Battle, 1918

Author(s):  
Thomas I. Faith

This chapter focuses on the American Expeditionary Force's (AEF) experiences with poison gas on the Western Front and the logistical effort made by the United States to support chemical warfare during World War I. The nascent Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) had to support battlefield operations in 1918 as the AEF faced poison gas in Europe. On the whole, the CWS found itself seriously challenged by conditions on the Western Front and dependent on U.S. allies for information and equipment. This chapter examines the CWS's efforts to train the AEF, manufacture chemical weapons, and use poison gas on the battlefield throughout 1918. It discusses the comparatively heavy gas casualties suffered by the AEF in the fighting due to the inadequacy of the gas-mask training that its soldiers were given. It also considers the AEF's limited use of chemical weapons against the Germans and the U.S. Army's inability to organize for chemical warfare jeopardized the gas warfare program's status after World War I ended.

Author(s):  
Thomas I. Faith

This chapter examines the United States' chemical warfare program as it developed before the nation began sending soldiers to fight in France during World War I. In 1917, the United States was rapidly and haphazardly putting together a chemical warfare organization capable of a variety of responsibilities that included performing research, manufacturing war gases and gas masks, training the soldiers of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) to defend themselves against enemy gas, and deploying gas on the battlefield. While the members of the chemical warfare program performed well under the circumstances, more advanced preparation would have improved readiness and mitigated the need for emergency measures. This chapter discusses the use of poison gas and gas masks and the United States' chemical weapons manufacturing operations during World War I.


Author(s):  
Thomas I. Faith

This chapter evaluates the successes and failures of the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) during the second half of the 1920s, in light of the organization's ultimate incapacity to influence foreign policy. By 1926, the CWS was a well-established organization capable of supporting the continuation of poison gas work into the foreseeable future. It had successfully influenced public policy to continue chemical warfare research after World War I. However, the CWS and its supporters failed to convince people to believe that gas warfare was humane. Public hostility toward chemical weapons ultimately led to the signing of international agreements prohibiting chemical warfare. This chapter discusses the CWS's sustained accomplishment during the period 1926–1929, with particular emphasis on its new chemical weapons initiatives in partnership with other departments and branches of the military; the United States' continued support for international efforts to prevent chemical warfare; and the CWS's reorganization into the U.S. Army Chemical Corps after World War II.


Author(s):  
Robert E. Lerner

This is the first complete biography of Ernst Kantorowicz (1895–1963), an influential and controversial German– American intellectual whose colorful and dramatic life intersected with many of the great events and thinkers of his time. Born into a wealthy Prussian-Jewish family, Kantorowicz fought on the Western Front in World War I, was wounded at Verdun, and earned an Iron Cross. Later, he earned an Iron Crescent for service in Anatolia before an affair with a general's mistress led to Kantorowicz being sent home. After the war, he fought against Poles in his native Posen, Spartacists in Berlin, and communists in Munich. An ardent German nationalist during the Weimar period, Kantorowicz became a member of the elitist Stefan George circle, which nurtured a cult of the “Secret Germany”. Yet as a professor in Frankfurt after the Nazis came to power, Kantorowicz bravely spoke out against the regime before an overflowing crowd. Narrowly avoiding arrest after Kristallnacht, he fled to England and then the United States, where he joined the faculty at Berkeley, only to be fired in 1950 for refusing to sign an anticommunist “loyalty oath.” From there, he “fell up the ladder” to Princeton's Institute for Advanced Study, where he stayed until his death. Drawing on many new sources, including numerous interviews and unpublished letters, this book tells the story of a major intellectual whose life and times were as fascinating as his work.


2002 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graham S. Pearson ◽  
Richard S. Magee

A critical evaluation is made of the chemical weapon destruction technologies demonstrated for 1 kg or more of agent in order to provide information about the technologies proven to destroy chemical weapons to policy-makers and others concerned with reaching decisions about the destruction of chemical weapons and agents. As all chemical agents are simply highly toxic chemicals, it is logical to consider the destruction of chemical agents as being no different from the consideration of the destruction of other chemicals that can be as highly toxictheir destruction, as that of any chemicals, requires the taking of appropriate precautions to safeguard worker safety, public health, and the environment. The Chemical Weapons Convention that entered into force in 1997 obliges all States Parties to destroy any stockpiles of chemical weapons within 10 years from the entry into force of the Conventionby 2007with the possibility of an extension for up to 5 years to 2012. There is consequently a tight timeline under the treaty for the destruction of stockpiled chemical weapons and agentsprimarily held in Russia and the United States. Abandoned or old chemical weaponsnotably in Europe primarily from World War I, in China from World War II as well as in the United Statesalso have to be destroyed. During the past 40 years, more than 20 000 tonnes of agent have been destroyed in a number of countries and over 80 % of this has been destroyed by incineration. Although incineration is well proven and will be used in the United States to destroy over 80 % of the U.S. stockpile of 25 800 tonnes of agent, considerable attention has been paid particularly in the United States to alternative technologies to incineration because of several constraints that are specific to the United States. Much of the information in this report is based on U.S. experienceas the United States had, along with the Russian Federation, by far the largest stockpiles of chemical weapons and agents anywhere in the world. The United States has made much progress in destroying its stockpile of chemical weapons and agents and has also done more work than any other country to examine alternative technologies for the destruction of chemical weapons and agents. However, the national decisions to be taken by countries faced with the destruction of chemical weapons and agents need to be made in the light of their particular national conditions and standardsand thus may well result in a decision to use different approaches from those adopted by the United States. This report provides information to enable countries to make their own informed and appropriate decisions.


Ad Americam ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 67-82
Author(s):  
Anna Wyrwisz

The United States had developed trade relations with the Dutch East Indies before World War I. In the 1920s, American diplomatic services prepared reports on the economic and political situation in the Dutch colony. The U.S. wanted to defend their interests in the region. In 1949, after several years of attempts to regain power in Indonesia, the Dutch withdrew in the absence of American support. A decade later, suchlike events occurred in connection with Dutch New Guinea.


Author(s):  
Thomas I. Faith

Chemical and biological weapons represent two distinct types of munitions that share some common policy implications. While chemical weapons and biological weapons are different in terms of their development, manufacture, use, and the methods necessary to defend against them, they are commonly united in matters of policy as “weapons of mass destruction,” along with nuclear and radiological weapons. Both chemical and biological weapons have the potential to cause mass casualties, require some technical expertise to produce, and can be employed effectively by both nation states and non-state actors. U.S. policies in the early 20th century were informed by preexisting taboos against poison weapons and the American Expeditionary Forces’ experiences during World War I. The United States promoted restrictions in the use of chemical and biological weapons through World War II, but increased research and development work at the outset of the Cold War. In response to domestic and international pressures during the Vietnam War, the United States drastically curtailed its chemical and biological weapons programs and began supporting international arms control efforts such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. U.S. chemical and biological weapons policies significantly influence U.S. policies in the Middle East and the fight against terrorism.


2010 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-225 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ajay K. Mehrotra

World War I was a pivotal event for U.S. political and economic development, particularly in the realm of public finance. For it was during the war that the federal government ended its traditional reliance on regressive import duties and excise taxes as principal sources of revenue and began a modern era of fiscal governance, one based primarily on the direct and progressive taxation of personal and corporate income. The wartime tax regime, as the historian David M. Kennedy has observed, “occasioned a fiscal revolution in the United States.”


Author(s):  
Thomas I. Faith

This chapter discusses the Chemical Warfare Service's (CWS) struggle to continue chemical weapons work in the face of a hostile political environment as the U.S. Army sought to digest the lessons learned from World War I under the budget constraints of the postwar period. It considers the uncertain future of the CWS and chemical weapons after the war as the American public reacted against modern weapons in general and poison gas in particular because of the battlefield suffering it had caused. It also discusses the attempts of policymakers in the Department of War and the U.S. Army to limit all chemical warfare activities in the armed forces after the armistice. Finally, it examines how the CWS, primarily under the leadership of Amos A. Fries, tried to counter anti-gas sentiment and promote chemical weapons and manage to lay a foundation that would allow them to continue improve their reputation through the 1920s.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Soumyajit Mazumder

When do groups on the social periphery assimilate into the social core of a nation? Building on a diverse set of literatures, I argue that individual participation in military service creates a number of conditions that drive individuals to assimilate into a broader national culture. To test the theory, I focus on the case of World War I in the United States–a period that closely followed a massive wave of immigration into the United States. Using an instrumental variables strategy leveraging the exogenous timing of the war, I show that individuals of foreign, European nativity–especially, the Italians and Eastern Europeans–were more likely to assimilate into American society after serving in the U.S. military. The theory and results contribute to our understanding of the ways in which states make identity and the prospects for immigrant assimilation in an age without mass warfare.


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