ◽  
pp. 1637-1659 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Wolf
Keyword(s):  
European Integration ◽  
Energy Supply ◽  
Nuclear Energy ◽  
European Economic Community ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Economic Community ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Energy Community

Only a few European integration experts know that Jean Monnet, one of the masterminds of the European Coal and Steel Community, strongly preferred the European Atomic Energy Community to the European Economic Community in the 1950s and 1960s. From his point of view, sectoral and technical cooperation in the field of nuclear energy seemed to be much more promising in order to foster European integration than cross-sectoral economic integration. Monnet and others believed that nuclear energy could, inter alia, solve all energy supply problems, would revolutionize research and technical development, and could contribute to unifying the peoples of Europe in a few decades. However, nuclear energy in general and Euratom in particular have belied these expectations.

Understanding the Role of the European Court of Justice in European Integration

2012 ◽  
Vol 106 (1) ◽  
pp. 214-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
CLIFFORD J. CARRUBA ◽  
MATTHEW GABEL ◽  
CHARLES HANKLA
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Political Constraints ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Theoretical Foundations

In 2008 we published an article finding evidence for political constraints on European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision making. Stone Sweet and Brunell (this issue) argue that our theoretical foundations are fundamentally flawed and that our empirical evidence supports neofunctionalism over intergovernmentalism “in a landslide.” We respectfully disagree with Stone Sweet and Brunell regarding both their conclusions about our theoretical arguments and what the empirical evidence demonstrates. We use this response to clarify our argument and to draw a clearer contrast between our and their perspective on the role the ECJ plays in European integration. Finally, we reevaluate their neofunctionalist hypotheses. Ultimately, we do not find support in the data for Stone Sweet and Brunell's empirical claims.

The Wall Around EU Fundamental Freedoms: the Purely Internal Rule at the Forty-Year Mark

2019 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
pp. 153-219
Author(s):  
Amedeo Arena
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Integration Process ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Fortieth Anniversary ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Fundamental Freedoms

Abstract ‘Purely internal situations’ are sets of facts entirely confined within a single Member State. According to the ‘purely internal rule’, introduced by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 1979, purely internal situations lie outside the scope of the internal market fundamental freedoms and of other EU provisions having a cross-border scope. On the fortieth anniversary of the jurisprudential genesis of the purely internal rule, this article seeks to examine its origins, rationale, and evolution, by analyzing the most relevant patterns in the over 250 preliminary rulings handed down in disputes involving purely internal situations. This survey will enable an assessment of the systemic significance of the purely internal rule and of the consequences that abolishing that rule would have for the European integration process.

Are Advocates General Political? An Empirical Analysis of the Voting Behavior of the Advocates General at the European Court of Justice

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Frankenreiter
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
The Political ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Political Preferences ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court

AbstractThe question whether political preferences of EU Member States play a role in the decision-making of the members of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has so far gone largely unanswered in the literature. This paper formally tests the hypothesis that the political preferences of Member State governments are reflected in the decisions of the Advocates General, who are judge-like members of the ECJ. The empirical analysis is motivated by a novel model of the interaction between the Advocate General and the judicial panel. Based on this model, the paper develops a formal test to answer whether there is a relationship between the policy preferences of EU Member State governments with regard to European integration and the decision behavior of Advocates General appointed by these governments. It then tests this hypothesis using a newly assembled dataset combining information on agreements and disagreements between the opinions issued by the Advocates General and the ensuing judgments of the ECJ in preliminary ruling proceedings with information on political preferences of Member State governments obtained from party manifesto data. The results of this test suggest that the votes of Advocates General reflect the political preferences of the appointing governmentsvis-à-visEuropean integration.

Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community

1997 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark A. Pollack
Keyword(s):  
European Integration ◽  
European Community ◽  
Regional Integration ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Traditional Schools ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Status ◽  
Supranational Institutions ◽  
Causal Variable

Do supranational institutions matter—do they deserve the status of an independent causal variable—in the politics of the European Community (EC)? Does the Commission of the European Communities matter? Does the European Court of Justice (ECJ) or the European Parliament? Is the EC characterized by continued member state dominance or by a runaway Commission and an activist Court progressively chipping away at this dominance? These are some of the more important questions for our understanding of the EC and of European integration. They have divided the two traditional schools of thought in regional integration, with neofunctionalists generally asserting, and intergovernmentalists generally denying, any important causal role for supranational institutions in the integration process. By and large, however, neither neofunctionalism nor intergovernmentalism has generated testable hypotheses regarding the conditions under which, and the ways in which, supranational institutions exert an independent causal influence on either EC governance or the process of European integration.

scholarly journals The European Court of Justice: Of Institutions and Democracy

1998 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Shapiro
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Limited Government ◽  
Administrative Action ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Court Interpreting ◽  
Law Making

The problem of democracy and judicial review is a problem engendered by successful constitutional courts. For where courts are not successful in establishing veto powers over legislation, no problem or only a very limited problem occurs. Of course any court interpreting statutes in the process of applying them does some law making. How much this law making interferes with democracy depends on how easy it is for the legislature to legislate. Where legislatures can amend statutes easily, they can easily correct “errors” of judicial statutory interpretation. Judicial review of the lawfulness of administrative action essentially involves the same power of statutory interpretation with the same potential for legislative correction.Most of the nations of the world that do not have successful constitutional courts are not democracies. Indeed, no state without considerable claims to democracy has successful judicial review. These facts are clues to the obvious. Constitutional government is limited government. In the real world we do not encounter nondemocratic limited governments although we encounter many shades of more or less democratic, more or less constitutional governments. So there is some affinity between democracy and constitutionalism.

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