scholarly journals Contra a noção de parte formal: Uma resposta a Kathrin Koslicki

2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rhamon de Oliveira Nunes
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis

Em seu livro de 2008, A estrutura dos objetos, Kathrin Koslicki defende uma teoria mereológica de cunho aristotélico para descrever a natureza dos objetos concretos. Tal teoria tem como coração a ideia de que objetos compostos são fusões de partes materiais e partes formais, ou seja, ela é uma espécie de neo-hilemorfismo. A principal motivação para a adoção de tal tese é se opor a certas teorias de composição, principalmente o universalismo mereológico, defendido por David Lewis (1986 e 1991). Entretanto, pretendo defender que nenhum dos argumentos de Koslicki é satisfatório para a postulação das partes formais. Isso porque os motivos que a levam ao comprometimento com essas entidades não apenas são injustificados, mas também é possível resolver os problemas levantados pela autora sem o apelo à própria noção de parte formal.

Whole New People of the Book

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 24-27
Author(s):  
Aaron Ricker
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Harvard University

A. David Lewis and Martin Lund, eds. 'Muslim Superheroes: Comics, Islam, and Representation'. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017. 264 pp., 15 illustrations. $24.95, paper.

Who Am I to Disagree With David Lewis?

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryan Frances
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis

Intentionalist Strategies of Interpretation

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathleen Stock
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Authorial Intention ◽  
Gregory Currie ◽  
Ordinary Case ◽  
Unreliable Narration ◽  
Fictional Truth

This chapter addresses the complaint that extreme intentionalism standardly forces the reader who engages in interpretation to posit private, or hidden, authorial intentions, for which she has little or no evidence. It is first argued that there are no automatic strategies of interpretation of fictional content: at every stage, whether or not a given interpretative strategy is to be appropriately applied depends on the presence of relevant authorial intention as a sanction. (This section includes a discussion, and rejection, of the views of David Lewis and Gregory Currie about fictional truth; a discussion of the relevance of genre to fictional content; and a consideration of the issue of unreliable narration for an intentionalist view.) The foregoing material on strategies of interpretation is then used to show that it is false to think of the extreme intentionalist as being committed to ‘hidden’ or ‘secret’ meanings in the ordinary case.

Only Imagine

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathleen Stock
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Strong Argument ◽  
Fictional Truth

This book begins with a detailed description and defence of a controversial theory of fictional content (or ‘fictional truth’) known as ‘extreme intentionalism’. On this view, roughly, the fictional content of a particular text is equivalent to exactly what the author of the text intended the reader to imagine. The book situates this theory in relation to its competitors including hypothetical intentionalism, value-maximizing theory, and the influential anti-intentionalism view of David Lewis—and puts forward a strong argument for its superiority, despite its many detractors. In the second half of the book, some consequences of extreme intentionalism are explored as they affect questions such as: the relation of fiction to testimony and belief; whether there are any limits to what we can imagine, and what explains those limits; what is the nature of fiction; to what extent imagination resembles belief; and to what extent the imagination can contribute to the provision of counterfactual and modal knowledge.

David Lewis Meets John Bell

1992 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Butterfield
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis

scholarly journals HIST Award to David Lewis

2018 ◽  
Vol 96 (41) ◽  
pp. 33-33
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis

scholarly journals Philosophy as Synchronic History

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
DANIEL STOLJAR
Keyword(s):  
Causal Explanation ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Philosophy Of History ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
History Of ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Philosophical Progress ◽  
The Way

Abstract Bernard Williams argues that philosophy is in some deep way akin to history. This article is a novel exploration and defense of the Williams thesis (as I call it)—though in a way anathema to Williams himself. The key idea is to apply a central moral from what is sometimes called the analytic philosophy of history of the 1960s to the philosophy of philosophy of today, namely, the separation of explanation and laws. I suggest that an account of causal explanation offered by David Lewis may be modified to bring out the way in which this moral applies to philosophy, and so to defend the Williams thesis. I discuss in detail the consequences of the thesis for the issue of philosophical progress and note also several further implications: for the larger context of contemporary metaphilosophy, for the relation of philosophy to other subjects, and for explaining, or explaining away, the belief that success in philosophy requires a field-specific ability or brilliance.

scholarly journals Necessitism, Contingentism, and Lewisian Modal Realism

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Nencha
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Timothy Williamson ◽  
Restricted Quantification

AbstractNecessitism is the controversial thesis that necessarily everything is necessarily something, namely that everything, everywhere, necessarily exists. What is controversial about necessitism is that, at its core, it claims that things could not have failed to exist, while we have a pre-theoretical intuition that not everything necessarily exists. Contingentism, in accordance with common sense, denies necessitism: it claims that some things could have failed to exist. Timothy Williamson is a necessitist and claims that David Lewis is a necessitist too. The paper argues that, granted the assumptions that lead to interpret the Lewisian as a necessitist, she can preserve contingentist intuitions, by genuinely agreeing with the folk that existence is contingent. This is not just the uncontroversial claim that the Lewisian, as a result of the prevalence of restricted quantification in counterpart theoretic regimentations of natural language, can agree with the folk while disagreeing with them in the metaphysical room. Rather, this is the claim that it is in the metaphysical room that the Lewisian can endorse the intuitions lying behind contingentism.

scholarly journals God and the Playpen: On the Feasibility of Morally Better Worlds

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 266
Author(s):  
Cheryl K. Chen
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Actual World ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Moral Good ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
Divine Intervention ◽  
Horrendous Evil ◽  
Good And Evil ◽  
Free Will Defense ◽  
Better Than

According to the free will defense, God cannot create a world with free creatures, and hence a world with moral goodness, without allowing for the possibility of evil. David Lewis points out that any free will defense must address the “playpen problem”: why didn’t God allow creatures the freedom required for moral goodness, while intervening to ensure that all evil-doing is victimless? More recently, James Sterba has revived the playpen problem by arguing that an omnipotent and benevolent God would have intervened to prevent significant and especially horrendous evil. I argue that it is possible, at least, that such divine intervention would have backfired, and that any attempt to create a world that is morally better than this one would have resulted in a world that is morally worse. I conclude that the atheologian should instead attack the free will defense at its roots: either by denying that the predetermination of our actions is incompatible with our freely per-forming them, or by denying that the actual world—a world with both moral good and evil—is more valuable than a world without any freedom at all.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document