Multilevel Selection and Units of Selection Up and Down the Biological Hierarchy

Author(s):  
Elisabeth A. Lloyd
Author(s):  
Caroline J. Rose ◽  
Katrin Hammerschmidt ◽  
Paul B. Rainey

AbstractMajor evolutionary transitions in individuality, at any level of the biological hierarchy, occur when groups participate in Darwinian processes as units of selection in their own right. Identifying transitions in individuality can be problematic because apparent selection at one level of the biological hierarchy may be a by-product of selection occurring at another level. Here we discuss approaches to this “levels-of-selection” problem and apply them to a previously published experimental exploration of the evolutionary transition to multicellularity. In these experiments groups of the bacterium Pseudomonas fluorescens were required to reproduce via life cycles involving soma- and germline-like phases. The rate of transition between the two cell types was a focus of selection, and might be regarded as a property of groups, cells, or even genes. By examining the experimental data under several established philosophical frameworks, we argue that in the Pseudomonas experiments, bacterial groups acquired Darwinian properties sufficient to allow the evolution of traits adaptive at the group level.


2018 ◽  
Vol 115 (16) ◽  
pp. 4006-4014 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Ford Doolittle ◽  
S. Andrew Inkpen

Many practicing biologists accept that nothing in their discipline makes sense except in the light of evolution, and that natural selection is evolution’s principal sense-maker. But what natural selection actually is (a force or a statistical outcome, for example) and the levels of the biological hierarchy (genes, organisms, species, or even ecosystems) at which it operates directly are still actively disputed among philosophers and theoretical biologists. Most formulations of evolution by natural selection emphasize the differential reproduction of entities at one or the other of these levels. Some also recognize differential persistence, but in either case the focus is on lineages of material things: even species can be thought of as spatiotemporally restricted, if dispersed, physical beings. Few consider—as “units of selection” in their own right—the processes implemented by genes, cells, species, or communities. “It’s the song not the singer” (ITSNTS) theory does that, also claiming that evolution by natural selection of processes is more easily understood and explained as differential persistence than as differential reproduction. ITSNTS was formulated as a response to the observation that the collective functions of microbial communities (the songs) are more stably conserved and ecologically relevant than are the taxa that implement them (the singers). It aims to serve as a useful corrective to claims that “holobionts” (microbes and their animal or plant hosts) are aggregate “units of selection,” claims that often conflate meanings of that latter term. But ITSNS also seems broadly applicable, for example, to the evolution of global biogeochemical cycles and the definition of ecosystem function.


Author(s):  
Luc Faucher ◽  
Pierre Poirier

Research on the adaptive characteristics of the human immune system reveals that evolutionary algorithms are not strictly matters of replication. And research in genomics suggests that there is no a single source of evolutionary information that carries the same content in every environment. A plausible theory of cultural evolution must acknowledge the possibility that multiple selective algorithms are operating at different time-scales, on different units of selection, with different logical structures; but it must explain how different selective processes are interfaced to yield culturally stable phenomena. This paper advances an empirically plausible approach to memetics that recognizes a wider variety of evolutionary algorithms; and it advances a pluralistic approach to cultural change. Finally, it shows that multiple forms of processing, operating at different timescales, on different units of selection, collectively sustain the human capacity to form and use certain types of representations.


1989 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 395-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisabeth A. Lloyd

1992 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 142-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elliott Sober

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hayley Cameron ◽  
Darren W. Johnson ◽  
Keyne Monro ◽  
Dustin J. Marshall

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