antitrust policy
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2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Callander ◽  
Niko Matouschek

We develop a model to capture the novelty of innovation and explore what it means for the nature of market competition and quality of innovations. An innovator decides not only whether to innovate but how boldly to innovate, where the more novel is the innovation—the more different it is from what has come before—the more uncertain is the outcome. We show in this environment that a variant of the Arrow replacement effect holds in that new entrants pursue more innovative technologies than do incumbents. Despite this, we show that the new entrant is less likely to disrupt an incumbent than the incumbent is to disrupt itself, and less likely to fail in the market. We extend the model to allow the incumbent to acquire the entrant postinnovation and show that this reverses the Arrow effect. The prospect of acquisition makes innovation more profitable but simultaneously suppresses the novelty of innovation as the entrant seeks to maximize her value to the incumbent. This reversal suggests a positive role for a strict antitrust policy that spurs entrepreneurial firms to innovate boldly. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 10-14
Author(s):  
S. S. Tatarinova

The article considers the specifics of occurrence and the basic stages of development of the legislation on protection of competition in France. The author reveals the impact of socio-economic and political aspects in the formation of antitrust policy. France, as a state member of the European Union, subject to the rules of supranational law, the analysis of which is paid special attention. The author concludes about the growing influence of EU law over national law of France, including in the sphere of protection of competition.


2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 569-600
Author(s):  
Naomi R. Lamoreaux ◽  
Laura Phillips Sawyer

Scholars have long recognized that the states’ authority to charter corporations bolstered their antitrust powers in ways that were not available to the federal government. Our paper contributes to this literature by focusing attention on the relevance for competition policy of lawsuits brought by minority shareholders against their own companies, especially lawsuits challenging voting trusts. Historically judges had been reluctant to intervene in corporations’ internal affairs and had been wary of the potential for opportunism in shareholders’ derivative suits. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, they had begun to revise their views and see shareholders as useful allies in the struggle against monopoly. Although the balance between judges’ suspicion of and support for shareholders’ activism shifted back and forth over time, in the end the lawsuits provoked state legislatures to strengthen antitrust policy by making devices like voting trusts unsuitable for purposes of economic concentration.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 4019-4032
Author(s):  
Borobov Vasily Nikolaevich ◽  
Bodnaruk Nikolay Mikhailovich ◽  
Budanova Irina Mikhailovna ◽  
Golovin Vladimir Valerievich

The scientific article reveals the essence of monopoly, its types, the behavior of the company in the conditions of monopoly. The role of the state in regulating the activities of monopolies is considered. A set of measures on antimonopoly policy is proposed.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ramsi Woodcock

Contemporary American interest in using antitrust law to address wealth inequality is a symptom of American political dysfunction rather than a reflection of any intellectual advance regarding the sources of inequality. Indeed, both the original American progressives of a century ago, as well as Thomas Piketty, whose work sparked contemporary intellectual interest in inequality, agree that inequality’s source is scarcity, rather than monopoly, and so will persist even in perfectly competitive markets. The only real solution is taxation, not a potentially destructive campaign of breakup. There are two cause of contemporary American antimonopolism. The first is American anti-statism, which has closed off tax policy as a viable political solution to inequality, forcing scholars and activists to seek a second- or third-best workaround in antitrust policy. The second is the American press, which is actively promoting antimonopolism as a way of fighting back against Google and Facebook, two companies that have badly outcompeted the press for advertising dollars in recent years. Given these idiosyncratic roots of contemporary American antimonopolism, other jurisdictions seeking to address inequality may have little to gain from following the American example, particularly if taxation remains a viable policy option for them.


Author(s):  
Dilfuza Sherqulovna Bababekova ◽  

The article examines the processes related to the objective necessity and economic significance of the implementation of antitrust policy in the development of the national economy. The existing problems in the framework of the processes related to the systematic organization of antitrust policy and its effectiveness are analyzed. Scientific proposals and practical recommendations for improving the system of antitrust policy in the national economy are given.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Wood ◽  
Owain Williams ◽  
Phil Baker ◽  
Vijaya Nagarajan ◽  
Gary Sacks

Abstract Background The detrimental impact of dominant corporations active in health-harming commodity industries is well recognised. However, to date, existing analyses of the ways in which corporations influence health have paid limited attention to corporate market power. Accordingly, the public health implications of concentrated market structures, the use of anti-competitive market strategies, and the ways in which market power mediates the allocation and distribution of resources via market systems, remain relatively unexplored. To address this gap, this paper aimed to identify and explore key literature that could inform a comprehensive framework to examine corporate market power from a public health perspective. The ultra-processed food (UPF) industry was used to provide illustrative examples. Methods A scoping review of a diverse range of literature, including Industrial Organization, welfare economics, global political economy and antitrust policy, was conducted to identify important concepts and metrics that could be drawn upon within the field of public health to understand and explore market power. The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) model, a guiding principle of antitrust policy and the regulation of market power, was used as an organising framework. Results We described each of the components of the traditional SCP model and how they have historically been used to assess market power through examining the interrelations between the structure of industries and markets, the conduct of dominant firms, and the overall ability of markets and firms to efficiently allocate and distribute the scarce resources. Conclusion We argue that the SCP model is well-placed to broaden public health research into the ways in which corporations influence health. In addition, the development of a comprehensive framework based on the key findings of this paper could help the public health community to better engage with a set of policy and regulatory tools that have the potential to curb the concentration of corporate power for the betterment of population health.


10.51868/3 ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 38-51
Author(s):  
Daryl Lim

Computational antitrust comes to us at a time when courts and agencies are underfunded and overwhelmed, all while having to apply indeterminate rules to massive amounts of information in fast-moving markets. In the same way that Amazon disrupted e-commerce through its inventory and sales algorithms and TikTok’s progressive recommendation system keeps users hooked, computational antitrust holds the promise to revolutionize antitrust law. Implemented well, computational antitrust can help courts curate and refine precedential antitrust cases, identify anticompetitive effects, and model innovation effects and counterfactuals in killer acquisition cases. The beauty of AI is that it can reach outcomes humans alone cannot define as “good” or “better” as the untrained neural network interrogates itself via the process of trial and error. The maximization process is dynamic, with the AI being capable of scouring options to optimize the best rewards under the given circumstances, mirroring how courts operationalize antitrust policy–computing the expected reward from executing a policy in a given environment. At the same time, any system is only as good as its weakest link, and computational antitrust is no exception. The synergistic possibilities that humans and algorithms offer depend on their interplay. Humans may lean on ideology as a heuristic when they must interpret the rule of reason according to economic theory and evidence. For this reason, it becomes imperative to understand, mitigate, and, where appropriate, harness those biases.


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