scholarly journals Non-Moral Evil and the Free Will Defense

2011 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-384 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Boyce ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Evil ◽  
Free Will Defense

scholarly journals God, Evil, and Alvin Plantinga on the Free-Will Defense

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 75-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ciro De Florio ◽  
Aldo Frigerio
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Evil ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Divine Omniscience ◽  
Divine Knowledge ◽  
Critical Account ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Free Will Defense

In this paper we will give a critical account of Plantinga’s well-known argument to the effect that the existence of an omnipotent and morally perfect God is consistent with the actual presence of evil. After presenting Plantinga’s view, we critically discuss both the idea of divine knowledge of conditionals of freedom and the concept of transworld depravity. Then, we will sketch our own version of the Free-Will Defence, which maintains that moral evil depends on the misuse of human freedom. However, our argument does not hinge on problematic metaphysical assumptions, but depends only on a certain definition of a free act and a particular interpretation of divine omniscience.

There is no Free-Will Defense

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
James P. Sterba
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Evil ◽  
Free Will Defense

This paper argues that there is no Free-Will Defense for the degree and amount of moral evil in our world. It denies that God’s creating our world with the degree and amount of moral evil that exists, or has existed, in it could be defended in terms of the freedom that it provides, or has provided, to its members. It takes no stand on whether the problem could be solved by arguing that the securing of some other good, or goods in an afterlife is the justification for the degree and amount of moral evil in our world. This paper simply attempts to demonstrate the need for just such further work by showing that the freedom that exists, or has existed, in our world could not constitute a justification for the moral evil that exists, or has existed, in it.

Augustine on Evil

Evil ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 155-193
Author(s):  
Peter King
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Evil ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Western Tradition ◽  
Full Generality ◽  
Natural Processes ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Positive Feature ◽  
To Come ◽  
Free Will Defense

Augustine’s account of evil has influenced most later thinkers in the western tradition. He argues for three central theses: (a) evil is the lack of some positive feature that ought to be present, a “privation”; (b) moral evil comes about solely from the less-than-perfect free choices of rational beings; and (c) all suffering—which need not be the result of moral evil but perhaps of natural processes or events—is morally justified. As part of his defense of (b), Augustine states in full generality the problem of evil (namely, how can there be any genuine evil in a world presided over by an omnipotent and benevolent deity?), and articulates in reply the free will defense. The arguments Augustine offers in support of the free will defense, and in favor of (a)–(c), are set forth and their implications assessed. The upshot is a coherent account of evil that dominated the debates for many centuries to come.

scholarly journals Let's Play GOLF!

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven B. Cowan
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Evil ◽  
Central Feature ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Moral Good ◽  
Libertarian Freedom ◽  
Free Will Defense

A central feature of the “free will defense” as developed by Alvin Plantinga is his response to the claim that God can create a world containing creatures with libertarian freedom that contains no moral evil. Plantinga’s response appeals to the notion of “morally significant freedom” according to which free creatures, in order to do moral good, must be capable of moral evil. In this paper, I argue, first, that morally significant freedom is not required for free creatures to do moral good and, second, that other recent attempts to necessitate a creaturely capability for evil likewise fail. The upshot of my paper is that the free will defense simply won’t work because it is possible and feasible for God to create a world containing libertarianly free creatures capable of moral good and yet containing no moral evil.

scholarly journals God and the Playpen: On the Feasibility of Morally Better Worlds

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 266
Author(s):  
Cheryl K. Chen
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Actual World ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Moral Good ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
Divine Intervention ◽  
Horrendous Evil ◽  
Good And Evil ◽  
Free Will Defense ◽  
Better Than

According to the free will defense, God cannot create a world with free creatures, and hence a world with moral goodness, without allowing for the possibility of evil. David Lewis points out that any free will defense must address the “playpen problem”: why didn’t God allow creatures the freedom required for moral goodness, while intervening to ensure that all evil-doing is victimless? More recently, James Sterba has revived the playpen problem by arguing that an omnipotent and benevolent God would have intervened to prevent significant and especially horrendous evil. I argue that it is possible, at least, that such divine intervention would have backfired, and that any attempt to create a world that is morally better than this one would have resulted in a world that is morally worse. I conclude that the atheologian should instead attack the free will defense at its roots: either by denying that the predetermination of our actions is incompatible with our freely per-forming them, or by denying that the actual world—a world with both moral good and evil—is more valuable than a world without any freedom at all.

scholarly journals Evil and Free Will: Contemporary Free-Will Defense and Classical Theism

2020 ◽  
Vol IV (4) ◽  
pp. 15-34
Author(s):  
Igor Gasparov
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Free Choice ◽  
Classical Theism ◽  
Divine Omnipotence ◽  
Voluntary Consent ◽  
Virtuous Character ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Free Will Defense

The article considers contemporary free will defences, proposed by A. Plantinga, R. Swinburne, according to which the existence of a world in which there is free will is something more valuable than the existence of a world in which there is no free will. It is shown that contemporary forms of free will defences share with atheistic arguments from evil an anthropomorphic model of God, in which God is thought as an individual among other individuals, although endowed with attributes such as omniscience and omnipotence to an excellent degree. It has also been shown that another important point of similarity between contemporary free will defences and atheistic arguments from evil is that both attempt to assess what our world would be like if created by such an individual. In contrast to atheistic arguments from evil, contemporary free will defences argue that divine omnipotence and omniscience are subject to some greater restrictions, as usually assumed, especially due to God's desire to give some of his creations the ability of free choice, which logically implies the possibility and even necessity of the existence of evil. It is demonstrated that classical theism does not share the anthropomorphic model of deity typical for many contemporary philosophers of religion. Classical theism rejects both the anthropomorphic model of deity and the unaccountability of free will to God as the supreme good. On the contrary, it assumes that free decision was initially an opportunity for the voluntary consent of man which had an innate aspiration towards God as his supreme good. Nevertheless, due to the creation of man out of nothing, this consent could not be automatic but implied forming a virtuous character, and man's transition from a state in which he was able not to sin, to a state in which he would be not able to sin.

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