Is bribery a managerial myopia? A denial from the perspective of CEO career horizon

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
pp. 10858
Author(s):  
Jiasi Fan ◽  
Zhexiong Tao
Keyword(s):  
2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew C. Call ◽  
Shuping Chen ◽  
Adam M. Esplin ◽  
Bin Miao

2002 ◽  
Vol 23 (8) ◽  
pp. 689-706 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kent D. Miller
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (7) ◽  
pp. 36
Author(s):  
Simone Rossi ◽  
Mariarosa Borroni ◽  
Mariacristina Piva ◽  
Andrea Lippi

During healthy economic/financial times, credit growth often happens without proper provisioning. This is due to a managerial myopia that underestimates the risks underlying an expansive lending policy, leading to lower profitability in following years. However, given the countercyclicality of credit standards, this effect shouldn’t occur during harsh times. In this paper, we analyse the relationship between abnormal credit growth and bank profitability during a crisis period. In particular, we test the hypothesis that during a crisis, abnormal credit growth improves bank profitability, given the need for higher, or at least stable, credit standards. We find support for this assumption using a sample of 101 large European banks observed during the recent crisis period. Results are robust to different robustness checks.


2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 6-6
Author(s):  
Steve Coomber
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (8) ◽  
pp. 2431-2465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonce Bargeron ◽  
Alice Bonaime

Though short sellers on average succeed at identifying overvalued equity, firms often signal disagreement with short sellers by repurchasing stock when short interest increases. We investigate whether this disagreement reflects a myopic defense of inflated prices, or positive private information. These repurchases appear motivated by managers’ private information, not agency issues, even when managerial benefits to short-termism are enhanced or monitoring is weaker. Managers’ informational advantage relates to subsequent news, earnings, and risk, but is attenuated if activists target management or insiders sell. A trading strategy based on our findings earns 7.5% annually.


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