Cash holding and performance analysis of mutual funds: a case of an emerging financial market

PurposeThis study is about the determinants of cash holding and impact of cash holding on mutual funds’ performance. In addition, the study analyzes the impact of performance-related determinants of cash holding on funds' performance.Design/methodology/approachPanel data of ten years of 190 open-end mutual funds are analyzed through fixed effect regression technique. The risk-adjusted funds' performance of cash based portfolios is computed through capital asset pricing model (CAPM) (1964), Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) models.FindingsThe results indicate that small size funds, high charging front-end load funds, high turnover ratio funds, high 12-month fund returns run up, high dividend paying funds and high redemption level funds hold more cash for precautionary purpose to avoid costs of cash short-falls. Further, monthly average raw returns and risk-adjusted performance of funds with the lowest raw and residual cash holding are found higher than the funds with the highest cash holding. An increase in cash is found to dilute performance.Originality/valueThis is a pioneer study in a corporate environment with shallow capital market, reliance of businesses on bank credit, firms exposed to agency issues, wealth expropriations and existence of business groups with political linkages but with opportunities of investments due to expected favorable geo-socio-political situation. The study generates outcomes relevant for other similar economies.

Accounting Comparability and Cash Holdings in Vietnam

The management of cash requires careful considerations to allow firms to benefit from proper resource allocations while mitigating agency issues. Accounting comparability can play an important role in tackling information asymmetry and agency cost, thus enabling managers to hoard more cash. This research aims to investigate the link between accounting comparability and cash holdings in an emerging market. Using a sample of listed firms in Vietnam from 2010 to 2019 and System Generalized Method of Moments, the study finds that comparability is positively associated with corporate cash holdings, confirming the value of the former as an effective governance mechanism. Additionally, we find a non-linear impact of comparability on cash holdings; in other words, comparability specifically enhances cash holdings for firms with high levels of comparability. We further document that cash holdings improve firm performance only for firms with high levels of comparability. Such evidence implies that only firms with high levels of financial statement comparability show commitment to tackle agency cost and information asymmetry.

Agency costs, board structure and institutional investors: case of India

PurposeThe author examines the role of board structure and institutional investors in dealing with the agency issues for the Indian firms by taking the data of NSE-500 nonfinancial firms for the period 2010–2019.Design/methodology/approachThe author applies dynamic panel data methodology to deal with endogeneity concerns prevalent in corporate finance variables.FindingsThe agency view is consistent with the board size in the context of India. The author observed that the board size has a harmful effect on agency cost. A larger board size may create a coordination problem, or CEO may find it easy to thrust his or her decisions on board. The author also noticed that firms should have sizeable institutional ownership, particularly pressure-insensitive investors, in equity as they can reduce agency-related issues.Originality/valueThis study focuses on one of the largest emerging economies, i.e. India.

Optimal Contract for Machine Repair and Maintenance

Maintenance outsourcing is quite common in industries that rely on complex and critical equipment. Instead of investing in the maintenance facilities, firms outsource maintenance activities to specialized companies. However, it may be hard for firms (i.e., principal) to observe whether maintenance companies (i.e., agent) put sufficient resources into providing the best service, which gives rise to agency issues. In a dynamic environment in which an agent is responsible for both maintenance and repair of a critical machine, how the principal uses payments and termination to tackle agency issues is a challenging problem. In “Optimal Contract for Machine Repair and Maintenance,” F. Tian, P. Sun, and I. Duenyas provide theoretical guidance on designing the optimal contract to induce efforts from an agent to efficiently operate a machine. Although they consider the very general contract forms, the optimal contracts demonstrate simple and intuitive structures, making them easy to describe and implement in practice.

Why Do Firms Disagree with Short Sellers? Managerial Myopia versus Private Information

Though short sellers on average succeed at identifying overvalued equity, firms often signal disagreement with short sellers by repurchasing stock when short interest increases. We investigate whether this disagreement reflects a myopic defense of inflated prices, or positive private information. These repurchases appear motivated by managers’ private information, not agency issues, even when managerial benefits to short-termism are enhanced or monitoring is weaker. Managers’ informational advantage relates to subsequent news, earnings, and risk, but is attenuated if activists target management or insiders sell. A trading strategy based on our findings earns 7.5% annually.

Aspect[s] of the Corporate Governance that Matter in a Firm’s Value: Evidence from Non-Financial Firms in Pakistan

Corporate governance (CG) is key to enhance firm’s value. The purpose of this research is to examine effects of various aspects of corporate governance on firm’s value. We used secondary penal data of 100 companies on Pakistan Stock Exchange for the period: 2010 – 2016. Findings revealed that among other aspects of CG, managerial ownership and board size have significant influence on the value of a firm. Among controlled variables, firm size and firm ages were also found significant in firm’s value. We are convinced that findings of this study would help addressing agency issues through effective corporate governance measures. This study has come up with some practical implications as well. It is suggested that for better firm performance and increasing efficiency the board size may be kept at minimum.