Adaptive preferences and the burqa

Keyword(s):  
Utilitas ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Stéphane Lemaire

Abstract Subjectivism about well-being holds that an object contributes to one's well-being to the extent that one has a pro-attitude toward this object under certain conditions. Most subjectivists have contended that these conditions should be ideal. One reason in favor of this idea is that when people adapt their pro-attitudes to situations of oppression, the levels of well-being they may attain is diminished. Nevertheless, I first argue that appealing to idealized conditions of autonomy or any other condition to erase or replace adaptive pro-attitudes is mistaken. Second, I show that the most natural version of subjectivism that does not appeal to any such idealizing condition can explain why the well-being of people having adaptive pro-attitudes should not be restricted to the fulfillment of these pro-attitudes. In sum, the existence of adaptive preferences does not militate in favor of the introduction of conditions of idealization but against it.


2021 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-220
Author(s):  
Joseph A. Stramondo ◽  

Both mainstream and disability bioethics sometimes contend that the self-assessment of disabled people about their own well-being is distorted by adaptive preferences that are only held because other, better options are unavailable. I will argue that both of the most common ways of understanding adaptive preferences—the autonomy-based account and the well-being account—would reject blanket claims that disabled people’s QOL self-assessment has been distorted, whether those claims come from mainstream bioethicists or from disability bioethicists. However, rejecting these generalizations for a more nuanced view still has dramatic implications for the status quo in both health policy and clinical ethics.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 35-54
Author(s):  
Jonathan S. Masur

Abstract In a series of important papers published roughly twenty years ago, Professor Robert Cooter developed a comprehensive economic theory of moral norms. He explained the value of those norms, described the process by which norms are adopted, and offered a set of predictions regarding the circumstances under which an individual will choose to adopt a particular moral norm. This brief Article applies behavioral law and economics and hedonic psychology to expand upon Professor Cooter’s path-breaking theory. In particular, understanding welfare in hedonic terms — rather than preference-satisfaction terms — suggests a multitude of further situations in which individuals will justifiably seek to internalize moral norms. The hedonic approach to welfare then further suggests an enhanced role for the government to play in encouraging the adoption of welfare-enhancing norms. Cooter’s theory, combined with modern understandings of welfare and human behavior, thus offers powerful predictive and prescriptive possibilities.


2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 1665-1687
Author(s):  
Michele S. Moses ◽  
Kathryn E. Wiley

Scholars in distinct academic disciplines may examine the same or similar phenomena, often relying on concepts that are well known within each discipline. In this article, we examine two related sociological concepts—capital and adaptive preferences—each used to explain young people’s choices and aspirations. We make the case that integrating the philosophical concept of the “social context of choice” into analyses using “capital” or “adaptive preferences” provides an interdisciplinary approach to analyses of underrepresented students’ educational choices and aspirations in higher education, beyond what each concept provides alone. We ground our philosophical examination in data from a 2-year empirical study of an educational access and outreach program for low-income students.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document