Thomas Nagel MORAL LUCK

Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Paul Schollmeier

Moral philosophers, beginning with Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, have recently broached the topic of moral luck in the philosophical literature. They limit their discussion however to considerations of how luck affects our ability to carry out actions or how it affects the consequences of our actions. I wish to suggest that luck is also an important factor in determining our actions as ends in themselves. What actions we may choose to perform for their own sake in a given situation depends much more than we might care to think on causes beyond our control. Our happiness rests ultimately on our luckiness.


Philosophy ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 59 (229) ◽  
pp. 323-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henning Jensen

Thomas Nagel recognizes that it is commonly believed that people can neither be held morally responsible nor morally assessed for what is beyond their control. Yet he is convinced that although such a belief may be intuitively plausible, upon reflection we find that we do make moral assessments of persons in a large number of cases in which such assessments depend on factors not under their control. Of such factors he says: ‘Wherea significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, itcan be called moral luck’ (p. 26).


2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Silcox

AbstractThomas Nagel has proposed that the existence of moral luck mandates a general attitude of skepticism in ethics. One popular way of arguing against Nagel’s claim is to insist that the phenomenon of moral luck itself is an illusion , in the sense that situations in which it seems to occur may be plausibly re-described so as to show that agents need not be held responsible for the unlucky outcomes of their actions. Here I argue that this strategy for explaining away moral luck fails because it does not take account of the fact that agents in morally unlucky circumstances are uniformly subject to a very specific type of epistemic obligation. I then proceed to sketch out an alternative strategy for blocking the inference to skepticism, one that makes use of the distinctive explanatory resources provided by epistemic virtue theory.


Author(s):  
Daniel Statman

The term ‘moral luck’ was introduced by Bernard Williams in 1976 to convey the idea that moral status is, to a large extent, a matter of luck. For example, that Bob grows up to be vicious and Tom to be virtuous depends very much on their different family conditions and educational background. Following Williams, Thomas Nagel widened the scope of moral luck. The position taken by both stands in stark contrast to the widely-held view, influenced by Kant, that one is morally accountable only for what is under one’s control, so that moral accountability is not a matter of luck. This idea is so deeply entrenched in our modern concept of morality that rejecting it would call for a rethinking and reformulation of the most basic notions of morality. Some have argued that the paradox of moral luck provides a strong reason to abandon traditional moral theories, and lends support to virtue ethics.


2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-49
Author(s):  
Gargi Goswami

The problem of moral luck is a genuine moral problem faced by all of us where the conflict arises on how and upon whom one should place the burden of moral responsibility when the situation is beyond one‟s control. On one hand, people commonly think that a person cannot be justly praised or blamed for his actions unless he controls them. On the other hand, ordinary moral judgments of persons routinely vary based on the actual consequences caused by the person, even when partly or wholly beyond his control. The problem lies in the apparent conflict between the idea that a morally responsible agent must control his actions and the standard practice of blaming people more simply for causing worse results even when the factors are beyond his control. My paper will focus on the various types of moral luck as explained by Thomas Nagel and analyze that the seemingly hopeless situations in the various cases of moral luck can be satisfactorily resolved by a proper theory of moral responsibility.


1987 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-158
Author(s):  
Robert Hopkins
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Author(s):  
Jens Schlieter

This chapter, an excursus, embarks on a more philosophical interpretation of consciousness and experience. Building on Thomas Nagel and Niklas Luhmann, it is argued that human consciousness, defined as a process of self-reproduction of never-ending new possibilities, is perplexed by the task of imagining its own nonexistence. Given that consciousness is not equipped for this task, that is to imagine death (its own nonexistence), it will react with a search for meaning, a context for the existential threat. The excursus argues that this leads to the highly accelerated activity of consciousness. It may result in a phenomenon reported by a certain number of near-death experiencers, namely, the life review. In short, then, the life review is a highly accelerated search for meaning. These deliberations are further substantiated by a comparison with “wake-up dreams,” in which a similar structure becomes visible.


Ethics ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 98 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen L. Darwall
Keyword(s):  

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