Vertical Restrictions: Development of Theory, Antitrust Legislation and Enforcement

2010 ◽  
pp. 110-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Avdasheva ◽  
N. Dzagurova
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Theory ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Hierarchical Organization ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
New Institutional Theory ◽  
Antitrust Laws ◽  
Antitrust Legislation ◽  
Market Organization

The article examines the interpretation of vertical restraints in Chicago, post-Chicago and New Institutional Economics approaches, as well as the reflection of these approaches in the application of antitrust laws. The main difference between neoclassical and new institutional analysis of vertical restraints is that the former compares the results of their use with market organization outcomes, and assesses mainly horizontal effects, while the latter focuses on the analysis of vertical effects, comparing the results of vertical restraints application with hierarchical organization. Accordingly, the evaluation of vertical restraints impact on competition differs radically. The approach of the New Institutional Theory of the firm seems fruitful for Russian markets.

The Nature of Vertical Restraints

1985 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-197
Author(s):  
Robert L. Steiner
Keyword(s):  
Vertical Restraints

scholarly journals Competitive Pressure and the Adoption of Complementary Innovations

2012 ◽  
Vol 102 (4) ◽  
pp. 1540-1570 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Kretschmer ◽  
Eugenio J Miravete ◽  
José C Pernías
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Model ◽  
Distribution System ◽  
Unobserved Heterogeneity ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Innovation Adoption ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
Competitive Pressure ◽  
Software Applications ◽  
Exclusive Territories

Liberalization of the European automobile distribution system in 2002 limits the ability of manufacturers to impose vertical restraints, leading to a substantial increase in competitive pressure among dealers. We estimate an equilibrium model of profit maximization to evaluate how dealers change their innovation adoption strategies following the elimination of exclusive territories. Using French data we evaluate the existence of complementarities between the adoption of software applications and the scale of production. Firms view these innovations as substitutes and concentrate their effort in one type of software as they expand their scale of production. Results are robust to the existence of unobserved heterogeneity. (JEL D24, K21, L21, L22, L62, O32)

scholarly journals Risks Facing the Retailers and Vertical Restraints

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-37
Author(s):  
Nataliya B. Dzagurova
Keyword(s):  
Vertical Restraints
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