Rethinking the Synthetic a priori de re

1998 ◽  
pp. 15-22
Author(s):  
Paul Burger
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Commitment ◽  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
A Priori ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Radical Empiricism ◽  
De Re ◽  
Direct Awareness ◽  
Synthetic A Priori ◽  
Ontological Turn

Hume and Kant destroyed the belief in the apriori de re, i.e. the rationalist’s doctrine of direct awareness of necessary facts about the nature of being. Later on, analytical philosophy told us that there are only two general classes of statements, synthetics a posteriori and analytics a priori. Quine eventually rejected the a priori in general and advanced a radical empiricism. However, both moderate and radical empiricism has recently been challenged by realistic minded philosophers. They have argued that ontological topics such as the nature of properties, laws or causation remain strongly undetermined by semantic ascent and Quinean ontological commitment, and announced an ontological turn. Are not ontological or metaphysical explanations a priori explanations? Despite his preferred talk in terms of a posteriori realism and inference of the best explanation, Armstrong’s defence of universals looks very much like an apriori one. Others, such as Barry Smith, explicitly defend that there are synthetic propositions a priori de re. I believe in both: Kant was right in claiming that an understanding of what metaphysics can teach us is dependent upon a clear concept of the synthetic a priori, but—against Kant— synthetics a priori de re are legitimate. In this paper I will defend synthetics a priori de re. However, I will reject the rationalist’s appeal to direct awareness of necessary facts as well as undeniableness or infallibility as necessary conditions for a prioris. Instead I will claim that all synthetics a priori express hypothetical truths.

Metaphysics

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin McGinn
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
A Priori ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
De Re ◽  
Necessary Truth ◽  
Possible Worlds Theory ◽  
De Dicto

This chapter explores philosophical issues in metaphysics. It begins by distinguishing between de re and de dicto necessity. All necessity is uniformly de re; there is simply no such thing as de dicto necessity. Indeed, in the glory days of positivism, all necessity was understood as uniformly the same: a necessary truth was always an a priori truth, while contingent truths were always a posteriori. The chapter then assesses the concept of antirealism. Antirealism is always an error theory: there is some sort of mistake or distortion or sloppiness embedded in the usual discourse. The chapter also considers paradoxes, causation, conceptual analysis, scientific mysteries, the possible worlds theory of modality, the concept of a person, the nature of existence, and logic and propositions.

scholarly journals LA TEORÍA DE LOS NOMBRES Y EL REALISMO METAFÍSICO

2013 ◽  
pp. 75-95
Author(s):  
Juan José Colomina Almiñana ◽  
Vicente Raga Rosaleny
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
De Re ◽  
De Dicto ◽  
Naming And Necessity

En el presente escrito, los autores pretenden una nueva interpretación de las principales tesis de la más conocida obra de Kripke, Naming and Necessity. Se atiende a las nociones de a priori (y de necesidad) y a posteriori (y contingencia), la noción de designador rígido (con su explícita crítica a la teoría descriptivista fregeana de los nombres) y su revisión de los conceptos metafísicos de modalidad de dicto y modalidad de re. Más tarde, se definirá mínimamente la noción de realismo y se intentará situar a Kripke en el tipo que más cómodamente se adapte a sus presupuestos teóricos de carácter ordinario. Todo ello permitirá situar la teoría kripkeana de los nombres dentro de un marco realista que posibilitará, en otro momento ulterior, formular ciertas críticas a esta Teoría Causal de la Referencia y al realismo metafísico a ella asociada.

Gründe für Gott: Ein Indizienbeweis

2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-92
Author(s):  
Harald Seubert
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Logic ◽  
Philosophy Of Religion ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Circumstantial Evidence ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Analytical Philosophy

SUMMARYErnst Welti’s ‘Evidence of Circumstantial Evidence’ confidently combines the aprioric, apostioric and pragmatic lines of reasoning of the newer analytical philosophy. The author’s competence in analytical philosophy of religion and in mathematical logic (Goedel’s proof) makes his book a crystalline overall view of the standardised form of the argument for the plausibility of a form of monotheism, which has good reasons to accept faith in the Christian God.RÉSUMÉDans cet ouvrage, Ernst Welti mêle des lignes d’argumentation a priori et a posteriori, ainsi que des manières de raisonnement pragmatiques empruntées à la nouvelle philosophie analytique. Sa compétence en matière de philosophie analytique de la religion et de logique mathématique (la preuve de Goedel) lui permet de produire une vue générale claire de la forme standard de l’argument en faveur de la plausibilité d’une forme de monothéisme, qui fournit de bonnes raisons d’accepter la foi au Dieu du christianisme.ZUSAMMENFASSUNGErnst Weltis ,,Indizienbeweis“ fügt in souveräner Weise apriorische, aposteriorische und pragmatische Argumentationslinien der neueren analytischen Philosophie zusammen. Die Kompetenz des Verfassers in analytischer Religionsphilosophie und in mathematischer Logik (Goedelscher Beweis) macht sein Buch zu einer kristallinen Gesamtschau auf die standardisierte Form des Argumentes für die Plausibilität eines Monotheismus, der mit guten Gründen auch den Glauben an den christlichen Gott nahelegen kann.

Twelve Basic Philosophical Concepts in Kant and the Compound Yijing

2015 ◽  
Vol 42 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 143-162
Author(s):  
Stephen R. Palmquist
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
The Third ◽  
Synthetic A Priori ◽  
Four Levels ◽  
The University ◽  
Priori Knowledge

This is the third in a series of articles that correlates Kant’s architectonic with the Yijing’s sixty-four hexagrams (gua 卦). Previous articles explained “architectonic” reasoning, introduced four levels of the “Compound Yijing,” consisting of 0+4+12+(4 × 12=48) gua, and suggested correlating the fourth level’s four sets of twelve to the four “faculties” in Kant’s model of the university. This third paper examines the philosophy faculty, assessing whether the twelve proposed gua meaningfully correlate with twelve basic philosophical concepts that Kant introduces in his three Critiques. A key difference emerges: Kant’s architectonic method aims to produce synthetic a priori knowledge, while the Yijing’s architectonic method aims to produce analytic a posteriori belief.

On the Idea of and Necessity for a Metaphysics of Morals

2021 ◽  
pp. 21-37
Author(s):  
Mark Timmons
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
General Introduction ◽  
Synthetic A Priori ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals

This chapter focuses on Section I of the general introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals in which Kant explains what a metaphysics of morals is, and why there must be one. To properly understand Kant’s views on these matters requires explaining Kant’s conception of philosophy and the place of metaphysics as a branch of philosophy. In spelling this out, the chapter discusses key distinctions between theoretical and practical cognition, empirical (a posteriori) versus rational (a priori) sources of cognition, and the analytic/synthetic distinction as Kant understood it. For Kant, a metaphysics of morals is that branch of philosophy concerned with those synthetic a priori propositions and principles fundamental to morality. The chapter also explains the role of anthropology in a metaphysics of morals.

Positive Economics From the Perspective of Kant's Thought

2020 ◽  
pp. 145-159
Author(s):  
Ertuğrul İbrahim Kızılkaya
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Positive Science ◽  
Positive Economics ◽  
Economic Reality ◽  
Synthetic A Priori ◽  
In The Beginning

Departing from Kant's thought, we could argue that the portrait of homo economicus drawn by positive economics corresponds to a homo phainomenon as a heteronomous person of concrete economic reality. In addition, we could try to show that economics could not get rid of naturalism, materialism, and fatalism, justifying Kant's concerns. We could also emphasize that, while in the beginning the aim of being a positive science to be able to produce synthetic a posteriori propositions, positive economics tried to continue its way by the method of synthetic a priori. Finally, we must also point out the possibility for an autonomous or free homo noumenon to establish an original ethos by setting goals for itself.

scholarly journals Numbers, Empiricism and the A Priori

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-177
Author(s):  
Olga Ramírez Calle ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Systematic Study ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Logical Thinking ◽  
Ontological Status ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Alternative Path ◽  
Synthetic A Priori ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Inferential Thinking ◽  
Logical Rules

The present paper deals with the ontological status of numbers and considers Frege´s proposal in Grundlagen upon the background of the Post-Kantian semantic turn in analytical philosophy. Through a more systematic study of his philosophical premises, it comes to unearth a first level paradox that would unset earlier still than it was exposed by Russell. It then studies an alternative path that, departing from Frege’s initial premises, drives to a conception of numbers as synthetic a priori in a more Kantian sense. On this basis, it tentatively explores a possible derivation of basic logical rules on their behalf, suggesting a more rudimentary basis to inferential thinking, which supports reconsidering the difference between logical thinking and AI. Finally, it reflects upon the contributions of this approach to the problem of the a priori.

Denial of the Synthetic A Priori

Philosophy ◽  
1960 ◽  
Vol 35 (134) ◽  
pp. 255-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver A. Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Logical Empiricism ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Logical Empiricist ◽  
Traditional Philosophy ◽  
Synthetic A Priori ◽  
Logical Impossibility

In his essay “Logical Empiricism”, in the anthology Twentieth Century Philosophy, Professor Feigl writes: “All forms of empiricism agree in repudiating the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge.” 2 Schlick makes the same point even more forcibly: “The empiricism which I represent believes itself to be clear on the point that, as a matter of principle, all propositions are either synthetic a posteriori or tautologous; synthetic a priori propositions seem to it to be a logical impossibility.”3 The denial of synthetic a prioris is a major thesis of the logical empiricist position, being found in the writings of most of the leaders of the movement.4 The reason for its importance is fairly clear. It provides a formula on which the empiricists can base their critique of traditional philosophy. To use Ayer's phrase, denial of the synthetic a priori results in “the elimination of metaphysics”. The philosophical tradition to which the empiricists are opposed and whose “metaphysics” they wish to eliminate can be called, somewhat loosely, rationalism.

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