The Nature of Emergency Powers and the Limitations of Parliamentary Control

2021 ◽  
pp. 7-33
Author(s):  
Neil Stammers
Keyword(s):  
1985 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 835-862 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Hiley

Modern British counter-espionage effectively began in April 1907, when a joint conference of naval and military officials, formed the previous year to consider ‘the Powers Possessed by the Executive in Time of Emergency’, recommended both an immediate strengthening of the laws against espionage, and a War is Office investigation of ‘the question of police surveillance and control of aliens’. These recommendations were to prove an important initiative, and did much to determine the course of British counter-espionage before 1914, yet at the time they probably seemed little more than an airing of old grievances unlikely to find new support, for they were among the last remnants n. of the abortive ‘Emergency Powers Bill’ which the War Office intelligence department had been advocating to strengthen home defence ever since the invasion scare of 1888. The 1906 joint conference had in fact hoped to further the cause of this great legislative package, with its radically new powers of access, requisition and seizure but, faced with the Liberal administration's commitment to the ‘continuous principle’ that a full-scale landing was impossible, had been forced instead to confine itself to the purely naval and military aspects of home defence. As its report confessed in April 1907, in the prevailing climate of opinion the only hope for the great ‘Emergency Powers Bill’ was as a series of ‘small and independent measures’.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 86-107
Author(s):  
Alexander Merkulenko

Due to the new coronavirus pandemic, high alert regimes were introduced across the Russian Federation in spring 2020. These emergency regimes were established exclusively by the state bodies of the Russian Federation’s constituent units – federal authorities did not introduce their own emergency regimes. This decentralized strategy of fighting the pandemic was also introduced by the USA and Brazil. Their states, without the sanction of the federal government, and in the case of Brazil, ignoring its bans, set emergency restrictions similar to those in Russia. The legal regulation of emergency regimes existed before 2020, when constituent units of the federation (states) actively used their emergency powers. However, the regimes introduced during the fight against the pandemic were slightly different to previous ones. The restrictions on rights and freedoms within these regimes were so severe that not only their proportionality was questioned, but there were also doubts as to whether the regional level of the government had the authority to establish such strict restrictions. In addition, the pandemic exposed old problems and revealed new shortcomings in the legal regulation of emergency regimes: lack of control over the realization of the emergency regime by legislative (representative) authorities, and gaps in legislative regulation – notably in the establishment of possible restrictions and of a mechanism for scrutinizing their proportionality. All this raised questions about the proportionality of the established restrictions. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation resolved a very insignificant amount of the problems. While the United States and Brazil faced similar issues, the practice of scrutinizing implemented restrictions in these countries was more common. This article takes domestic and foreign experiences into account, while examining certain aspects of the establishment and the operation of regional emergency regimes.


1940 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 572
Author(s):  
Frederick L. Schuman ◽  
Frederick Mundell Watkins

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