Die Haftung für Wildschäden

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dominik Groß

Currently, the tenant of a hunting ground is contractually liable for game damage regardless of fault. Although the tenant of a shoot can make efforts to limit game damage, he is never released from his liability. This liability concept has been practised for decades and has hardly been questioned so far. Since the majority of the German hunting community are hobby hunters, private individuals are liable with their assets for entrepreneurial damages in agriculture and forestry. Increasingly intensive management thus leads to a potentially escalating liability risk. Dominik Groß examines possible solutions de lege lata and de lege ferenda.

Anaesthesia ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 214-225 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. MOSS ◽  
J. S. GIBSON ◽  
D. G. McDOWALL ◽  
R. M. GIBSON

1912 ◽  
Vol 25 (95) ◽  
pp. 66
Author(s):  
John W. Chapman
Keyword(s):  

2013 ◽  
Vol 401-403 ◽  
pp. 1900-1903
Author(s):  
Xu Mei Zhang ◽  
Qiao Ling Fan

The informationalization construction is playing an increasingly important role for the development of enterprise group.However, there are problems that enterprise group has to be faced with, like the rapid growth of data, the continuous increase in purchase and maintenance costs of software and hardware equipment, the overlapping allocation of IT resources and so on. To solve these problems, a hierarchical model of intensive management of IT resources of enterprise group based on cloud services was established, and intensive management modes of software, hardware and knowledge of enterprise group were proposed as well.


2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 187-208
Author(s):  
Mitchell A. Farlee

ABSTRACT: Disclosure and monitoring policy are studied, where disclosure relates to information about the monitoring system. A moral hazard model is presented where employee monitoring occurs with some exogenous probability and the owner privately learns whether he will be monitoring before the employee chooses his productive action. Disclosure policy is an owner choice between revealing to the employee whether he will be monitoring before the action (Disclosure) or remaining silent (Secrecy). The results rely on the joint presence of risk aversion and limited liability. Risk aversion creates an efficiency/risk tradeoff where secrecy obtains risk-sharing benefits. Limited liability reduces these benefits, allowing preference for disclosure. Lower monitoring probabilities increase the risk premium required to obtain effort with secrecy. For small monitoring probabilities, disclosure is preferred even though less efficient production is achieved, because disclosure provides a greater risk-sharing benefit. For high monitoring probabilities, secrecy is preferred because it leads to greater efficiency despite a greater risk premium.


JAMA ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 257 (6) ◽  
pp. 778
Author(s):  
Richard Belsey
Keyword(s):  

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