Demographic Theory and Population Ethics – Relationships between Population Size and Population Growth

Demographic theory aims at explaining how population systems regulate themselves given available resources. Population ethics is concerned with demography in the sense that the analytical objects of interest are births, deaths, and populations. However, demographic theory which explores theoretically when, how and why populations grow, based on empirically observed patterns, has up until now played a minor role in population ethics. Similarly, debates about population dynamics among demographers have seldom been concerned with ideas and concepts in population ethics. In this manuscript, I will give a brief outline of how population size, population growth, and welfare mutually affect each other. Theories on the endogeneity between population size, population growth, and welfare will be referred to as demographic theory. I will give a particular focus on how population growth responds with respect to welfare, as welfare, utility, well-being, and happiness are important concepts in population ethics. A key concept in demographic theory is population homeostasis (the dynamics of a system which maintains a population at a steady population size, or growth rate), in particular resource dependent homeostasis. I will also discuss demographic theory in relation to historical and future demographic change. This working paper was later published in Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics, and is available at https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/at5pj/

Does Climate Change Put Ethics on a Collision Course with Itself?

The purpose of this paper is to outline an intuitive ethics of climate change, one that understands our maximizing values, according to which it makes things better to make things better for people, to be tempered by our existential values, according to which existence is just different: making things better for a person by way of bringing that person into existence doesn’t, on its own, make things better. Such a reconciliation, I argue, avoids the collision course we can otherwise anticipate between population ethics on the one hand and climate ethics on the other. The work of reconciliation is commenced by reference to what we can call the person-affecting, or person-based, intuition. It’s hard to get that intuition right; we need a formulation of the intuition that avoids the many pitfalls that many earlier formulations have fallen into. The principle I propose is, however, hardly immune to objection. In this paper, I consider and reply to two such objections both of which rely on the claim that probabilities are, in at least some cases, critical to moral evaluation. My counterargument will be that those objections evaporate just as soon as we clearly recognize that the probability facts underlying the one objection are very different from the probability facts underlying the other.

Does Climate Change Policy Depend Importantly on Population Ethics? Deflationary Responses to the Challenges of Population Ethics for Public Policy

Choosing a policy response to climate change seems to demand a population axiology. A formal literature involving impossibility theorems has demonstrated that all possible approaches to population axiology have one or more seemingly counterintuitive implications. This leads to the worry that because axiology is so theoretically unresolved as to permit a wide range of reasonable disagreement, our ignorance implies serious practical ignorance about what climate policies to pursue. We offer two deflationary responses to this worry. First, it may be that given the actual facts of climate change, all axiologies agree on a particular policy response. In this case, there would be a clear dominance conclusion, and the puzzles of axiology would be practically irrelevant (albeit still theoretically challenging). Second, despite the impossibility results, we prove the possibility of axiologies that satisfy bounded versions of all of the desiderata from the population axiology literature, which may be all that is needed for policy evaluation.

Calibrating Variable-Value Population Ethics

Variable-Value axiologies propose solutions to the challenges of population ethics. These views avoid Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion, while satisfying some weak instances of the Mere Addition principle (for example, at small population sizes). We apply calibration methods to Variable-Value views while assuming: first, some very weak instances of Mere Addition, and, second, some plausible empirical assumptions about the size and welfare of the intertemporal world population. We find that Variable-Value views imply conclusions that should seem repugnant to anyone who opposes Total Utilitarianism due to the Repugnant Conclusion. So, any wish to avoid repugnant conclusions is not a good reason to choose a Variable-Value view. More broadly, these calibrations teach us something about the effort to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion. Our results join a recent literature arguing that prior efforts to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion hinge on inessential features of the formalization of repugnance. Some of this effort may therefore be misplaced.

Nondeterminacy and Population Ethics

This paper synthesizes a general view out of Derek Parfit’s last views on how to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion and presents the general features of a plausible theory of population ethics based on Parfit’s suggestions. The paper argues that a plausible population axiology provides only partial orderings and implies that some outcomes are nondeterminate in their ranking. The paper shows, first, how the combination of what Parfit calls “imprecise equality” and the “Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle” allows one to avoid both the Continuum Argument and the Improved Mere Addition Paradox. Second, the paper shows how this is enough to in principle also refute Gustaf Arrhenius’s impossibility theorems. Third, the paper suggests that a plausible population axiology must allow for nondeterminacy, that whatever the substance of the axiology is, it can only provide partial orderings of outcomes, and that if we revise Arrhenius’s adequacy conditions these can condition what a satisfactory population axiology looks like. Finally, the paper illustrates how one can apply normative theories that allow for nondeterminacy and also infer formal constraints on the theories in light of the consequences of their application.

Positive Egalitarianism

According to Positive Egalitarianism, not only do relations of inequality have negative value, as Negative Egalitarians claim, but relations of equality also have positive value. The egalitarian value of a population is a function of both pairwise relations of inequality (negative) and pairwise relations of equality (positive). Positive and Negative Egalitarianism diverge, especially in different number cases. Hence, an investigation of Positive Egalitarianism might shed new light on the vexed topic of population ethics and our duties to future generations. We shall here, in light of some recent criticism, further develop the idea of giving positive value to equal relations.

Positive Egalitarianism Reconsidered

According to positive egalitarianism, not only do relations of inequality have negative value, as negative egalitarians claim, but relations of equality also have positive value. The egalitarian value of a population is a function of both pairwise relations of inequality (negative) and pairwise relations of equality (positive). Positive and negative egalitarianism diverge, especially in different-number cases. Hence, an investigation of positive egalitarianism might shed new light on the vexed topic of population ethics and our duties to future generations. We shall here, in light of some recent criticism, further develop the idea of giving positive value to equal relations.

Demographic theory and population ethics

Demographic theory is concerned with how population systems regulate themselves given available resources and external shocks to population size. This chapter provides an overview of demographic theory, focusing specifically on relationships between population size, population growth, and welfare. It then discusses four implications of demographic theory for population ethics. Speaking broadly, these four implications concern (1) the overreliance by some population ethicists on Malthusian assumptions about the average welfare of population declining with increasing population size, (2) the likelihood of certain hypothetical scenarios that feature in thought experiments used in population ethics, (3) the prioritization of extinction risks by population ethicists, and (4) the patterns of intergenerational and intertemporal inequality that population ethicists may anticipate over the long run. The chapter closes with a discussion of demographic theory in relation to historical and future demographic change.

Two asymmetries in population and general normative ethics

This paper examines a dilemma in reproductive and population ethics that can illuminate broader questions in axiology and normative ethics. This dilemma emerges because most people have conflicting intuitions concerning whether the interests of non-existent beings can outweigh the interests of existing beings when those merely potential beings are expected to have overall net-good or overall net-bad lives. The paper claims that the standard approach to this issue, in terms of exemplifying the conflict between Narrow Person-Affecting Views and Impersonal Views, is not correct. It argues that, instead, we can approach the issue through the distinction between Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Views about the relative importance of positive and negative value. The paper also claims that Asymmetrical Views provide the most intuitively satisfactory solution to the dilemma and can in addition be defended independently on further grounds. Keywords: person-affecting views, impersonal views, symmetry, asymmetry