A Proposal for a Coherentist-Constitutivist Account of Normativity

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 24-34
Author(s):  
Yixue (Anna) Cheng ◽  

We operate under norms of evaluating actions as good and bad, right and wrong, or reasonable and unreasonable. What justifies the authority of these norms? Christine Korsgaard takes the constitutivist position and argues that self-constitution, as the standard for what constitutes action, is the source of normativity. David Enoch argues that it is impossible for any constitutivist model to justify normative standards, and that realism is the best solution. In this paper, I demonstrate that the best solution to the tensions Enoch raises is not realism, but an original coherentist-constitutivist model of normativity rooted in Korsgaardian constitutivism.

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-35
Author(s):  
Yixue (Anna) Cheng

We operate under norms of evaluating actions as good and bad, right and wrong, or reasonable and unreasonable. What justifies the authority of these norms? Christine Korsgaard takes the constitutivist position and argues that self-constitution, as the standard for what constitutes action, is the source of normativity. David Enoch argues that it is impossible for any constitutivist model to justify normative standards, and that realism is the best solution. In this paper, I demonstrate that the best solution to the tensions Enoch raises is not realism, but an original coherentist-constitutivist model of normativity rooted in Korsgaardian constitutivism.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam J. Roberts

Abstract The pessimistic arguments May challenges depend on an anti-Kantian philosophical assumption. That assumption is that what I call philosophical optimists about moral reason are also committed to empirical optimism, or what May calls “optimistic rationalism.” I place May's book in the literature by explaining how that assumption is resisted by Christine Korsgaard, one of May's examples of a contemporary Kantian.


Author(s):  
J.D. Trout

In early epistemology, philosophers set standards on how to reason and on what counts as knowledge. These normative standards still form a core of work in contemporary epistemology, but much objectively excellent reasoning still doesn’t meet these epistemological standards, and sometimes these standards lead reasoning astray. Improving decisions about health and happiness may require developing even better reasoning strategies than are now available through contemporary epistemology. One naturalistic theory of good reasoning—Strategic Reliabilism—holds that excellent reasoning efficiently allocates cognitive resources to robustly reliable reasoning strategies, all applied to significant problems. This contrasts with the traditional normative theories in epistemology that drew their inspiration from intuitions.


Author(s):  
John Deigh

Bernard Williams’s controversial view about reasons for action is the topic of this essay. The essay explains Williams’s internalist account of reasons for action as an improvement on Donald Davidson’s account. It then corrects Williams’s criticism of externalist accounts of reasons for action by conceding that such accounts are viable as long as they do not imply that the reasons a person has for doing an action can explain his or her doing it. The concession follows from acknowledging the very different program of studying reasons in ethics exemplified in the work of Kurt Baier. Once the correction is made to Williams’s criticism, the essay offers a defense of his view against the criticisms of T. M. Scanlon and Christine Korsgaard.


This volume features ten papers in political philosophy, addressing a range of central topics and represent cutting-edge work in the field. Papers in the first part look at equality and justice: Keith Hyams examines the contribution of ex ante equality to ex post fairness; Elizabeth Anderson looks at equality from a political economy perspective; Serena Olsaretti’s paper studies liberal equality and the moral status of parent–child relationships; and George Sher investigates doing justice to desert. In the second part, papers address questions of state legitimacy: Ralf Bader explores counterfactual justifications of the state; David Enoch examines political philosophy and epistemology; and Seth Lazar and Laura Valentini look at proxy battles in just war theory. The final three papers cover social issues that are not easily understood in terms of personal morality, yet which need not centrally involve the state: the moral neglect of negligence (Seana Valentine Shiffrin), the case for collective pensions (Michael Otsuka); and authority and harm (Jonathan Parry).


Author(s):  
Felice D Gaer

Longstanding proposals to strengthen implementation of the international human rights treaties have often focused on procedural reforms such as harmonizing methods of work or consolidating ten treaty monitoring bodies into one. This article reviews past reform efforts and then considers proposals to create stronger individual petition mechanisms—including a ‘world court’—as a way of strengthening human rights implementation. After discussing these proposals, the author offers additional ways to make the system more effective and efficient. She rejects the oft-suggested proposal to create a ‘world court’ for human rights, noting legal, organizational, logistical, and financial obstacles. Rather than rushing to tear down the current treaty body system, the author offers a proposal for determining how consolidation of petition proceedings might affect normative standards.


Author(s):  
Julian Dodd

This book argues that the so-called ‘authenticity debate’ about the performance of works of Western classical music has tended to focus on a side issue. While much has been written about the desirability (or otherwise) of historical authenticity—roughly, performing works as they would have been performed, under ideal conditions, in the era in which they were composed—the most fundamental norm governing our practice of work performance is, in fact, another kind of kind of authenticity altogether. This is interpretive authenticity: being faithful to the performed work by virtue of evincing a profound, far-reaching, or sophisticated understanding of it. While, in contrast to other performance values, both score compliance authenticity (being true to the work by obeying its score) and interpretive authenticity are valued for their own sake in performance, only the latter is a constitutive norm of the practice in the sense introduced by Christine Korsgaard. This has implications for cases in which the demands of these two kinds of authenticity conflict with each other. In cases of genuine such conflict, performers should sacrifice a little score compliance for the sake of making their performance more interpretively authentic.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-283
Author(s):  
Marta Andruszkiewicz

AbstractThis article analyses the linguistic norms found within legal and legislative language and their implementation. It attempts to answer the following questions: is there a common scope for the use of linguistic norms in general language and legislative language, what can form the basis for resolving issues of correctness in legal and legislative language and is a codification of the linguistic norms for legislative language necessary? The discrepancies observed between normative standards and linguistic practise raise the issue of the need to codify linguistic norms within legal and legislative language. In this article, I hypothesise the need to elaborate a source for codifying the norms of legal and legislative language.


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