Chapter 6 examines the consequences of the Union’s submission to the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals (ICTs) for the autonomy of the EU legal order. In fact, no discussion of the effects of external relations on the internal constitutional structures would be complete without considering the specific and ever-increasing external pressure from ICTs that led the Court of Justice (CJEU) to take a rather protective and controversial position, for example, in Opinion 2/13 (EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights). Chapter 6 concentrates on three ICTs that have, in the eyes of the Court or the Commission, raised particular issues for the autonomy of the EU legal order: investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms/the Investment Court System (ISDS/ICS), the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee (ACCC) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) after the EU’s accession to the ECHR. The chapter draws the conclusion that, under certain circumstances, the CJEU’s concern that ICTs may threaten the autonomy of the EU legal order is plausible and links this conclusion to the potential of emerging structures of bonding within the EU legal order, as well as the effectiveness and legitimacy of the Union and its actions. Simply put, conceptual legal autonomy is needed for all three. Indeed, the very potential of structures of bonding depends on autonomy. One can only bond with an autonomous entity.