Filosofia da ciência e epistemologias feministas: entrevista com Helen Longino

Filosofia da ciência e epistemologias feministas: entrevista com Helen Longino

Ciência e Valores: uma leitura epistemologicamente guiada de fontes primárias

Introduzo a temática da relação entre ciência e valores, um problema lógico que tem origem no problema da indução e na crítica ao positivismo lógico, com o escrutínio do conceito de subdeterminação. O objetivo geral é apresentar duas teses filosóficas com capacidade heurística bastante interessante para o Ensino de Física e de Ciências, em geral, sobretudo àqueles que, trabalhando com história da ciência no ensino, gostariam de poder examinar os potenciais filosóficos de algumas fontes primárias. O modelo triádico de justificação, desenvolvido por Larry Laudan, é um construto simultaneamente crítico ao positivismo e ao pós-positivismo. Por ser focado precisamente na justificação, tem o poder de permitir as análises de documentos como as Conferências Nobel, por exemplo. Reconhecendo a relação reticulada entre métodos, teorias e objetivos que faz um cientista ou uma comunidade, é possível olhar esses documentos e compreender o processo de racionalização ao qual eles aludem. Analiso a Conferência Nobel de Marie Curie, de modo a mostrar as inter-relações e ajustes entre métodos, teorias e objetivos anunciados pela física, em 1911, que culminaram em uma reestruturação da própria Química. Prosseguindo em relação às teses filosóficas, a ciência como conhecimento social, defendida por Helen Longino, é apresentada e, especificamente a importância dos tipos de crítica intersubjetiva, evidenciais e conceituais, elencados pela filósofa. Tais críticas servem de instrumento heurístico para a análise do trabalho “Sobre o elemento 93” de Ida Noddack, revelando como a subdeterminação de certas evidências pode gerar novas hipóteses, como neste caso, a da fissão nuclear.

Longino's Concept of Values in Science

While classical neo-positivists reject any role for traditionally understood values in science, Kuhn identifies five specific values as criteria for assessing a scientific theory; this approach has been further developed by several other authors. This paper focuses on Helen Longino, who presents a significant contemporary critique of Kuhn’s concept. The most controversial aspect of Longino’s position is arguably her claim that the criterion of empirical adequacy is the least defensible basis for assessing theories. The de-emphasizing of the importance of external consistency as a value and the introduction of socio-political considerations into the processes of an assessment of scientific theories are also considered problematic issues. I provide arguments against Longino’s conception, identify some of its problems, and argue for refusal of her approach.

Bias

This chapter offers an account of central issues and themes in feminist philosophical reflections on bias and objectivity. Some feminists have argued that objectivity is an unachievable and thus inappropriate epistemic norm for human beings. But at the same time, these feminists have criticized philosophy for displaying masculinist bias. This complex critique faces a problem I’ve called the “Bias Paradox” and that Helen Longino calls an “Essential Tension:” how we can criticize partiality at the same time we acknowledge its ubiquity. I explain Longino’s proposed “social empiricist” solution, and contrast it with my own. I argue for a re-conception of “bias” as a normatively neutral epistemic inclination. Biases, in this sense, play a crucial constructive role in the development of human knowledge by solving the problem of underdetermination of theory by evidence. The biases we (correctly) regard as morally bad, such as social prejudice, involve the operation of neutral biases in unpropitious natural or social environments.

Knowledge, behaviour, and policy: questioning the epistemic presuppositions of applying behavioural science in public policymaking

The aim of this article is to question the epistemic presuppositions of applying behavioural science in public policymaking. Philosophers of science who have examined the recent applications of the behavioural sciences to policy have contributed to discussions on causation, evidence, and randomised controlled trials. These have focused on epistemological and methodological questions about the reliability of scientific evidence and the conditions under which we can predict that a policy informed by behavioural research will achieve the policymakers’ goals. This paper argues that the philosophical work of Helen Longino can also help us to have a better and fuller understanding of the knowledge which the behavioural sciences provide. The paper advances an analysis of the knowledge claims that are made in the context of policy applications of behavioural science and compares them with the behavioural research on which they are based. This allows us to show that behavioural policy and the debates accompanying it are based on an oversimplified understanding of what knowledge behavioural science actually provides. Recognising this problem is important as arguments that justify reliance on the behavioural sciences in policy typically presume this simplification.

Science

Anna Morandi was the foremost anatomist in eighteenth-century Bologna. Although her work was widely recognized as exceptional by the scientists of her day, she was not granted the standing of a scientist. In this chapter, the author uses Morandi as a case study to illuminate aspects of the philosophy of science. In particular, the chapter addresses conceptions of scientific objectivity and the role of social values in science, drawing on the work of Helen Longino. In addition to the phenomena described by Longino, the author argues that social values enter into science and impact scientific research by determining how individuals are positioned in scientific communities, or excluded from them.

Helen Longino. Una epistemología contextual, empirista y pluralista=Helen Longino. A contextual, empiricist and pluralist epistemology

<p align="left"><strong>Resumen</strong></p><p>Este artículo presenta a una de las epistemólogas feministas más relevantes: Helen Longino. Se muestra una aproximación a su posicionamiento, en el ámbito de la ciencia y el género. El propósito es mostrar sus líneas principales respecto a cómo se entiende la ciencia y su producción, en un momento en el que parece evidente que es necesario ampliar los sujetos que intervienen en la producción de conocimientos, así como en la importancia de la crítica como herramienta para la mejora del progreso científico. Para ello, la perspectiva de género y las voces que tradicionalmente no han formado parte de esta esfera de la ciencia, se hacen fundamentales para mostrar los sesgos de género en la ciencia.</p><p align="left"><strong>Abstract</strong></p><p>This article introduces one of the most relevant feminist epistemologists: Helen Longino. An approximation to her position in the field of science and gender is shown. The purpose is to show its main lines regarding how science and its production are understood, at a time when it seems clear that it is necessary to expand the subjects involved in the production of knowledge, as well as the importance of criticism as a tool for the improvement of scientific progress. For this purpose, the gender perspective and the voices that traditionally have not been part of this sphere of science, become essential to show gender biases in science.</p>

Hacia una ciencia redefinida. La propuesta de Helen Longino

This paper presents the epistemological proposal of Helen Longino, a philosopher of science who understands scientific knowledge as an unfinished result and who takes into account the context for its realization, the subjects who do science, the importance of criticism as a tool for the improvement of knowledge and science. The normative values that this author postulates are presented, and they are compared with the proposal of Thomas Kuhn, in order to make explicit a novel and alternative proposal to traditional science, which takes into account other perspectives to improve the conduct of scientific activity (which is social), and the democratization of it.

Situating Longino in the debate on the values in science

Esta nota procura relacionar as ideias de Helen Longino – tal como apresentadas em seu artigo “Valores, heurística e política do conhecimento” – com as de outros fi lósofos, especialmente na questão dos valores na ciência. Após uma introdução sobre o papel dos valores na ciência a partir de Thomas Kuhn, apresento algumas ideias de Longino. Em seguida, procuro relacionar essas ideias com aquelas de outros filósofos da ciência, tanto aqueles que não aceitam a presença de valores na ciência, como Susan Haack, quanto outros que os aceitam, ainda que de modo mais ou menos diverso do empregado por Longino, como Elizabeth Anderson e Hugh Lacey