Schumpeterian political economy and Downsian public choice: alternative economic theories of democracy

Author(s):  
Michael Wohlgemuth
2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (6) ◽  
pp. 229-252

The article deals with characteristic features of economic anthropology"s rhetoric of reciprocity and analyzes the factors that affected its formation. The authors consider two principal interpretations of reciprocity in economic anthropology that were formed under the influence of its two main founders - Malinowski and Mauss. The characteristic features of their two types of rhetoric are discussed together with the purposes for which they were used. Two different intentions were pivotal for the work of these researchers and their followers: first, to establish economic anthropology as a positivistic science; and second, to use the analysis of archaic societies as evidence for their critique of a capitalistic economy.To achieve the first task they actively used rhetoric borrowed from the natural sciences, and especially from biology as well as from economic theories that were another social science also striving for a more rigorous positivism. For the second task they turned to the rhetoric of political economy and used arguments based on a dialectical opposition between commodity exchange and gift exchange. The most prominent example of such dialectical rhetoric is in the works of Chris Gregory and Karl Polanyi in which gift exchange was interpreted as a metaphor for a utopian alternative to capitalistic commodity exchange. Because the rhetoric of economic anthropology from its inception to the present has been profoundly influenced by the language of general economic theory, the article examines the genesis of the rhetoric of economics as a science. This leads to an analysis of how the language of economics was affected by the rhetoric of the natural sciences, then of psychology and finally of law.


Author(s):  
Christian Bjørnskov

This chapter provides a selective survey of the literature on social trust in public choice and political economy. It outlines the empirical evidence and discusses theoretical channels through which social trust can affect the quality of institutions and policies, and the conditions under which such mechanisms are likely to work. It also addresses the discussion of reverse causality, that is, whether good institutions or policies actively create trust. It then discusses whether trust can be created or destroyed by activist government policy or accidental institutional changes. Its main focus is on the set of theories and evidence of the association between social trust and institutions of governance.


Author(s):  
Luna Bellani ◽  
Heinrich Ursprung

The authors review the literature on the public-choice analysis of redistribution policies. They restrict the discussion to redistribution in democracies and focus on policies that are pursued with the sole objective of redistributing initial endowments. Since generic models of redistribution in democracies lack equilibria, one needs to introduce structure-inducing rules to arrive at a models whose behavior realistically portrays observed redistribution patterns. These rules may relate to the economic relationships, political institutions, or to firmly established preferences, beliefs, and attitudes of voters. The chapter surveys the respective lines of argument in turn and then present the related empirical evidence.


2012 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-182
Author(s):  
Akira Yokoyama

Abstract The literature of public choice and constitutional political economy argues for fiscal decentralization and for enlarging the tax and spending powers of sub-national tiers of government. Numerous investigations of vertical tax externalities caused by overlapping and uncoordinated taxation appeared in the 1990s after Brennan - Buchanan [1980] and Flowers [1988]. The literature, however, seldom discussed constitutional rules governing overlapping taxation in federal or multi-tiered governmental structures. This paper closes that gap in the literature. It explicates the criteria for selecting constitutional rules governing overlapping taxation and demonstrates that a competitive tax regime constrained by a maximum tax rate surpasses a competitive tax regime without rate constraints as a constitutional rule. It concludes that constraining maximum tax rates applicable to any tax base is highly important in multi-tiered governmental structures.


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