Beware of the Trojan Horse: Dispute Settlement in (Mixed) Agreements and the Autonomy of the EU Legal Order

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 425-453
Author(s):  
Philip Strik

AbstractWhile investor–State arbitration is to a large extent detached from the EU legal order, EU law has recently started to be invoked in investor-State arbitration proceedings. In the context of intra-EU bilateral investment treaties, the Commission has expressed the view that investor-State arbitration gives rise to a number of ‘arbitration risks’ for the EU legal order. Not only can it solicit investors to engage in forum-shopping, but it can also result in questions of EU law not being litigated in Member State or Union courts. This chapter explores the extent to which the compatibility of investor–State arbitration with the EU legal order is in issue. It examines the main features of investor-State arbitration as concerns its interplay with the EU legal order, as well as the Court of Justice’s case law on issues of compatibility between systems of international dispute settlement and the EU legal order. The chapter highlights that the way in which investor–State arbitral tribunals handle issues of EU law, as well as the involvement of interested parties, may foster the synergy between investor–State arbitration and the EU legal order.


Author(s):  
Maria FANOU

Abstract In April 2019, the Court of Justice of the EU (‘CJEU’) handed down its Opinion (C-1/17) on the compatibility of the Investment Court System (‘ICS’), that is the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (‘ISDS’) mechanism under the EU-Canada Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (‘CETA’), with EU law. This article puts Opinion 1/17 in its broader (policy and legal) context, focusing on the salient issue of compatibility with the principle of autonomy of the EU legal order. It argues that the Court's openness to this judicial competitor was an acknowledgment of the need to maintain the powers of the Union in international relations. However, Opinion 1/17 should not be perceived as an automatic green light for any future investment court (such as the Multilateral Investment Court) as the autonomy test it introduces is a rather difficult one to pass.


2010 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 425-453
Author(s):  
Philip Strik

Abstract While investor–State arbitration is to a large extent detached from the EU legal order, EU law has recently started to be invoked in investor-State arbitration proceedings. In the context of intra-EU bilateral investment treaties, the Commission has expressed the view that investor-State arbitration gives rise to a number of ‘arbitration risks’ for the EU legal order. Not only can it solicit investors to engage in forum-shopping, but it can also result in questions of EU law not being litigated in Member State or Union courts. This chapter explores the extent to which the compatibility of investor–State arbitration with the EU legal order is in issue. It examines the main features of investor-State arbitration as concerns its interplay with the EU legal order, as well as the Court of Justice’s case law on issues of compatibility between systems of international dispute settlement and the EU legal order. The chapter highlights that the way in which investor–State arbitral tribunals handle issues of EU law, as well as the involvement of interested parties, may foster the synergy between investor–State arbitration and the EU legal order.


Author(s):  
Gabriela Belova ◽  
◽  
Gergana Georgieva ◽  
Anna Hristova ◽  
◽  
...  

Although in the last years the international community has adopted a broad approach, the definition of foreign investors and foreign investments is still very important for the development of international investment law. The nationality of the foreign investor, whether a natural person or legal entity, sometimes is decisive, especially in front of the international jurisdictions. The paper tries to follow the examples from bilateral investment agreements as well as from multilateral instrument such as the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention. An important case concerning Bulgaria in past decades is also briefly discussed. The authors pay attention to some new moments re-developing the area of investment dispute settlement within the context of EU Mixed Agreements, especially after the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement.


2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dr. Laurens Ankersmit

This article explores the legality of investment arbitration in eu trade agreements under eu law. Investor-state dispute settlement (isds), including the Investment Court System, allows foreign investors to challenge eu acts and decisions before investment tribunals and these tribunals may be faced with questions of eu law. Since this system of dispute resolution operates entirely outside the eu judicial framework and rivals with it, the powers of the courts of the Member States and that of the European Court of Justice may be adversely affected. This in turn could affect the uniform interpretation and effectiveness of eu law and the autonomy of the eu legal order.


Author(s):  
Christina Eckes

Chapter 6 examines the consequences of the Union’s submission to the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals (ICTs) for the autonomy of the EU legal order. In fact, no discussion of the effects of external relations on the internal constitutional structures would be complete without considering the specific and ever-increasing external pressure from ICTs that led the Court of Justice (CJEU) to take a rather protective and controversial position, for example, in Opinion 2/13 (EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights). Chapter 6 concentrates on three ICTs that have, in the eyes of the Court or the Commission, raised particular issues for the autonomy of the EU legal order: investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms/the Investment Court System (ISDS/ICS), the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee (ACCC) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) after the EU’s accession to the ECHR. The chapter draws the conclusion that, under certain circumstances, the CJEU’s concern that ICTs may threaten the autonomy of the EU legal order is plausible and links this conclusion to the potential of emerging structures of bonding within the EU legal order, as well as the effectiveness and legitimacy of the Union and its actions. Simply put, conceptual legal autonomy is needed for all three. Indeed, the very potential of structures of bonding depends on autonomy. One can only bond with an autonomous entity.


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