Interest Groups, Parties, and Economic Growth in the American States

Author(s):  
Jeffrey E. Cohen ◽  
Gregory C. Brunk
2006 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maxine Berg

Global history has debated the emergence of a divergence in economic growth between China and the West during the eighteenth century. The Macartney Embassy, 1792–94, the first British embassy to China, occurring as it did at the end of the eighteenth century, was an event which revealed changing perceptions of China and the Chinese by different British interest groups from government, trade, industry and enlightened opinion. Many histories of the embassy recount failures of diplomacy and cultural misconception, or divergent ideas of science. This article examines attitudes of British industry to the embassy through the part played in its preparations by the Birmingham industrialist, Matthew Boulton, and revealed in correspondence in the Matthew Boulton Papers. The article uncovers debate among different interest groups over the objects and skilled personnel to be taken on the embassy. Were the objects purveyors of trade or tribute, or of ‘useful knowledge’ and ‘industrial enlightenment’?


1988 ◽  
Vol 82 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Virginia Gray ◽  
David Lowery

Mancur Olson's model of economic growth has attracted great attention as a theoretical account of how interest groups influence the rate of economic growth over time. Moreover, the model appears to have received strong empirical support in Olson's tests employing U.S. state data. However, the specification of the Olson construct in these tests is insufficiently attentive to the complex causal chain implicit in Olson's argument, inadequately accounts for precisely how interest groups matter, and employs a static research design that obfuscates the cause-and-effect relationships posited by the model. We review these issues and develop a more complete specification of the Olson model. The respecified model is then tested using U.S. state data for the period of the late 1970s and early 1980s using new measures of interest-group influence.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (6) ◽  
pp. 1478-1511
Author(s):  
Duarte N. Leite ◽  
Óscar Afonso ◽  
Sandra T. Silva

Understanding the causes of the Industrial Revolution, namely the process of transition from a Malthusian equilibrium to modern economic growth, has been the subject of passionate debate. This paper contributes to insights into the process of industrialization and the demographic transition that followed. We present a model that proposes a mechanism behind the claim that landed elites had strong incentives to block education reforms. By applying the theory of interest groups to landownership, landowners could delay education. However, they could not prevent its introduction indefinitely since gains for the landed elites derived from education would at some moment surpass the costs associated with them. We also sustain that improvements in agricultural productivity prior to the Industrial Revolution may have induced a positive impact on the landowners’ decision to educate the population, which led to an earlier introduction of education reforms. The conclusions fit the patterns of the late boom of industrialization and demographic transition and help explain why some countries (e.g., Britain and The Netherlands) had accelerated education reforms and a faster process of industrialization than most continental countries. A theoretical model is presented, and numerical simulations are exhibited to illustrate our claims.


Public Choice ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
John McCallum ◽  
Andr� Blais

2011 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brenda J. Lutz ◽  
James M. Lutz

AbstractThe American states have demonstrated varying levels of support for animal rights legislation. The activities of interest groups, including pressures from competing groups, help to explain the presence or absence of ten pro-animal regulations and laws. This article analyzes and ranks each of the fifty states with regard to ten key areas of animal protection and welfare legislation. The analysis reveals that states with a more agricultural economic base are less likely to provide protection to animals. In addition, states with a more traditional political culture are less likely to have pro-animal legislation in place.


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