Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community

1997 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark A. Pollack
Keyword(s):  
European Integration ◽  
European Community ◽  
Regional Integration ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Traditional Schools ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Status ◽  
Supranational Institutions ◽  
Causal Variable

Do supranational institutions matter—do they deserve the status of an independent causal variable—in the politics of the European Community (EC)? Does the Commission of the European Communities matter? Does the European Court of Justice (ECJ) or the European Parliament? Is the EC characterized by continued member state dominance or by a runaway Commission and an activist Court progressively chipping away at this dominance? These are some of the more important questions for our understanding of the EC and of European integration. They have divided the two traditional schools of thought in regional integration, with neofunctionalists generally asserting, and intergovernmentalists generally denying, any important causal role for supranational institutions in the integration process. By and large, however, neither neofunctionalism nor intergovernmentalism has generated testable hypotheses regarding the conditions under which, and the ways in which, supranational institutions exert an independent causal influence on either EC governance or the process of European integration.

Party Autonomy in the Brussels I Regulation and Rome I Regulation and the European Court of Justice

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (11) ◽  
pp. 1505-1524 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan-Jaap Kuipers
Keyword(s):  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Brussels Convention ◽  
Private International Law ◽  
International Convention ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Rome Convention ◽  
The Status ◽  
Contractual Obligations ◽  
Rome I

The relationship between Community law and Private International Law (PIL) did not have an easy start. The original EEC Treaty merely made one reference to PIL. The notable exception was the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (1968), an international convention concluded on the basis of art. 220 EEC (293 EC). The Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980) did not even have an explicit legal basis. After the adoption of the Rome Convention it remained relatively silent on the Community level. It did not help that due to the status of international convention the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was deprived of any power of interpretation. The problem was resolved in two separate protocols. The protocol on the Brussels Convention entered into force in 1975 and the protocol on the Rome Convention only entered into force in 2004. Whereas there has been a substantial amount of case-law on the Brussels Convention, the ECJ only delivered its first judgment on the Rome Convention in October 2009.

Would chocolate by any other name taste as sweet?

2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 571-587 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald Slater
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
European Community ◽  
Consumer Protection ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Generic Product ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Food Law ◽  
European Court

Food law in the European Community is a touchy subject. One of the big ongoing debates in this area centres on the question of what names we call our foodstuffs by. In an internal market where local supermarket shelves are stocked with products coming from all around the EC and beyond, how can we be sure that the contents of the packets conform to our connotations of the name on the label? For example, if it says “chocolate” on the label, how can we be sure that it really is “chocolate” within our understanding of the word? The question of what names can or should go on labels is, sadly, very complicated. This article therefore intends to look at only one aspect of this problem: when a Member State is allowed to insist that the name of an imported “generic” product be changed. We will begin by briefly looking at the case law and one of the major pieces of legislation in this area – the Labelling Directive – before going on to discuss application of the law to the recent Chocolate Cases, handed down by the European Court of Justice (hereafter the “Court”) at the beginning of this year. This discussion will give some (hopefully) interesting insights into the way in which primary law, as interpreted by the Court, and secondary legislation interact and into the balancing of consumer protection and free trade performed by the Court.

The European Community, the European Court of Justice and the Law of the Sea

2008 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 643-713 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sonja Boelaert-Suominen
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
European Community ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Law Of The Sea ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Fishery Policy ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Law

AbstractThe European Community has gradually increased its focus on marine and maritime affairs, starting with the Community's Fishery Policy in the 1970s and culminating recently in the 2007 Blue Book on an Integrated Maritime Policy of the European Union. The Community's increased clout over marine and maritime matters has been reflected also in the case law of the European Court of Justice. From the outset the Court has given great impetus to the Community's efforts to assert its external competence in matters related to fisheries and conservation of biological resources of the sea. Even so, the Court has thus far only occasionally been confronted with public international law questions pertaining to the law of the sea. However, the few cases in which the Court has addressed such issues are worthy of note. For example, the Court has ruled on whether Member States should be allowed to rely on the international law of the sea in order to derogate from obligations under Community law; whether Member States should be allowed to prefer the dispute settlement provisions set out in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea over the Community's own dispute settlement system; and on whether private parties may invoke arguments derived from the customary or conventional international law of the sea to challenge the validity of Community legislation pertaining to marine and maritime matters. The resulting judgments of the European Court of Justice have often turned out to be landmark cases, although some of them have tended to divide academic opinion.

scholarly journals Euratom, the European Court of Justice, and the Limits of Nuclear Integration in Europe

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (8) ◽  
pp. 1637-1659 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Wolf
Keyword(s):  
European Integration ◽  
Energy Supply ◽  
Nuclear Energy ◽  
European Economic Community ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Economic Community ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Energy Community

Only a few European integration experts know that Jean Monnet, one of the masterminds of the European Coal and Steel Community, strongly preferred the European Atomic Energy Community to the European Economic Community in the 1950s and 1960s. From his point of view, sectoral and technical cooperation in the field of nuclear energy seemed to be much more promising in order to foster European integration than cross-sectoral economic integration. Monnet and others believed that nuclear energy could, inter alia, solve all energy supply problems, would revolutionize research and technical development, and could contribute to unifying the peoples of Europe in a few decades. However, nuclear energy in general and Euratom in particular have belied these expectations.

Understanding the Role of the European Court of Justice in European Integration

2012 ◽  
Vol 106 (1) ◽  
pp. 214-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
CLIFFORD J. CARRUBA ◽  
MATTHEW GABEL ◽  
CHARLES HANKLA
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Political Constraints ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Theoretical Foundations

In 2008 we published an article finding evidence for political constraints on European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision making. Stone Sweet and Brunell (this issue) argue that our theoretical foundations are fundamentally flawed and that our empirical evidence supports neofunctionalism over intergovernmentalism “in a landslide.” We respectfully disagree with Stone Sweet and Brunell regarding both their conclusions about our theoretical arguments and what the empirical evidence demonstrates. We use this response to clarify our argument and to draw a clearer contrast between our and their perspective on the role the ECJ plays in European integration. Finally, we reevaluate their neofunctionalist hypotheses. Ultimately, we do not find support in the data for Stone Sweet and Brunell's empirical claims.

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