European Competition Law Annual 2001 : Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law

2001 ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 439
Author(s):  
Alfonso-Luis Calvo Caravaca ◽  
Julia Suderow

Resumen: La aplicación privada del derecho de la Competencia no se limita tan sólo a acciones de daños por infracciones del art. 101 TFUE, sino que también abarca las acciones follow on y stand alone contra los abusos de posición de dominio sancionados por el art. 102 TFUE. Se trata de acciones que tienen su origen en conductas unilaterales en las que las cláusulas de atribución de competencia juegan un papel esencial. El TJUE resuelve con la sentencia Ap-ple Sales ciertas dudas sobre el alcance de estas cláusulas si bien su respuesta genera nuevas cuestiones que podrán plantearse en futuros litigios. La voluntad de las partes y la proporcio-nalidad tendrán que seguir siendo los elementos sobre los que pivote la exclusividad del foro de sumisión expresa.Palabras clave: acciones para la indemnización de daños anticompetitivos, acciones autónomas, acciones de seguimiento, acuerdos de elección de foro, arbitraje, competencia judicial internacional, Daños, Derecho antitrust, Derecho europeo de la competencia, Unión Europea.Abstract: Private enforcement of Competition Law is not limited to cartel damage claims based on infringements of art. 101 TFUE. Follow on and Stand alone actions against the abuse of dominance sanctioned by art. 102 TFUE are also included. They are actions derived from unilateral conducts where jurisdiction agreements play an important role. In the ruling Apple Sales, the ECJ solves certain doubts about the scope of this type of clauses but its answer generates new questions that will be dealt in future disputes. The will of the parties as well as the proportionality will still be the basis of the exclusivity of the forum.Keywords: antitrust damages actions, stand-alone actions, follow-on actions, jurisdiction agreements, arbitration, jurisdiction, damages (Torts), Antitrust Law, European Competition Law, European Union.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 663
Author(s):  
Alicia Arroyo Aparicio

Resumen: Este estudio analiza la jurisprudencia del TJUE referida a los acuerdos de distribución se­lectiva de productos cosméticos de lujo y la compatibilidad de la restricción de las ventas de esos produc­tos a través de plataformas de internet (on line) con el Derecho protector de la libre competencia de la UE. Se tiene en cuenta en particular la Sentencia de 6 de diciembre de 2017, Asunto Coty Germany GbmH c. Parfümerie Akzente GmbH, si bien se observa la jurisprudencia en general así como desde la recaída en el Asunto Metro hasta dicha sentencia. Tres cuestiones son destacadas: distribución selectiva y Derecho de la Competencia; la compatibilidad de la prohibición de comercializar en plataformas de internet –“amazon.de” es la plataforma concreta del Asunto Coty– y la interconexión con el Derecho de marcas.Palabras clave: distribución selectiva, plataformas de venta en internet, productos de lujo, Dere­cho de la Competencia, Asunto Coty.Abstract: This study analyzes EJC Case Law referring to the selective distribution agreements of luxury cosmetic products and the compatibility of the restriction of sales of these products through onli­ne platforms, under the perspective of Antitrust European Law. In particular, the Judgment of December 6, 2017, Coty Germany GbmH c. Parfümerie Akzente GmbH is considered, but also it is important to take into account the evolution from Metro Case to Coty. Three issues are highlighted: selective distri­bution and Competition Law, compatibility of the prohibition to market on internet platforms - “amazon.de” was the specific platform in Coty- Case and the interconnection with the Trademarks Law.Keywords: selective distribution, on line sales and platform bans, Antitrust Law, Coty Case.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 889 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juliana Rodríguez Rodrigo

Resumen: El Auto del Juzgado de lo Mercantil de Madrid, objeto de comentario en este trabajo, resuelve una declinatoria por falta de jurisdicción en un caso de reclamación de daños por un ilícito antitrust. El comportamiento anticompetitivo del que derivan los perjuicios, que ahora se reclaman, es el conocido como cártel de los camiones, que sancionó la Comisión Europea en el año 2016. Una de las víctimas de ilícito antitrust pide una indemnización por los daños y perjuicios sufridos por el hecho de haber tenido que pagar un sobreprecio en la compra de uno o varios camiones objetos del acuerdo colusorio. El Juzgado de lo Mercantil de Madrid rechaza la declinatoria por hallarse el domicilio de la demandada en territorio español.Palabras clave: aplicación privada del Derecho de la competencia, acciones follow on, cártel de los camiones, indemnización por daños derivados de un ilícito antitrust, foro del lugar del hecho ilícito, foro del lugar del daño.Abstract: The Decision of Commercial Court of Madrid, object of comment in this paper, resolves a declinatory for lack of jurisdiction in a case of claim of damages from European antitrust law infringement. The anticompetitive behavior from which the damages derive is known as the truck cartel, which was sanctioned by the European Commission in 2016. One of the victims of this behavior seeks compensation for the damages suffered by the fact of having to pay a surcharge in the purchase of one or more trucks that belong to scope of collusive agreement. The Commercial Court of Madrid rejects the declinatory because the defendant’s domicile is located in Spanish territory.Keywords: private enforcement of competition law, follow on actions, cartel of trucks, compensation for damages from European antitrust law infringement, forum of place in which the harmful event occurred, forum of place of damage.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 731-766
Author(s):  
Anu Bradford ◽  
Adam Chilton ◽  
Katerina Linos ◽  
Alexander Weaver

Legal Studies ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Wardhaugh

The European desire to ensure that bearers of EU rights are adequately compensated for any infringement of these rights, particularly in cases where the harm is widely diffused, and perhaps not even noticed by those affected by it, collides with another desire: to avoid the perceived excesses of an American-style system of class actions. The excesses of these American class actions are in European discourse presented as a sort of bogeyman, which is a source of irrational fear, often presented by parental or other authority figures. But when looked at critically, the bogeyman disappears. In this paper, I examine the European (and UK) proposals for collective action. I compare them to the American regime. The flaws and purported excesses of the American regime, I argue, are exaggerated. A close, objective examination of the American regime shows this. I conclude that it is not the mythical bogeyman of a US class action that is the barrier to effective collective redress; rather, the barriers to effective, wide-ranging group actions lie within European legal culture and traditions, particularly those mandating individual control over litigation.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 237-257
Author(s):  
Rimantas Antanas Stanikunas ◽  
Arunas Burinskas

This paper provides a study of the interaction between public and private enforcement of Lithuanian antitrust law. The study refers to the Damages Directive. It has been found that private enforcement depends greatly on public enforcement of competition law. Therefore, their compatibility and balance are of great importance to antitrust policy. The Lithuanian NCA prioritises cases where an economic effect on competition does not have to be proven. This creates uncertainty about the outcome of private enforcement cases. Private enforcement in Lithuania is also in need of detailed rules on the identification of harm and causality. The analysis reveals how challenging it can be to estimate and prove harm or a causal link in private enforcement cases. Support from the NCA is therefore exceedingly needed. Moreover, even though the use of the leniency programme helps, it remains insufficient to solve the problem of under-deterrence. However, measures introduced by the Damages Directive do not make the leniency programme safe.


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