Ersatz Rigor

The natural evolution of language that can capture nature’s varied behaviors in effective terms frequently encourages descriptive practices that encode physical data in deviously complex ways. Often this complexity sets in without being overtly noticed by the agents in question. When this happens, “small metaphysics” conundrums frequently arise in the form “what is this bit of language actually telling us about the world beyond?” Historically, many of the familiar systems of grander metaphysics arose from these puzzling seeds, and these same schemes frequently place unacceptable restrictions upon the free development of science. To cast off the oppressive yoke often encouraged by this vein of philosophical musing, Rudolf Carnap and others developed a logicized conception of “theory” that claimed to liberate science (and philosophy) from any concern with “metaphysics” whatsoever. This point of view will be called “theory T thinking” in this book. But Carnap’s proposed remedy represents a diagnostic mistake; the real-life complexities of efficient data registration demand direct examinations of the strategic assumptions that underlie the effective forms of word-to-world alignment. The present book rejects the misleading conceptions of “methodological rigor” that Carnap’s conception of “theory” encourages.

Coincidences and Konstatierungen. Aspects of Methodological Creativity in Schlick's Science-Oriented Philosophizing

Moritz Schlick (1882–1936)—the integrating figure of the Vienna Circle—is an inspiring thinker who philosophizes in the immediate vicinity of contemporary physics in particular and other empirical sciences including psychology as well as ethics. In the context of interpreting Einstein’s (general) theory of relativity he wrote his „Space and time in contemporary physics, an introduction to the theory of relativity and gravitation“ [“Raum und Zeit in der gegenwärtigen Physik: zur Einführung in das Verständnis der Relativitäts- und Gravitations­theorie”]—first published in 1917. Schlick developed his conception of space-time coincidences of events. For the second edition he added the new chapter “X. Relations to Philosophy” using coincidences methodologically to connect terms which belong to different spaces of meaning. Starting in 1934—in the context of the debate on protocol sentences mainly with Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap—he offered his approach of Konstatierungen[1] to answer the question: “What is to be regarded as our fundament of knowledge?” I will shortly discuss Schlick’s term coincidence, move on to Konstatierungen and show some interrelations between them. I will argue for the methodological creativity in Schlick’s science-oriented philosophizing by explicating the inner structure of Konstatierungen within my 2-dimensional language of analysis. Finally, I will compare Schlick’s Konstatierungen with Kant’s synthetic a priori judgments and Frege’s thoughts as interrelated cases of two-dimensionally structured intermediate cases.

C. I. Lewis

Clarence Irving Lewis (b. 1883–d. 1964) is arguably the most important philosopher bridging the pragmatism of the golden age of William James and Charles Sanders Peirce and the analytic quasi-pragmatism of philosophers like W. V. Quine, Nelson Goodman, Wilfrid Sellars, and Hilary Putnam (the first three of whom were taught by him). Lewis’s philosophy as a whole reveals a unified systematic development from his dissertation in 1910, his early work in logic, the development of his epistemology in the 1920s and 1930s, his account of value theory in the 1940s and 1950s, culminating in his work in ethics, which occupied him until his death. Along the way he offered a devastating critique of American absolute idealism and offered a rich epistemology grounded in a Peircean kind of pragmatism. Early in his career Lewis wrote the first the history of logic in English, and, critical of the paradoxes of material implication, he developed an account of strict implication and a set of successively stronger modal logics, the S systems becoming the father of modern modal logic. Lewis was the most influential American philosopher from the mid-1930s until after his retirement in the 1950s. His work helped shape American philosophy as an academic endeavor and contributor to the growing acceptance of rigorous philosophical analysis and European logical empiricism. Lewis spent practically his entire career at Harvard University, bridging the Harvard of James and Royce and the modern department of Quine and Goodman. During his career he wrote six books and a hundred or so papers and reviews. A student of Josiah Royce, William James, and Ralph Barton Perry, a contemporary of Hans Reichenbach, Rudolf Carnap, and the logical empiricists of the 1930s and 1940s, and the teacher of Quine, William Frankena, Goodman, Roderick Chisholm, Roderick Firth, Sellars, and others, he played a pivotal role in shaping the marriage between pragmatism and empiricism that has come to dominate much of current analytic philosophy. Despite his significant contributions, his work soon became neglected and misinterpreted, lost in the influx of interest in Wittgenstein and the philosophy of language. Fortunately, this neglect has begun to wane.

Are Ontological Questions Really Meaningless?

An influential critique of ontology, traditionally linked to Rudolf Carnap, logical empiricism, and verificationism, has it that ontological questions and statements are meaningless. In recent years, Amie Thomasson has revived this Carnapian critique, albeit in a non-verificationist version. This chapter argues that the meaningfulness of ontological statements can be vindicated by appealing to considerations compatible with Thomasson’s Carnapian approach. Two possible avenues are explored. The first is that of specifying the assertibility conditions of ontological statements like ‘There are Fs’, by providing an adequate rule of use. The second is that of spelling out the truth-conditions of the same ontological statements by means of a T-schema where the right-hand side is a sentence formulated in a language specifically introduced for doing ontology—what several authors call ‘Ontologese’. It is proposed that Ontologese be introduced as a bona-fide Carnapian framework, and this option is defended against a number of objections.

O que é ‘Metametafisica’? Uma Análise das Metodologias de Meinong, Carnap e Quine

A Metametafísica é o estudo sobre os fundamentos e a metodologia da Metafísica. Analisaremos neste artigo três metodologias que marcaram as origens da Metametafísica na Tradição Analítica: a de Alexius Meinong, Rudolf Carnap e Willard van Orman Quine. De acordo com Meinong, há uma distinção entre ‘existir’ e ‘haver’ e, para preservar a intuição de que todo ato intencional é direcionado a um objeto, há coisas que não existem. Segundo Carnap, as perguntas em Metafísica podem ser facilmente respondidas por meios empíricos ou inferenciais, desde que adotemos um sistema de referência linguístico (framework) e respondamos às questões internamente a esse framework. Já Quine argumentou que tomar uma entidade com sendo existente é tomá-la como o valor de uma variável ligada. A Metametafísica é relevante porque desambigua o nosso vocabulário e evita que os filósofos e filósofas se envolvam em meras disputas verbais. O nosso objetivo neste artigo não foi explicitar a nossa predileção por alguma dessas metodologias, mas fornecer um ponto de partida para os que não estão familiarizados com essas discussões — de modo que outros pesquisadores e pesquisadoras se engajem com as questões pertencentes à Metametafísica.

Construction, Cognition, and the Role of the Surface

What do Babbitt’s theoretical commitments tell us about how to listen to his music? This chapter excavates Babbitt’s reading in analytical philosophy (particularly of Rudolf Carnap) and cognitive psychology (particularly of George A. Miller) in an attempt to answer that question. Babbitt’s compositional techniques are reviewed in this light: array construction, interdimensional parallelism (e.g., the use of the time-point system to complement the twelve-tone system), and cross-references are shown to be motivated by a desire to write music amenable to rational reconstruction (in Carnap’s term) and sensitive to theories of memory and information processing. Babbitt’s views on Schenker are revisited: he found Schenkerian analysis to represent a model for musical memory. His understanding of language, too, is conditioned by his reading of philosophy and cognitive science. The chapter ends with a discussion of the limitations of Babbitt’s psychology as a guide to the analysis of his music.

Rudolf Carnap und Kurt Gödel: Die beiderseitige Bezugnahme in ihren philosophischen Selbstzeugnissen

ZusammenfassungGegenstandes des Aufsatzes ist die gegenseitige Beeinflussung und Bezugnahme von Rudolf Carnap und Kurt Gödel in ihren jeweiligen Selbstzeugnissen während der 20er- bis 40er-Jahre des 20. Jahrhunderts. Der Vergleicht bestätigt die bisherige Forschung, der zufolge Carnap auf Gödels Arbeiten der Jahre 1930 und 1931 einigen Einfluss hatte. Er zeigt darüber hinaus, dass die beiden sich größtenteils als mathematische Logiker wahrgenommen und rezipiert haben. Nach allem, was wir bisher wissen, bleibt das so hinsichtlich Carnaps Wertschätzung für Gödels Denken. Gödel wendet sich hingegen Carnap ab 1934 auch als einem philosophischen Denker zu, dessen Philosophie eine gewisse Nähe zu der von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz aufweist, aber anders als letztere, von Gödel kritisch gesehen wird.

Rudolf Carnap: Philosoph der Neuen Sachlichkeit

ZusammenfassungRudolf Carnap hat nur im Vorwort zum „Logischen Aufbau der Welt“ Bemerkungen zum Verhältnis seiner wissenschaftlichen Arbeit zur Kunst und Architektur seiner Zeit veröffentlicht. Aber sein emphatisches Bekenntnis zur Moderne der 20er-Jahre hat bisher nur selten Aufmerksamkeit in der philosophiegeschichtlichen Sekundärliteratur gefunden. In meinem Beitrag versuche ich in den ersten beiden Abschnitten, seinen kulturellen Hintergrund seit seiner Schul- und Studentenzeit zu skizzieren und dann seine persönlichen Kontakte und Austauschbeziehungen mit Vorkämpfern der Moderne wie Franz Roh und Siegfried Giedion zu beschreiben. Nach diesen Vorbereitungen wird die Frage gestellt, ob und in wieweit Carnaps Philosophie selbst als ein Teil der Bewegung der Neuen Sachlichkeit verstanden werden kann oder sogar muss. Zur Beantwortung werden eine Reihe von Charakteristika dieses Zeitgeist-Phänomens aus den – gleichzeitig mit Carnaps „Aufbau“ erschienenen Werken der Genannten – herauspräpariert und dann untersucht, ob diese Kriterien sich auch im Werk Carnaps finden. Das Ergebnis ist, dass man ihn mit Fug und Recht als „Philosoph der Neuen Sachlichkeit“ bezeichnen kann.