The Double Auction Market Institution: A Survey

2018 ◽  
pp. 3-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Friedman
Keyword(s):  
Double Auction ◽  
Auction Market ◽  
Market Institution

Decentralized problem solving using the double auction market institution

1997 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vijay Rajan ◽  
James R. Slagle ◽  
John Dickhaut ◽  
Arijit Mukherji
Keyword(s):  
Problem Solving ◽  
Double Auction ◽  
Auction Market ◽  
Market Institution

scholarly journals Do traders learn to select efficient market institutions?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Alós-Ferrer ◽  
Johannes Buckenmaier ◽  
Georg Kirchsteiger
Keyword(s):  
Returns To Scale ◽  
Production Costs ◽  
Switching Behavior ◽  
Double Auction ◽  
Trading Behavior ◽  
Market Institutions ◽  
Market Institution ◽  
Simple Rules ◽  
Rules Of Thumb ◽  
Constant Returns To Scale

AbstractWhen alternative market institutions are available, traders have to decide both where and how much to trade. We conducted an experiment where traders decided first whether to trade in an (efficient) double-auction institution or in a posted-offers one (favoring sellers), and second how much to trade. When sellers face decreasing returns to scale (increasing production costs), fast coordination on the double-auction occurs, with the posted-offers institution becoming inactive. In contrast, under constant returns to scale, both institutions remain active and coordination is slower. The reason is that sellers trade off higher efficiency in a market with dwindling profits for biased-up profits in a market with vanishing customers. Hence, efficiency alone might not be sufficient to guarantee coordination on a single market institution if the surplus distribution is asymmetric. Trading behavior approaches equilibrium predictions (market clearing) within each institution, but switching behavior across institutions is explained by simple rules of thumb, with buyers chasing low prices and sellers considering both prices and trader ratios.

scholarly journals Controlling monopoly power in a double‐auction market experiment

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Attanasi ◽  
Kene Boun My ◽  
Andrea Guido ◽  
Mathieu Lefebvre
Keyword(s):  
Monopoly Power ◽  
Double Auction ◽  
Auction Market ◽  
Market Experiment

scholarly journals Performance Evaluation for Transactive Energy Systems Using Double-Auction Market

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
pp. 4128-4137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianming Lian ◽  
Huiying Ren ◽  
Yannan Sun ◽  
Donald J. Hammerstrom
Keyword(s):  
Performance Evaluation ◽  
Energy Systems ◽  
Double Auction ◽  
Auction Market ◽  
Transactive Energy

Minimal Intelligence Agents in Double Auction Markets with Speculators

2011 ◽  
pp. 79-98
Author(s):  
Senlin Wu ◽  
Siddhartha Bhattacharyya
Keyword(s):  
Market Efficiency ◽  
Double Auction ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Agent Based Model ◽  
Market Conditions ◽  
Market Prices ◽  
Auction Markets ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Auction Market

This chapter explores the minimal intelligence conditions for traders in a general double auction market with speculation activities. Using an agent-based model, it is shown that when traders and speculators play together under general market curve settings, zero-intelligent plus (ZIP) is still a sufficient condition for market prices to converge to the equilibrium. At the same time, market efficiency is lowered as the number of speculators increase. The experiments demonstrate that the equilibrium of a double auction market is an interactive result of the intelligence of the traders and other factors such as the type of the players and market conditions. This research fills in an important gap in the literature, and strengthens Cliff and Bruten’s (1997) declaration that zero is not enough for a double auction market.

Experimental Stock Markets with Controlled Risk Preferences

1992 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. O'Brien
Keyword(s):  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
World Market ◽  
Equilibrium Price ◽  
Double Auction ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Market Institution ◽  
Certainty Equivalents ◽  
Optimal Risk Sharing

In this paper the empirical validity of the binary lottery preference inducing technique is tested in a real world market institution. In each market the potential gains to exchange arise from induced risk preferences, and the predicted competitive equilibrium is equivalent to the Pareto optimal risk sharing allocation. Price convergence to (and near) the competitive equilibrium price was rapid in each market, and most trades were individually rational with respect to induced certainty equivalents. This evidence implies that preferences can be induced in an oral double auction institution, using this technique.

scholarly journals An Asynchronous Double Auction Market to Study the Formation of Financial Bubbles and Crashes

2017 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sadek Benhammada ◽  
Frédéric Amblard ◽  
Salim Chikhi
Keyword(s):  
Double Auction ◽  
Auction Market ◽  
Financial Bubbles

scholarly journals Efektivitas Pasar Lelang Bahan Olah Karet dalam Koperasi Unit Desa

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 166-176
Author(s):  
Ulta Marta Seli ◽  
Lukman Mohammad Baga ◽  
Bayu Krisnamurthi
Keyword(s):  
Data Collection ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
International Market ◽  
Crumb Rubber ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Business Unit ◽  
Auction Market ◽  
Market Institution ◽  
Market Output ◽  
High Level

The auction market for crumb rubber is a business unit owned by KUD Berkat. The auction market was formed to obtain the highest price at the farmer level for the sale of crumb rubber. Therefore in this study, it is necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of the auction market for crumb rubber seen from the price, quality, volume, and the number of auction market players and to analyze farmers' perceptions of the effectiveness of the auction market from the auction market output, auction market flexibility, and whether there is tension between institutions in auction market with proportion test. Data collection uses secondary data and primary data obtained by interviewing respondents from weighting a Likert scale, and secondary data obtained from related institutions. The results showed that evaluation of effectiveness the auction market for crumb rubber seen from the price in line with the international market, the quality according to SNI standards and 98% of farmers had fulfilled the 60% KKK, the average of quantity (volume) of crumb rubber every farmer was in a low category, the number of farmers who participated auctions in the five years ago still increased. Farmers' perceptions of the auction market institution for crumb rubber based on the proportion test of more than 50% mean the auction market in KUD has a high level of effectiveness and is feasible to run.

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