Attachment and Axiology

Author(s):  
Samuel Scheffler

Many discussions of future generations attempt to identify a satisfactory population axiology: a principle that would enable us to assess the relative value of total states of affairs that differ in population-related respects. Such an axiology would in turn supply the basis for a principle of beneficence, which would spell out our responsibilities for promoting optimal population outcomes. By contrast, the approach defended in this book is predominantly attachment-based. The reasons for caring about the fate of future generations discussed in previous chapters all depend on our existing values and evaluative attachments and on our conservative disposition to preserve and sustain the things that we value. This chapter appeals to the nature of valuing to clarify these forms of dependence, and it explores the contrast between the axiological and attachment-based approaches.

2002 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 314-341
Author(s):  
Eric Mack

Do differences in income or wealth matter, morally speaking? This essay addresses a broader issue than this question seems to pose. But this broader issue is, I believe, the salient philosophical issue which this question actually poses. Let me explain. Narrowly read, the question at hand is concerned only with inequality of income or wealth. It asks us to consider whether inequality of income or wealth as such is morally problematic. On this construal, the question invites us to consider whether the bare fact that Joshua has a greater income or net worth than Rebekah is a morally defective social state of affairs. Is there at least a significant moral presumption on behalf of equality of income or wealth such that, if an inequality of income or wealth obtains vis-à-vis Joshua and Rebekah, that inequality ought to be nullified unless some impressive positive justification for the inequality can be provided? On this narrow reading, the salient issue is whether there exists in particular an egalitarian presumption with respect to income or wealth. But I believe that the genuinely salient issue here is whether there exists in general an egalitarian presumption with respect to whatever factual condition of individuals one is supposed to attend to when assessing social states of affairs. The crucial question is not whether income or wealth or utility or well-being is the condition the unequal distribution of which is as such morally problematic.


Utilitas ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 232-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS HURKA

T. M. Scanlon has cited the value of friendship in arguing against a ‘teleological’ view of value which says that value inheres only in states of affairs and demands only that we promote it. This article argues that, whatever the teleological view's final merits, the case against it cannot be made on the basis of friendship. The view can capture Scanlon's claims about friendship if it holds, as it can consistently with its basic ideas, that (i) friendship is a higher-level good consisting in appropriate attitudes to other goods and evils in a friend's life, (ii) these goods and evils have agent-relative value, i.e. more value than similar states of strangers, and (iii) the attitudes constituting friendship have less value than their objects. Given these independently plausible claims, the teleological view can agree with Scanlon that, e.g., it is wrong to betray a friend in order to promote more friendships among other people.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Stephen Emet

In this article I pose a challenge for attempts to ground all reasons in considerations of value. Some believe that all reasons for action are grounded in considerations of value. Some also believe that there are agent-relative restrictions, which provide us with agent-relative reasons against bringing about the best state of affairs, on an impartial ranking of states of affairs. Some would like to hold both of these beliefs. That is, they would like to hold that such agent-relative restrictions are compatible with a teleological theory, one that grounds all reasons for action in considerations of value. This is what I will argue is problematic. I will argue that agent-centered restrictions will not fit into a teleological theory. If the correct moral theory is a teleological one, then there are no agent-relative restrictions. If there are agent-relative restrictions, then teleology is false. My argument challenges a particular project, of showing that all ethical theories are broadly consequentialist. The attraction of this project is that it promises to preserve what is thought to be compelling about consequentialism—its teleology and maximizing—while also preserving elements of commonsense morality—such as agent-relative restrictions—that have typically been thought of as distinctly non-consequentialist in nature. If my argument is correct, then this promise cannot be fulfilled.


GeroPsych ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-52
Author(s):  
Matthew C. Costello ◽  
Shane J. Sizemore ◽  
Kimberly E. O’Brien ◽  
Lydia K. Manning

Abstract. This study explores the relative value of both subjectively reported cognitive speed and gait speed in association with objectively derived cognitive speed. It also explores how these factors are affected by psychological and physical well-being. A group of 90 cognitively healthy older adults ( M = 73.38, SD = 8.06 years, range = 60–89 years) were tested in a three-task cognitive battery to determine objective cognitive speed as well as measures of gait speed, well-being, and subjective cognitive speed. Analyses indicated that gait speed was associated with objective cognitive speed to a greater degree than was subjective report, the latter being more closely related to well-being than to objective cognitive speed. These results were largely invariant across the 30-year age range of our older adult sample.


2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 126-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin L. Nabi ◽  
Debora Pérez Torres ◽  
Abby Prestin

Abstract. Despite the substantial attention paid to stress management in the extant coping literature, media use has been surprisingly overlooked as a strategy worthy of close examination. Although media scholars have suggested media use may be driven by a need to relax, related research has been sporadic and, until recently, disconnected from the larger conversation about stress management. The present research aimed to determine the relative value of media use within the broader range of coping strategies. Based on surveys of both students and breast cancer patients, media use emerged as one of the most frequently selected strategies for managing stress across a range of personality and individual difference variables. Further, heavier television consumers and those with higher perceived stress were also more likely to use media for coping purposes. Finally, those who choose media for stress management reported it to be an effective tool, although perhaps not as effective as other popular strategies. This research not only documents the centrality of media use in the corpus of stress management techniques, thus highlighting the value of academic inquiry into media-based coping, but it also offers evidence supporting the positive role media use can play in promoting psychological well-being.


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