scholarly journals Incommensurability and Vagueness in Population Axiology

2021 ◽  
pp. 126-139
Author(s):  
Gustaf Arrhenius
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Samuel Scheffler

Many discussions of future generations attempt to identify a satisfactory population axiology: a principle that would enable us to assess the relative value of total states of affairs that differ in population-related respects. Such an axiology would in turn supply the basis for a principle of beneficence, which would spell out our responsibilities for promoting optimal population outcomes. By contrast, the approach defended in this book is predominantly attachment-based. The reasons for caring about the fate of future generations discussed in previous chapters all depend on our existing values and evaluative attachments and on our conservative disposition to preserve and sustain the things that we value. This chapter appeals to the nature of valuing to clarify these forms of dependence, and it explores the contrast between the axiological and attachment-based approaches.


Author(s):  
Gustaf Arrhenius ◽  
Mark Budolfson ◽  
Dean Spears

Choosing a policy response to climate change seems to demand a population axiology. A formal literature involving impossibility theorems has demonstrated that all possible approaches to population axiology have one or more seemingly counterintuitive implications. This leads to the worry that because axiological theory is radically unresolved, this theoretical ignorance implies serious practical ignorance about what climate policies to pursue. This chapter offers two deflationary responses to this worry. First, it may be that given the actual facts of climate change, all axiologies agree on a particular policy response. In this case, there would be a clear dominance conclusion, and the puzzles of axiology would be practically irrelevant (albeit still theoretically challenging). Second, despite the impossibility results, the authors prove the possibility of axiologies that satisfy bounded versions of all of the desiderata from the population axiology literature, which may be all that is needed for policy evaluation.


2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hilary Greaves ◽  
Toby Ord

Given the deep disagreement surrounding population axiology, one should remain uncertain about which theory is best. However, this uncertainty need not leave one neutral about which acts are better or worse. We show that, as the number of lives at stake grows, the Expected Moral Value approach to axiological uncertainty systematically pushes one toward choosing the option preferred by the Total View and critical-level views, even if one’s credence in those theories is low.


2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-110
Author(s):  
Johan E. Gustafsson

AbstractCritical-Range Utilitarianism is a variant of Total Utilitarianism which can avoid both the Repugnant Conclusion and the Sadistic Conclusion in population ethics. Yet Standard Critical-Range Utilitarianism entails the Weak Sadistic Conclusion, that is, it entails that each population consisting of lives at a bad well-being level is not worse than some population consisting of lives at a good well-being level. In this paper, I defend a version of Critical-Range Utilitarianism which does not entail the Weak Sadistic Conclusion. This is made possible by what I call ‘undistinguishedness’, a fourth category of absolute value in addition to goodness, badness, and neutrality.


2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 344-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johann Frick

AbstractWhat moral reasons, if any, do we have to ensure the long-term survival of humanity? This article contrastively explores two answers to this question: according to the first, we should ensure the survival of humanity because we have reason to maximize the number of happy lives that are ever lived, all else equal. According to the second, seeking to sustain humanity into the future is the appropriate response to the final value of humanity itself. Along the way, the article discusses various issues in population axiology, particularly the so-called Intuition of Neutrality and John Broome’s ‘greediness objection’ to this intuition.


Utilitas ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gustaf Arrhenius

Fred Feldman has proposed a desert-adjusted version of utilitarianism, ‘justicism’, as a plausible population axiology. Among other things, he claims that justicism avoids Derek Parfit's ‘repugnant conclusion’. This paper explains the theory and tries to straighten out some of its ambiguities. Moreover, it is shown that it is not clear whether justicism avoids the repugnant conclusion and that it is has other counter-intuitive implications. It is concluded that justicism is not convincing as a population axiology.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Elliott Thornley

Abstract Lexical views in population axiology can avoid the Repugnant Conclusion without violating Transitivity or Separability. However, they imply a dilemma: either some good life is better than any number of slightly worse lives, or else the ‘at least as good as’ relation on populations is radically incomplete. In this paper, I argue that Archimedean views face an analogous dilemma. I thus conclude that the lexical dilemma gives us little reason to prefer Archimedean views. Even if we give up on lexicality, problems of the same kind remain.


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