Moral Inquiry Beyond Objectivism and Subjectivism

2021 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 165
Author(s):  
Pueyo-Ibáñez
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. Doris
Keyword(s):  

Abstract In this commentary on May's Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind, I argue that many of the interdisciplinary moral psychologists whom May terms “pessimists” are often considerably more optimistic about the prospects for progress in moral inquiry than he contends.


Author(s):  
Gerald Gaus

This book lays out a vision for how we should theorize about justice in a diverse society. It shows how free and equal people, faced with intractable struggles and irreconcilable conflicts, might share a common moral life shaped by a just framework. The book argues that if we are to take diversity seriously and if moral inquiry is sincere about shaping the world, then the pursuit of idealized and perfect theories of justice—essentially, the entire production of theories of justice that has dominated political philosophy for the past forty years—needs to change. Drawing on recent work in social science and philosophy, the book points to an important paradox: only those in a heterogeneous society—with its various religious, moral, and political perspectives—have a reasonable hope of understanding what an ideally just society would be like. However, due to its very nature, this world could never be collectively devoted to any single ideal. The book defends the moral constitution of this pluralistic, open society, where the very clash and disagreement of ideals spurs all to better understand what their personal ideals of justice happen to be. Presenting an original framework for how we should think about morality, this book rigorously analyzes a theory of ideal justice more suitable for contemporary times.


Author(s):  
Adam Lerner

People engage in pure moral inquiry whenever they inquire into the moral features of some act, agent, or state of affairs without inquiring into the non-moral features of that act, agent, or state of affairs. The first section of this chapter argues that ordinary people act rationally when they engage in pure moral inquiry, and so any adequate view in metaethics ought to be able to explain this fact. The Puzzle of Pure Moral Motivation is to provide such an explanation. The remaining sections of the chapter argue that each of the standard views in metaethics has trouble providing such an explanation. A metaethical view can provide such an explanation only if it meets two constraints: it allows ordinary moral inquirers to know the essences of moral properties, and the essence of each moral property makes it rational to care for its own sake whether that property is instantiated.


Ethics ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 539-541
Author(s):  
Karol Sołtan
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Mark Hestenes

The past president of the International Academy of Practical Theology, Prof. Donald Browning, has written books and articles across a wide variety of topics concerning the correlation of many great fields of knowledge, including theology, psychology, philosophy, sociology, practical theology, ethics, family therapy and ecology over the past 40 years. Prof. Browning passed away on 03 June 2010. This left the author of this article with a desire to begin to reassess some of Browning’s earlier reflections regarding his vision of pastoral care in a pluralistic age and the importance of his method of practical moral inquiry.


1996 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 633
Author(s):  
Lisa Sun-Hee Park ◽  
Richard Madsen
Keyword(s):  

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