Comparative International Law Within, Not Against, International Law: Lessons from the International Law Commission

2015 ◽  
Vol 109 (3) ◽  
pp. 498-513 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathias Forteau

Public international law and comparative law have so far been regarded as largely distinct fields, with little to no overlap between them. The degree of separation between the two disciplines is rendered in particularly stark relief by the absence in practice or scholarship of any real inquiry into the relationship between comparative law on the one hand and customary international law and general principles of international law on the other. Some eminent international lawyers go so far as to claim that it would be both unnecessary and unrealistic to have recourse to comparative law in the context of the identification of customary international law and general principles of law, pointing to the case law of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice, which, according to them, “show[s] a clear disinclination towards the use of the comparative method.”

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marija Đorđeska

Abstract Article 38, para.1, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) defines customary international law as evidence of general practice accepted as law, understood as State practice and opinio juris. However, by identifying certain norms as an international custom without referring to the traditional evidence of State practice and opinio juris, international courts and tribunals are contributing to the formation of customary international law. This paper presents an analysis of how the International Court of Justice contributes to the formation of customary international law by relying on the draft articles of the International Law Commission (ILC). Th e International Court of Justice, in “deciding in accordance with international law”, also authoritatively declares what the current international law is, while the International Law Commission, although constituted of highly qualified publicists from various States, is drafting only non-binding international instruments. By relying on the ILC draft articles and declaring them to be reflecting customary international law-although the draft articles may not be necessary the expression of the States’ practice and their opinio juris, the ICJ creates and generates the creation of customary international law. Interestingly, the ICJ tends to rely mostly on ILC draft articles that refer to the jurisprudence of either the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) or the ICJ itself. Th e paper presents research of approximately 70 ICJ decisions and individual opinions that cite to the work of the ILC. The author notes the evolution of the relationship between the ICJ and the ILC through three different time periods, and presents the findings on how, when and why the ICJ relies on the ILC draft articles. In addition, the author gives examples in which the ICJ rejected the reliance on the ILC’s work, mainly due to the divergent interpretation on the specific area of international law. The ICJ, by relying on the ILC draft articles that in turn refer to the jurisprudence of the ICJ or PCIJ, is not only generating norms of customary international law, but is also reaffirming the importance of its (and PCIJ’s) jurisprudence for the future of international law. Although ICJ decisions are binding only between the parties to the dispute (Art.59 ICJ Statute), the clarification of whether a norm is customary or not, affects the international community of States. Noting the present reluctance of States to adopt treaties, and- hence their potentially decreasing role in international law-making, this research offers an insight into an alternative venue of international law-making. As the international community, and the ILC itself, is regaining interest in the sources of international law, this paper aims to identify the mechanisms of international law-making, the understanding of which will contribute to international law’s needed predictability and a more uniform and reliable interpretation of international law.


2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rossana Deplano, PhD

On 30 May 2016, the International Law Commission (‘ilc’) adopted a set of 16 Draft Conclusions providing a methodology on how to identify customary international law. Although largely based on the two elements approach set forth in article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the ilc study pushes the boundaries of the formal sources of international law beyond the realm of state practice by recognising that the practice of international organizations (‘ios’) as such may be constitutive of custom. This article critically examines the ilc Draft Conclusions concerning the role of ios in the process of custom creation. It examines the concept of resolution adopted by the ilc and assesses the coherence of the interpretive methodology devised by the ilc using the un General Assembly resolutions as a case study. The findings show that the Draft Conclusions fall short of expectation in providing authoritative guidance to scholars and practitioners alike.


Author(s):  
Larissa van den Herik ◽  
Emma Irving

This chapter analyses the due diligence component of the duty to prevent genocide and crimes against humanity. It examines the International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgment in the Bosnia Genocide case of 2007 and outlines the system of differentiated obligations based on a state’s ‘capacity to influence’ events in another state set out in the judgment. Furthermore, the chapter argues that developments under customary international law, which are buttressed and specified by the International Law Commission (ILC), support the existence of an obligation to prevent crimes against humanity of an equivalent character to the obligation to prevent genocide. The chapter examines the role that due diligence plays in delimiting the nature and scope, the content, and the temporal elements of the obligations to prevent genocide and crimes against humanity. Taking a future-oriented approach, the chapter enquires how new technologies inform state’s due diligence and whether non-state actors (including social media companies) can have the necessary ‘capacity to influence’, thus extending the preventive obligation’s potential reach.


2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-54
Author(s):  
Abdul Ghafur Hamid

On 23rd January 2020, the International Court of Justice indicated provisional measures to protect the Rohingya from the alleged genocidal acts committed in Myanmar. Rejecting the argument made by Myanmar, the World Court decided that The Gambia has standing before the court although it was not directly injured by the alleged wrongful act. The court applied the concept of “obligations erga omnes partes” in the context of its ruling on standing. The court, however, did not elaborate more on the concept and did not touch on its details. Since this case had attracted so much international attention, the concept has become a trending topic for legal discourse. This article, therefore, is an attempt to resolve the issues of whether the concept of obligations erga omnes partes has been established as a rule of customary international law and whether such an obligation may arise from any type of multilateral treaty and any provision in a multilateral treaty. To this end, the article analyses the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the case law of international human rights courts and the work and the valuable commentary of the International Law Commission on Article 48 of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally wrongful Act 2001. The article concludes that the concept of obligations erga omnes partes has been established as a rule of customary international law, that it may arise from any type of multilateral treaty and that it is applicable only in relation to the provision of a treaty that is essential to the accomplishment of object and purpose of the treaty.


Author(s):  
Philippa Webb

The last 50 years have seen significant changes in the law of immunity. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has, over the past 15 years in particular, played an influential role in the law applicable to this ‘moving target’. This chapter examines three approaches of the ECtHR to the identification of general international law: (i) the ECtHR looking to the International Court of Justice; (ii) the ECtHR looking to national practice; and (iii) the ECtHR looking to the work of the International Law Commission and the provisional application of treaties. Although the ECtHR strives to locate itself within general international law, it necessarily approaches the immunities of States, officials, and international organizations through the lens of Article 6 ECHR and whether the immunity in question constitutes a legitimate and proportionate restriction on the right of access to court. This has, at times, taken the Court down a different path to other judicial bodies and we can identify the emergence of a ‘European approach’ to the role of immunity in employment disputes.


2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 641-668 ◽  
Author(s):  
MASSIMO LANDO

AbstractIn 2009, the International Court of Justice introduced plausibility as a requirement for indicating provisional measures under Article 41 of its Statute. Upon its introduction, plausibility was conceived as a test to establish that the rights asserted by applicant states might exist under international law. However, the Court subsequently developed the plausibility test into a higher standard, which requires the Court also to assess that the alleged conduct of the respondent state might breach that applicant state's asserted rights. This development has important implications for provisional measures proceedings before the Court. First, one could distinguish two aspects of plausibility, legal and factual. Second, plausibility has different functions in requests for provisional measures depending on whether the applicant state asserts rights arising under a treaty or under customary international law. Third, the Court's enquiry into plausibility could overlap with the enquiry into prima facie jurisdiction ratione materiae, although these two requirements conceivably entail different thresholds. Fourth, plausibility in provisional measures indicated in interpretation proceedings could be seen to be different from plausibility in provisional measures indicated in ordinary contentious proceedings.


2013 ◽  
Vol 107 (3) ◽  
pp. 632-638
Author(s):  
Filippo Fontanelli

In August 2012, the First Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation (Supreme Court or Court), the highest Italian domestic court, issued a judgment upholding Germany’s sovereign immunity from civil claims brought by Italian war crime victims against Paul Albers and eight others in the Italian courts (Albers). In so doing, the Court overruled its own earlier decisions and also reversed the judgment of April 20, 2011, by the Italian Military Court of Appeal (Military Court), which had upheld such claims relating to war crimes committed by German forces in Italy during World War II. With this ruling, the Court of Cassation put an end to its decade long effort to find an exception to the well-known rule of customary international law providing for sovereign immunity from foreign civil jurisdiction for actsjure imperii. Thisrevirementresulted from the Court’s decision to give effect to the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) inGermany v. Italy.


Author(s):  
Caroline E. Foster

Potentially global regulatory standards are emerging from the environmental and health jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, the World Trade Organization, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and investor-state dispute settlement. Most prominent are the three standards of regulatory coherence, due regard for the rights of others, and due diligence in the prevention of harm. These global regulatory standards are a phenomenon of our times, representing a new contribution to the ordering of the relationship between domestic and international law, and inferring a revised conception of sovereignty in an increasingly pluralistic global legal era. However, considered with regard to jurisprudential theory on relative authority, the legitimacy of the resulting ‘standards-enriched’ international law remains open to question. Procedurally, although they are well-placed to provide valuable input, international courts and tribunals should not be the only fora in which these standards are elaborated. Substantively, challenges and opportunities lie ahead in the ongoing development of global regulatory standards. Debate over whether regulatory coherence should go beyond reasonableness and rationality requirements and require proportionality in the relationship between regulatory measures and their objectives is central. Due regard, the most novel of the emerging standards, may help protect international law’s legitimacy claims in the interim. Meanwhile, all actors should attend to the integration rather than the fragmentation of international law, and to changes in the status of private actors.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-76
Author(s):  
Marco Longobardo

Abstract This article explores the role of counsel before the International Court of Justice, taking into account their tasks under the Statute of the Court and the legal value of their pleadings in international law. Pleadings of counsel constitute State practice for the formation of customary international law and treaty interpretation, and they are attributable to the litigating State under the law on State responsibility. Accordingly, in principle, counsel present the views of the litigating State, which in practice approves in advance the pleadings. This consideration is relevant in discussing the role of counsel assisting States in politically sensitive cases, where there is no necessary correspondence between the views of the States and those of their counsel. Especially when less powerful States are parties to the relevant disputes, the availability of competent counsel in politically sensitive cases should not be discouraged since it advances the legitimacy of the international judicial function.


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