The World Trade Organization’s International Trade Agreements – A Synopsis of the Other Multilateral and the Plurilateral Agreements

Author(s):  
Graeme Baber
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuyi Fang

In this dissertation, I provide a compelling explanation about why the World Trade Organization (WTO) permits retaliation only after a lengthy delay. I then explain why it usually rejects requests for retaliation (or a reciprocal withdrawal of concessions) in other related inter- national agreements. Next, I consider a more general problem about agents negotiating over an allocation of some surplus. This multilateral bargaining model could be applied to international trade or many real-world negotiations. I begin by taking a dynamic mechanism design approach and analyze the welfare effects among same-sector retaliation with and without delay as well as cross-sector retaliation with and without delay. I show that a retaliation with delay mechanism generates higher welfare and supports a higher self-enforcing level of cooperation than does a retaliation without delay mechanism. I demonstrate that under certain conditions, a same-sector retaliation mechanism generates higher welfare and supports a higher self-enforcing level of cooperation than does a cross-sector retaliation mechanism. All the above results are showing to hold for several different stochastic process of how a state of the world evolves. I then consider a more general case of bargaining where the size of the surplus is endogenized. In my model of the first two chapters after the introduction, although the size of the surplus varies across time, it still evolves in a stochastic manner. In many real-world negotiations, however, a surplus is usually created by players and each player may have certain power to influence a recognition process. Hence, my main innovation in the last chapter is to allow a surplus as well as recognition probabilities to be endogenously determined by players' actions. I assume that players' actions can have either persistent or transitory effects on a bargaining process. I compare the equilibrium outcomes under different voting rules and show that when a competition becomes less intensive (i.e., a proposal needs the consents of more players), it raises social welfare while it makes a free-ride problem more severe.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuyi Fang

In this dissertation, I provide a compelling explanation about why the World Trade Organization (WTO) permits retaliation only after a lengthy delay. I then explain why it usually rejects requests for retaliation (or a reciprocal withdrawal of concessions) in other related inter- national agreements. Next, I consider a more general problem about agents negotiating over an allocation of some surplus. This multilateral bargaining model could be applied to international trade or many real-world negotiations. I begin by taking a dynamic mechanism design approach and analyze the welfare effects among same-sector retaliation with and without delay as well as cross-sector retaliation with and without delay. I show that a retaliation with delay mechanism generates higher welfare and supports a higher self-enforcing level of cooperation than does a retaliation without delay mechanism. I demonstrate that under certain conditions, a same-sector retaliation mechanism generates higher welfare and supports a higher self-enforcing level of cooperation than does a cross-sector retaliation mechanism. All the above results are showing to hold for several different stochastic process of how a state of the world evolves. I then consider a more general case of bargaining where the size of the surplus is endogenized. In my model of the first two chapters after the introduction, although the size of the surplus varies across time, it still evolves in a stochastic manner. In many real-world negotiations, however, a surplus is usually created by players and each player may have certain power to influence a recognition process. Hence, my main innovation in the last chapter is to allow a surplus as well as recognition probabilities to be endogenously determined by players' actions. I assume that players' actions can have either persistent or transitory effects on a bargaining process. I compare the equilibrium outcomes under different voting rules and show that when a competition becomes less intensive (i.e., a proposal needs the consents of more players), it raises social welfare while it makes a free-ride problem more severe.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 300-333
Author(s):  
Patrícia Nasser de Carvalho

Desde a institucionalização da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC), em 1995, ficaram evidentes as suas importantes conquistas na promoção do livre comércio e na gestão das regulações de bases multilaterais do Sistema de Comércio Internacional. No entanto, desde a última rodada (ainda em curso) de negociações da OMC, iniciada em 2001, em Doha, também foram revelados diversos impasses, que provocaram lentidão no avanço de entendimentos, parcos resultados no processo decisório e falta de interesse político dos seus membros. Esses obstáculos deixaram um vácuo no Sistema de Comércio Internacional multilateral, que vem sendo preenchido pelos Acordos preferenciais de comércio (APCs), ou seja, a opção dos países, em sua maioria membros da OMC, por barganhar APCs, neste início de século está intrinsicamente ligada às dificuldades encontradas por eles em concluir acordos satisfatórios nas rodadas de negociações comerciais multilaterais. No início do século XXI, a ampliação do número de APCs se dá a um ritmo de crescimento inigualável em todas as regiões do mundo. A partir de uma discussão pautada na perspectiva da Economia Política Internacional, os objetivos deste trabalho são: a) discutir os principais impasses no Sistema de Comércio Internacional multilateral, tendo em vista as dificuldades enfrentadas pela OMC ao longo das últimas duas décadas; b) a partir da análise dos dados disponíveis, identificar as principais configurações e tendências da proliferação de APCs no mundo, processos que se que intensificam na década de 1990, mas que ganharam mais fôlego no início do século XXI e formam estruturas normativas distintas da OMC.   Abstract: Since the institutionalization of the World Trade Organization (WTO), in 1995, its important achievements in the promotion of free trade and in the management of the regulations of multilateral bases of the International Trade System have been evident. However, since the last round (still in progress) of the WTO negotiations, which had begun in Doha in 2001, a number of deadlocks were also been revealed, which have resulted in slow progress in understandings, lack of results in the decision-making process and lack of political interest of its members. However, a number of deadlocks have also been revealed, which have led to slow progress in understanding, poor results in the decision-making process and lack of political interest of its members. These obstacles have left a vacuum in the multilateral International Trade System, which is being filled by the Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). This is the option of countries, mostly of them WTO members, to bargain PTAs, is intrinsically linked to the constraints they encountered in concluding satisfactory agreements in the rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. At the beginning of the 21st century, the expansion of the number of PTAs is at an unequaled growth rate in all regions of the world. From a discussion based on the perspective of International Political Economy, the objectives of this work are: a) to discuss the main deadlocks in the multilateral International Trade System in this century, given the difficulties faced by the WTO over the last two decades; b) from the analysis of the available data, to identify the main configurations and trends of the proliferation of PTAs in the world, processes that have been intensified since the 1990s, but have been a growing trend in the 21st century and taking different normative structures other than the WTO. Keywords: World Trade Organization (WTO); International Trade; Preferential Trade Agreements; International Trade System.     Recebido em: maio/2018 Aprovado em: agosto/2018


foresight ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Pierre Cling

Purpose – The global governance of trade is in a deadlock and the WTO is suffering from a long standing crisis of legitimacy. This paper aims to analyse the main issues which might influence the governance of world trade from now until 2030 and present quantitative projections of international trade. Design/methodology/approach – The research on the main issues which might influence the governance of world trade from now until 2030 draws on a detailed analysis of the WTO and trade policies. Four scenarios of the world economy are presented, which are derived from the international AUGUR research project “Challenges for Europe in the world in 2030” coordinated by Paris Nord University. The analysis takes into account econometric forecasting of world trade conducted in the framework of this project. Findings – First, the failure of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations to reach its ambitious agenda derives from the discrepancy between the governance of world trade and the new power relationship prevailing in the world economy, with new emerging powers (China, India, etc.) rapidly increasing their share of world trade. Second, the continuous restructuring of world trade and economy, which goes together with new forms of globalization, will increase pressure for a profound reform of the governance of world trade in the next few years. Research limitations/implications – This paper calls for a reform of world trade governance, especially of the missions of WTO within a renovated economic world order. Future research could investigate more deeply the potential for regional trade integration, which is reinforced by international production networks. Regional trade agreements might be an increasing alternative to multilateral trade agreements. Originality/value – This paper brings new ideas by raising the issue of the governance of world trade using a prospective approach, with the aim to identify the key channels through which international trade integration will impact the world economy. This study bases its analysis on potential scenarios from now on until 2030, each of these scenarios corresponding to a specific institutional configuration.


2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-141
Author(s):  
Tom S H Moerenhout

ABSTRACT Energy subsidy and pricing reform is widely heralded as a necessity to transition to sustainable development and keep global warming below 2°C. Energy pricing policies and subsidies are also at the heart of the energy–trade–climate nexus, but progress has been slow within the international trade regime. This is unlike other international organizations or networks, where progress has been more substantial. This article investigates the lack of legitimacy to regulate or coordinate pricing reform and links it to fundamentally divergent interests between fuel producers and importers. The article discusses the regulatory and coordinative potential of the World Trade Organization and preferential trade agreements. It finds that at the World Trade Organization, the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the Anti-Dumping Agreement, case law, Ricardian theory, and negotiation history all preempt the consideration of most pricing policies as subsidies. As a result, subsidy notification within the World Trade Organization is low and while other options for improving transparency via the Committee on Trade and Environment and Trade Policy Review Mechanism have been suggested, not much has actually happened because producers protect their comparative advantage. Therefore, support for fuel pricing reform remains on a general level via Ministerial Statements or through general provisions in preferential trade agreements that reconfirm the G-20 and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation commitments to fuel subsidy reform. The only real advancement has been made within bilateral trade negotiations where heavyweights such as the European Union can push trading partners to abandon dual pricing policies.


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