2002 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yung Chul Park ◽  
Yunjong Wang

As was the case in the Mexican crisis of 1994–95, the G-7 and international financial institutions appear to have lost their zeal to garner the support they need for reform. The ongoing debate on the future direction of international financial reform suggests that most of the problems are likely to remain unchanged. This pessimistic outlook arouses a deep concern in developing countries that they will remain vulnerable to future financial crises, even if they faithfully carry out the kinds of reform recommended by the IMF and the World Bank. Given this reality, developing countries may have to develop a national or regional defense mechanism of their own by instituting a system of capital controls, adopting an exchange rate system that lies somewhere between the two-corner solutions, or strengthening regional financial cooperation.


2021 ◽  
pp. 232-256
Author(s):  
Quentin Deforge ◽  
Benjamin Lemoine

In this article, we analyse how international crises and conflicts over sovereign debt have transformed the agenda of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Geneva-based organization founded in 1964 and whose history is closely linked to the G77 group of developing countries. We show how UNCTAD’s projects for structural reform of the international financial architecture were contested and ultimately rejected in the 1970s. Such defeats were a blow to the transformative goals that UNCTAD had initially set to achieve. In the 1980s, UNCTAD gradually became a technical agency and its mandate restricted to providing expert assistance and support to developing countries during their negotiations with the Paris Club. Meanwhile, the mandate to produce expertise at the macro level (the so-called ‘upstream’ area), was effectively transferred to the IMF and World Bank. With the development of the Debt Management Financial Analysis System (DMFAS), UNCTAD went from promoting systemic change in international financial architecture to sponsoring the micro-management of domestic policies as remedy to over-indebtedness. But we also show that UNCTAD did not always restrict itself to doing such ‘downstream’ work, i.e., improving debt issuing capacities and technologies of developing countries. While UNCTAD’s recent project on fair principles of lending and borrowing principles conforms to what’s expected from the group of advanced countries, another project involving the creation of an international mechanism of sovereign debt restructuring functioned as a disturbance to this fragile downstream–upstream division of labour between international organizations.


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