Constitutional Developments in Europe

2006 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Giuliano Amato

Can we still speak of constitutional developments in Europe after the fall of the document called the ‘European Constitution’ in the French and Dutch referenda? Yes, we definitely can do so, for that document was not the founding act of a European constitutional order; it was a step(undoubtedly a very relevant one) in a process that has been ongoing for more than 40 years.The European Community was conceived as an international organisation based on the typical source of international law, a treaty among sovereign states. Inside the organisation the representatives of the Member States, namely their Ministers sitting in a common Council (more precisely, in the sectoral formations of it), were empowered to adopt the legally bindings acts of the Community.

2006 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Giuliano Amato

Can we still speak of constitutional developments in Europe after the fall of the document called the ‘European Constitution’ in the French and Dutch referenda? Yes, we definitely can do so, for that document was not the founding act of a European constitutional order; it was a step(undoubtedly a very relevant one) in a process that has been ongoing for more than 40 years. The European Community was conceived as an international organisation based on the typical source of international law, a treaty among sovereign states. Inside the organisation the representatives of the Member States, namely their Ministers sitting in a common Council (more precisely, in the sectoral formations of it), were empowered to adopt the legally bindings acts of the Community.


2019 ◽  
Vol 49 ◽  
pp. 275-302
Author(s):  
Álvaro Paúl

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights developed a doctrine called conventionality control. In general terms, this doctrine is somewhat similar to the idea of judicial review of legislation, but applied in a transnational forum. According to the Court, conventionality control would require domestic judges and other bodies of States parties to the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) to depart from domestic legislation that runs counter to the ACHR or the Inter-American Court’s interpretation of the ACHR. Many scholars contend that the application of this doctrine should be carried out even if the domestic bodies that apply it have no constitutional power to do so. Others have a more restrictive interpretation and consider that domestic bodies would have to apply it to the extent of their power, according to their national constitutions. Apparently, the latter interpretation is gaining a wider support, which is desirable, because only this reading would be compatible with the principles of international law, and possibly accepted by all member States.


2008 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 643-713 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sonja Boelaert-Suominen

AbstractThe European Community has gradually increased its focus on marine and maritime affairs, starting with the Community's Fishery Policy in the 1970s and culminating recently in the 2007 Blue Book on an Integrated Maritime Policy of the European Union. The Community's increased clout over marine and maritime matters has been reflected also in the case law of the European Court of Justice. From the outset the Court has given great impetus to the Community's efforts to assert its external competence in matters related to fisheries and conservation of biological resources of the sea. Even so, the Court has thus far only occasionally been confronted with public international law questions pertaining to the law of the sea. However, the few cases in which the Court has addressed such issues are worthy of note. For example, the Court has ruled on whether Member States should be allowed to rely on the international law of the sea in order to derogate from obligations under Community law; whether Member States should be allowed to prefer the dispute settlement provisions set out in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea over the Community's own dispute settlement system; and on whether private parties may invoke arguments derived from the customary or conventional international law of the sea to challenge the validity of Community legislation pertaining to marine and maritime matters. The resulting judgments of the European Court of Justice have often turned out to be landmark cases, although some of them have tended to divide academic opinion.


2010 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 305-336 ◽  
Author(s):  
KAROLINA MILEWICZ ◽  
ANDRÉ BÄCHTIGER ◽  
ARNE NOTHDURFT

AbstractThis article asks whether international law is moving towards a more unified constitutional order or whether differentiated types of constitutional processes are emerging. We study the sequencing and ratification pace of 32 ‘quasi-constitutional’ international agreements containing procedural guidelines for inter-state relations and fundamental human rights provisions for individuals drawn up between 1945 and 2007. We do so in a comparative and quantitative fashion applying sophisticated statistical tools, namely event history techniques combined with counting processes. On the basis of our multi-treaty framework, the findings do not lend support to a unified and quick process of global constitutionalisation. Rather, they provide evidence for the idea of a ‘multi-speed globe’ of differentiated constitutionalisation. We also make a first attempt to study antecedents to global constitutionalisation. Our findings show that processes of global constitutionalisation vary across regime types and world regions (while there is no effect for new and old states).


1981 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Stein

Tucked away in the fairyland Duchy of Luxembourg and blessed, until recently, with benign neglect by the powers that be and the mass media, the Court of Justice of the European Communities has fashioned a constitutional framework for a federal-type structure in Europe. From its inception a mere quarter of a century ago, the Court has construed the European Community Treaties in a constitutional mode rather than employing the traditional international law methodology. Proceeding from its fragile jurisdictional base, the Court has arrogated to itself the ultimate authority to draw the line between Community law and national law. Moreover, it has established and obtained acceptance of the broad principle of direct integration of Community law into the national legal orders of the member states and of the supremacy of Community law within its limited but expanding area of competence over any conflicting national law.


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