Critical examination of the role of private actors in the fight against money laundering: the case of the UK retail banking industry

2013 ◽  
pp. 109-120
2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-274
Author(s):  
Karin Svedberg Helgesson ◽  
Ulrika Mörth

This article discusses the role of private actors in the finance–security nexus. It analyses how the delegated authority bestowed upon private actors in anti-money laundering and combating terrorist financing (AML/CTF) may be perceived not as empowerment but as an expression of a threatening invasive and hegemonic order: To reap the possible benefits offered by the security paradigm in the ‘war on terror’, private actors must relinquish a degree of self-determinacy. This threat to self-determinacy, it is argued, foregrounds (affective) resistance among for-profit professionals. The article probes how for-profit professionals engage in (affective) resistance through self-authorship. Evoking Hansen’s discourse analysis on linkages and differentiation, the empirical analysis delineates how lawyers in the UK and France resist being resilient subjects in AML/CTF. It shows how for-profit professionals use self-authorship for purposes of (affective) resistance. Specifically, it finds that the linkages and counter-values subjects pin to the perceived invasive order of AML/CTF serve as poles in the fence protecting a space where professional identity is safeguarded. In this way, actors became resisting subjects when faced with obligations to be resilient. In conclusion, the article affords nuance to the role of private actors in the finance–security nexus by outlining how the forging of the first link in De Goede’s security chain is undermined.


2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 471-484 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karin Svedberg Helgesson

Recent risk-based regulation on anti-money laundering emphasises the need for private business actors to be more actively engaged in preventative efforts. This proposed public-private partnership against crime raises important questions of how to balance values and interests as it situates business actors in an intricate position at the centre of conflicting claims and attributions. Based on an interview study of the banking industry in Sweden, this article analyses how surveillance for the state in relation to anti-money laundering is implemented into the business-as-usual of business actors. The findings support the initial assumption that the role of agent of the state is in conflict with the role of being an agent for private principals. However, a complementary tentative conclusion is that the demands of one principal could also be beneficial for promoting the interests of the other principal. Finally, it is suggested that making oneself more accountable may, in fact, be a means to limit corporate accountability.


2020 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 100871
Author(s):  
Shakeel Ahmed ◽  
Kenbata Bangassa ◽  
Saeed Akbar

Organization ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 407-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ajit Nayak ◽  
Antony Beckett

2007 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Favarel-Garrigues ◽  
T. Godefroy ◽  
P. Lascoumes

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