Aggregation Without Interpersonal Comparisons of Well‐Being

Author(s):  
Jacob M. Nebel

2006 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafael Di Tella ◽  
Robert MacCulloch

Happiness research is based on the idea that it is fruitful to study empirical measures of individual welfare. The most common is the answer to a simple well-being question such as “Are you Happy?” Hundreds of thousands of individuals have been asked this question, in many countries and over many years. Researchers have begun to use these data to tackle a variety of important questions in economics. Some require strong assumptions concerning interpersonal comparisons of utility, but others make only mild assumptions in this regard. They range from microeconomic questions, such as the way income and utility are connected, to macroeconomic questions such as the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment, including large areas in political economy. Public policy is another area where progress using happiness data is taking place. Given the central role of utility notions in economic theory, we argue that the use of happiness data in empirical research should be given serious consideration.



1993 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 129
Author(s):  
Michael Hechter ◽  
Jon Elster ◽  
John E. Roemer


Author(s):  
Charles Blackorby ◽  
Walter Bossert

This article provides a short survey of the use of interpersonal comparisons in social evaluation. The focus of this discussion is on the principles for social evaluation that are welfarist, or those principles that use information about individual well-being to rank alternatives. The article reviews some of the most important characterization results for the welfarist social evaluation principles. A basic notation, along with a formal definition of social evaluation functionals, is introduced. The article then formulates some basic axioms for social evaluation orderings, and this is followed by an introduction to information invariance properties. The article also provides an overview of some important results.



2007 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARC FLEURBAEY

It has become accepted that social choice is impossible in the absence of interpersonal comparisons of well-being. This view is challenged here. Arrow obtained an impossibility theorem only by making unreasonable demands on social choice functions. With reasonable requirements, one can get very attractive possibilities and derive social preferences on the basis of non-comparable individual preferences. This new approach makes it possible to design optimal second-best institutions inspired by principles of fairness, while traditionally the analysis of optimal second-best institutions was thought to require interpersonal comparisons of well-being. In particular, this approach turns out to be especially suitable for the application of recent philosophical theories of justice formulated in terms of fairness, such as equality of resources.





Author(s):  
Ken Binmore

There are at least as many views on how the welfare of individuals should be compared as there are authors who write on the subject. An indication of the bewildering range of issues considered relevant in the literature is provided by the book Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being (Elster & Roemer 1991). However, this article plans to interpret the interpersonal comparison of utility narrowly. Although it reviews some traditional approaches along the way, its focus is on what the modern economists mean when they talk about units of utility and how can such utils be compared. It is widely thought that utils assigned to different individuals cannot sensibly be compared at all.



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