Interpersonal comparisons of the good

Utilitas ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 288-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
MATHEW COAKLEY

To evaluate the overall good/welfare of any action, policy or institutional choice we need some way of comparing the benefits and losses to those affected: we need to make interpersonal comparisons of the good/welfare. Yet sceptics have worried either: (1) that such comparisons are impossible as they involve an impossible introspection across individuals, getting ‘into their minds’; (2) that they are indeterminate as individual-level information is compatible with a range of welfare numbers; or (3) that they are metaphysically mysterious as they assume the existence either of a social mind or of absolute levels of welfare when no such things exist. This article argues that such scepticism can potentially be addressed if we view the problem of interpersonal comparisons as fundamentally an epistemic problem – that is, as a problem of forming justified beliefs about the overall good based on evidence of the individual good.


Author(s):  
Torbjörn Tännsjö

The idea that it is bad for a person when someone else is better off is presented. If taken seriously, this means that one should maximize not the sum total of happiness but a weighed sum where the weights for each person are given with reference to a position in relation to others with regard to happiness. This is egalitarianism. The egalitarian idea presupposes that interpersonal comparisons of happiness are possible and it takes for granted the distinction between persons. Yet, while it acknowledges that compensation within lives is morally unproblematic, and accepts some compensation between lives, the latter kind of compensation comes with a moral price whenever it means that increments fall on those who are better off rather on those who are worse off (comparatively speaking). Since compensation within lives is considered morally acceptable it is maintained that when we assess how badly off a person is, in relation to others, we focus on their entire lives rather than on time-slice of them.


2020 ◽  
pp. 172-174
Author(s):  
Louis Narens ◽  
Brian Skyrms

What is Utilitarianism? The answer is not obvious, and without and answer much that has been written about Utilitarianism is not meaningful. But measurement of hedonic value of episodes on a ratio scale opens up possibilities various kinds of product utilitarianism without interpersonal comparisons. And equilibration dynamics opens up the possibility of conventional interpersonal comparisons, and the use of the Utilitarian sum.


2020 ◽  
pp. 160-171
Author(s):  
Louis Narens ◽  
Brian Skyrms

Interpersonal comparisons of utility can be conventional. Alternative conventions are possible. The (conventional) aggregate utility can be used for equilibrium selection. This solves the old Utilitarian problem of conflict between maximizing individual and group utility. Conditions on an equilibration dynamics leading to such a convention are given.


2020 ◽  
pp. 145-159
Author(s):  
Louis Narens ◽  
Brian Skyrms

A theory of hedonic episodes is given. A representation theorem is given, which measures utility on a ratio scale.For aggregation of pleasures for a group, the product of individual utilities is meaningful without interpersonal comparisons. Common “counterexamples” to Utilitarianism turn out not to be meaningful. There are two distinct kinds of group expected utility: one violates group rationality, the other violates Pareto dominance.


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